STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CW 06-1542
MEYER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
VERSUS
COUSHATTA TRIBE OF LOUISIANA
************
ON SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2006-2683, HONORABLE R. RICHARD BRYANT, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE
MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN JUDGE
Court composed of Michael G. Sullivan, Glenn B. Gremillion, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
WRIT GRANTED.
Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr. Faircloth, Vilar & Elliott, LLC Post Office Box 12730 Alexandria, Louisiana 71315-2730 (318) 442-9533 Counsel for Defendant/Applicant: Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana
Richard P. Ieyoub James E. Moore, Jr. Couhig Partners, LLP One American Place, Suite 900 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825 (225) 282-0600 Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent: Meyer & Associates, Inc. Lynn H. Slade Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, PA Bank of America Centre 500 Fourth Street N.W., Suite 1000 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 (505) 848-1800 Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent: Meyer & Associates, Inc. SULLIVAN, Judge.
In this writ application, the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana (Coushatta) urges that
the trial court erred in determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction in this matter
and that its Tribal Court, not the trial court, should determine whether the Tribal
Council’s Chairman and/or his designee had authority to waive Coushatta’s sovereign
immunity in a series of contractual agreements. For the following reasons, we stay
this matter to allow the Tribal Court to make this determination.
Facts
Coushatta is a federally recognized Indian tribe with its reservation located
approximately three miles north of Elton in Allen Parish, Louisiana. It is governed
by a Tribal Council, consisting of a Chairman and four Council members.
In 2001, Coushatta entered into a contractual relationship with Meyer and
Associates, Inc. (Meyer). Meyer, a general consulting engineering firm, contracted
to provide professional services to Coushatta in connection with a capital
improvement program it had instituted. Their agreement was initially set forth in an
Agreement for Professional Services.
On January 14, 2003, Coushatta and Meyer entered into an Interim &
Definitive Supplemental Agreement to Existing Agreement for the development of
a Power Program (Supplemental Agreement). In furtherance of Coushatta’s stated
interest in developing potential energy projects and a related industrial park to
diversify its economic welfare, the Supplemental Agreement provided for the design,
construction, maintenance, and operation of an electric-power-generating facility
(Power Plant Project). It revised the Agreement for Professional Services in a number
of respects. Thereafter, Memoranda of Agreement were executed which also amended the Supplemental Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the contracts,
Coushatta committed to invest millions of dollars in the Power Plant Project.
After disputes arose in the execution of these joint venture contracts, Coushatta
filed suit in its Tribal Court on April 26, 2006, against Meyer and Richard T. Meyer,
seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for actions arising out
of these contracts. On June 6, 2006, Meyer filed suit in the Fourteenth Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu against Coushatta. Meyer then filed
motions to dismiss Coushatta’s suit with the Tribal Court, challenging that court’s
jurisdiction.
Thereafter, on July 7, 2006, Coushatta sought to stay the trial court proceedings
on the basis of lis pendens and the exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine. It also filed
an Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Coushatta contended that this
state court proceeding should be stayed because its suit was pending in Tribal Court
before Meyer filed suit in state court and that, pursuant to the federal jurisprudential
doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies, the Tribal Court should be allowed to
determine whether or not Coushatta waived its sovereign immunity. Coushatta
further asserted that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because its
January 14, 2003 Resolution did not waive sovereign immunity as required by Tribal
ordinance.
Meyer urged in opposition that the above-cited contract provisions waived
Coushatta’s sovereign immunity, that the Tribal Council representatives who signed
the contracts had authority to do so, that the Tribal Court does not have jurisdiction
to proceed, and that this litigation is properly before the Fourteenth Judicial District.
2 At a hearing held on October 31, 2006, the trial court denied Coushatta’s
request to stay these proceedings on the basis of lis pendens and took the other issues
under advisement. In its Reasons for Judgment, the trial court held that the
exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine does not apply to this matter and denied
Coushatta’s Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Coushatta filed this writ application, urging that the trial court erred in failing
to stay this proceeding to allow the Tribal Court the first opportunity to determine
whether it validly waived its sovereign immunity and in finding that the trial court
had subject matter jurisdiction.
Discussