Meyer, T. v. Chisom, A. v. Rising Tide Partners

2025 Pa. Super. 228

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: 1311 WDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A19032-25

2025 PA Super 228

TODD MEYER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : AUDRA CHISOM : : : No. 1311 WDA 2024 v. : : : RISING TIDE PARTNERS : : Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered September 24, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): No. CS-24-000029

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: October 6, 2025

Rising Tide Partners (“Rising Tide”) appeals from the order that, among

other things, appointed Todd Meyer as conservator of the property located at

1511 Boyle Street in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“the property”) pursuant to the

Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act. We vacate in part and

remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

Meyer, who owns a building situated immediately adjacent to the

property, filed a petition seeking his appointment as conservator on May 7,

2024. The trial court scheduled an initial hearing on the petition for July 3.

On that date, Rising Tide, a nonprofit entity in the business of remodeling

distressed properties, appeared with counsel and presented a petition to J-A19032-25

intervene for the purpose of convincing the court that it should be appointed

as a conservator instead of Meyer. That proceeding was not transcribed;

however, on July 5, the court entered an order stating as follows:

An evidentiary hearing on the petition to intervene pursuant to 68 Pa.C.S. § 1105(b) filed on behalf of Rising Tide . . ., a putative intervenor, shall occur before the undersigned on September 9, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 706 of the City-County Building, 410 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219.

In the event th[e c]ourt denies the petition to intervene, then this court will proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition for appointment of conservator filed by petitioner [Meyer].

Order of Court, 7/5/24 (cleaned up).

Meyer and Rising Tide appeared for the September 9 hearing, both

represented by counsel. The trial court noted on the record that Rising Tide’s

petition to intervene had not been filed, though it was previously presented.

Rising Tide responded that it could not so file because the court had not yet

determined whether the non-profit was a party in interest in the matter.

Meyer nonetheless conceded that the petition was properly before the court

that day. See N.T. Hearing, 9/9/24, at 12. The court indicated that it would

take the intervention petition under advisement and desired to hear evidence

concerning Meyer’s underlying petition for conservatorship. Id. at 13. Rising

Tide did not lodge an objection to this procedure.

Meyer then testified, highlighting that he had purchased numerous

buildings within the Northside area of Pittsburgh where the property is located,

primarily with the purpose of repairing them and leasing them for rent. He

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described that he used readily-available funds within his portfolio to finance

projects, and that repairing homes in that area of the city was a passion

project for him. Rising Tide was permitted to cross-examine him and in fact

did so, despite no determination from the court that it was a party in interest.

Rising Tide was also permitted to present a single witness, Taylor

Williams, who is an Acquisition and Conservatorship Manager for the company.

She attested as to Rising Tide’s non-profit status and the number of properties

over which it had been appointed as conservator in the Pittsburgh area.

Notably, upon questioning from Meyer’s attorney, Ms. Williams stated that she

did not have documentation with her supporting her testimony because she

“was under the impression this was for the hearing to intervene to be made a

party of the case.” Id. at 36. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

took the petition for conservatorship under advisement as well.

Fifteen days later, the court issued the order in question, which granted

Rising Tide’s petition to intervene. Within the same order, it also found that

the property met the condition of being abandoned and blighted, and

appointed Meyer as the conservator based on the evidence presented at the

September hearing. Meyer subsequently submitted a final plan of abatement

and moved to schedule a hearing, which was set for December. Rising Tide

did not submit any post-disposition motion. Instead, it filed the instant timely

appeal along with a request for preparation of transcripts.

The record does not indicate that the trial court ordered Rising Tide to

submit a statement of errors complained of on appeal, and it appears none

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was filed. The trial court authored a brief opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) explaining its rationale for appointing Meyer as conservator.

Rising Tide raises three issues for our review:

[I.] Whether the trial court violated [Rising Tide]’s right to due process by failing to hold a hearing on the petition to intervene in order to make specific findings and take sufficient evidence to grant the intervenor standing[.]

[II.] Whether [the] trial court’s failure to follow its own order prejudiced [Rising Tide] by impeding its ability to have time to prepare for the conservatorship hearing.

[III.] Whether [the] trial court erred by using the disparity in testimony and preparation for the conservatorship hearing as the basis for appointing [Meyer] as the conservator.

Rising Tide’s brief at 9 (cleaned up).

Before turning to these issues, we must first consider whether Rising

Tide has waived all claims in light of appealing without first having filed a post-

trial motion. On December 12, 2024, this Court issued a rule for Rising Tide

to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failing to preserve

issues, citing G & G Invs., LLC v. Phillips Simmons Real Est. Holdings,

LLC, 183 A.3d 472, 477 (Pa.Super. 2018) (holding that post-trial motions are

required following a proceeding where the court heard and relied upon new

testimony and evidence to issue a decision on a petition for conservatorship

in a blighted property action). Rising Tide responded in writing, and we

discharged the rule for it to be addressed by this panel.

With respect to post-trial motions, Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

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(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after

(1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to agree, or nonsuit in the case of a jury trial; or

(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case of a trial without jury.

If a party has filed a timely post-trial motion, any other party may file a post-trial motion within ten days after the filing of the first post-trial motion.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c).

As discussed, this Court has previously held that post-trial motions must

be filed if there is a hearing wherein the court took testimony and heard

evidence to issue a decision on a petition for conservatorship. See G & G,

183 A.3d at 477. We have likewise determined that an appeal of an order

appointing a conservator over real property is properly taken from the order

denying post-trial motions. See Oceanview Prop. Mgmt. & Recovery

Servs., LLC v. Baker, 319 A.3d 508, 511 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2024) (explaining

that such an appeal is from the order denying post-trial motions because it

effectively affirms the trial court’s previous order affecting the possession or

control of property). The rationale underlying these decisions was that “the

hearing on [the conservatorship] petition constituted a trial for purposes of

Rule 227.1.” G & G, 183 A.3d at 477.

Despite these decisions, we recently reexamined this reasoning in

Northside LLC v. O’Neill Maintenance, 316 A.3d 1046 (Pa.Super. 2024).

In that case, this Court held that when the order issued in a conservatorship

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action does not dispose of all claims, post-trial motions are not required to

preserve issues for appeal. Id. at 1051. We noted that since the time G & G

was decided in 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued Wolk v. School

District of Lower Merion, 197 A.3d 730 (Pa. 2018), which offered new

guidance for determining whether a hearing constitutes a “trial” for purposes

of Rule 227.1. The Wolk Court found that where a trial court’s order “[did

not dispose of all claims for relief . . . , ‘the decision’ of the case was not

rendered for purposes of Rule 227.1, and no post-trial motions were

implicated under that rule.” Id. at 741. Applying that standard, we found in

Northside that the appellant did not waive its issues because, despite there

being an order appointing a conservator, a petition to disqualify counsel

remained outstanding and the trial court had yet to determine the distribution

of escrow funds, and thus there was no disposition of all claims or “trial” at

the time the appeal was filed. See Northside, 316 A.3d at 1050-51.

In response to the rule to show cause, Rising Tide argues that here, like

in Northside, the court’s order did not resolve all claims below. The non-

profit highlights the failure of the trial court to certify the schedule of

encumbrances, approve of certain aspects of the final plan of abatement, and

rule on title to the property. As such, it contends that it was not required to

file post-trial motions to preserve its claims.

We agree. The record plainly shows that there were still unresolved

matters before the trial court in this conservatorship action, most notably the

pending final plan for abatement filed by Meyer. Accordingly, based upon

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Northside, post-trial motions were not required to preserve issues for this

appeal. To the extent that G & G contradicts that position by applying a

different test for determining whether a trial had occurred for purposes of Rule

227.1, we discern that the High Court’s decision in Wolk casts doubt on

whether G & G remains pertinent authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 700 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“It is beyond the power of

a Superior Court panel to overrule a prior decision of the Superior Court,

except in circumstances where intervening authority by our Supreme

Court calls into question a previous decision of this Court.” (emphasis

added)). In a similar vein, we find Oceanview inapposite, as it relied upon

G & G without discussing the changes in the law following Wolk. In sum, we

conclude that Rising Tide has not waived its claims.1

Turning to the merits, we address Rising Tide’s first two issues together,

as they are related and we find them dispositive. Therein, it asserts that the

trial court violated its due process rights and neglected to act in conformance

with its own order by granting Rising Tide’s petition to intervene after holding

a hearing on Meyer’s petition for appointment of conservatorship. See Rising

Tide’s brief at 14-23.

____________________________________________

1 Although the appealed-from order did not dispose of all conservatorship issues, this matter is nonetheless properly before us pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(2), which states that an appeal may be taken as of right from “[a]n order confirming, modifying, dissolving, or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship, receivership, or similar matter affecting the possession or control of property[.]”

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We have held that “[a] question regarding whether a due process

violation occurred is a question of law for which our standard of review is de

novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Reitz v. Flower, 245 A.3d 723,

727 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]t is well settled

that procedural due process requires, at its core, adequate notice, opportunity

to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial

tribunal having jurisdiction over the case. Due process is flexible and calls for

such procedural protections as the situation demands.” S.T. v. R.W., 192

A.3d 1155, 1161 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).

Rising Tide begins its argument by asserting that, based on the language

of the court’s order, a hearing on the conservatorship would only proceed on

September 9, 2024, in the event the court denied the petition to intervene,

which did not occur. Id. at 16-17. Rising Tide contends that “[t]he court’s

decision to move directly to the petition for the appointment of a conservator

denied [Rising Tide] the ability to adequately prepare evidence and testimony

that was vital to showing the [company]’s capacity and capability to serve as

a conservator on the property.” Id. at 21 (some capitalization altered). It

maintains that Rising Tide “was not prepared for a hearing on the merits,”

which in effect deprived it of the ability to meaningfully participate and

constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 22-23.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court pointed to its belief that it

“scheduled an evidentiary hearing for September 9, 2024[,] to determine if

the subject property met the conditions for conservatorship, and, if so, to

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appoint a conservator.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/25, at 1 (some capitalization

altered). It noted that it allowed Rising Tide to participate in the hearing and

later granted the petition to intervene. Id. It concluded moreover:

At no point did Rising Tide . . . offer any objections to any substantive points nor did Rising Tide . . . object to [the court’s] consideration of the merits of the petition of Meyer. To the contrary, counsel for Rising Tide . . . cross-examined Meyer. Rising Tide . . . also had the opportunity to offer substantive testimony and evidence of its own. Rising Tide . . . did not seek to continue the hearing, voice an objection, present additional evidence, or to provide th[e] court with any opportunity to cure any prejudice to Rising Tide . . . if it believed that th[e] court did not intend to make a ruling on the appointment at the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, Rising Tide . . . did not file any post-trial motions.

Id. at 3 (some capitalization altered).

For his part, Meyer argues that Rising Tide’s due process claim fails

because it is not an aggrieved party, as the petition to intervene was

ultimately granted. See Meyer’s brief at 10. He asserts that Rising Tide

neglected to cite any particular rule that was violated by how the trial court

conducted itself in the manner it did. Id. at 11. Meyer suggests that Rising

Tide’s appellate argument is so undeveloped that we should disregard it. Id.

He further argues that the trial court complied with 68 P.S. § 1105, which

permits a “party in interest” to participate in a hearing, including by presenting

evidence. Id. at 12. Like the trial court, Meyer highlights that Rising Tide did

not object to the court holding a hearing on the conservatorship on September

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9, which results in waiver as issues cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal. Id. at 12, 14.2

Upon review, we determine that the court erred by conducting a hearing

on Meyer’s petition for conservatorship before rendering a decision as to Rising

Tide’s intervention petition and by deciding to appoint Meyer without giving

Rising Tide a post-intervention opportunity to make its case. This is true

notwithstanding the fact that Rising Tide was permitted to question Meyer as

to the merits of his action. Despite the court’s intention, it did not

unconditionally schedule a hearing on the merits of the conservatorship via its

July 5, 2024, order. Rather, the order stated that a hearing solely as to

Meyer’s conservatorship petition would occur “[i]n the event th[e c]ourt

denies the petition to intervene.” Order of Court, 7/5/24. This implied that if

the court decided to grant intervention then the opposite was true, namely

that the hearing would not occur on that date, but at a later time. To add to

the confusion, the trial court neither granted nor denied the intervention

petition at the scheduled proceeding, instead issuing an order addressing

multiple different matters fifteen days later. It was apparent from the

testimony that Rising Tide was not adequately prepared to present evidence

concerning the merits of the conservatorship, which was understandable due

to the language utilized in the trial court’s order. ____________________________________________

2 Meyer similarly notes without significant discussion that Rising Tide “did not

file post-trial motions.” See Meyer’s brief at 14. However, for the reasons already discussed in this writing, we conclude that the failure to file such in this case does not deprive Rising Tide of the opportunity for appellate review.

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Furthermore, we are not convinced that Rising Tide waived its claims by

failing to object to the court’s procedure, at least under the facts of this case.

While Rising Tide was arguably permitted to “participate” in the hearing

concerning Meyer’s conservatorship petition by subjecting him to cross-

examination, it is nonetheless undisputed that the court had not declared

Rising Tide a party in interest in the action at that point in time. Thus, it is

not at all clear that Rising Tide had standing to lodge procedural objections as

to the conservatorship. See, e.g., Society Hill Civic Ass’n v. Pennsylvania

Gaming Control Bd., 928 A.2d 175, 183 (Pa. 2007) (noting that participation

in a hearing does not necessarily afford standing as a party).

Moreover, although not wholly determinative, the court’s decision to

delay ruling on the intervention petition deprived Rising Tide of the

opportunity to file a responsive document to Meyer’s petition, which is

permissible with the court’s discretion. See Allegheny County Local Rule

706(3) (“The Court has discretion to permit a party in interest who has not

filed an answer or other responsive pleading, including a petition to intervene,

to do so or to postpone the hearing or permit said party in interest to

participate in the hearing.”).

Therefore, under these specific circumstances, we deem it appropriate

to vacate the order to the extent that it went beyond granting Rising Tide’s

petition to intervene. The court shall conduct a hearing as to Meyer’s petition

for conservatorship and permit Rising Tide to fully participate as a party in

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interest. In the court’s discretion, it may allow Rising Tide to file an

appropriate responsive pleading consistent with local rule.3

Order vacated in part. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

3 Although it does not bear on the merits of the claims at stake, we understand

from Rising Tide’s argument that in Allegheny County, parties seeking to intervene in conservatorship matters often have difficulty electronically filing the intervention petition, namely because the prospective intervenor is not identified as a party within the online system. Instead, these potential parties in interest must take additional steps as a work around, such as filing in person or submitting personalized requests for assistance with personnel that control electronic filing. This is so despite local and statewide procedural rules contemplating the filing of intervention petitions prior to a court proceeding. See, e.g., Allegheny County Local Rule 704(2) (permitting a party in interest to file a petition to intervene prior to a hearing); see also Pa.R.P.C. 2329 (giving a court authority to enter an order allowing intervention “[u]pon the filing of the petition and after hearing[.]”).

We highlight this apparent aberration in the hopes that the appropriate authorities will review the matter and take steps toward resolution. A party should be able to seamlessly file petitions to intervene electronically in accordance with the procedural rules promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which includes such filing in counties that have implemented an electronic filing system. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 205.4(e)(2) (“No pleading or other legal paper that complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be refused for filing by the prothonotary or the electronic filing system based upon a requirement of a local rule or local administrative procedure or practice pertaining to the electronic filing of legal papers.”).

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DATE: 10/6/2025

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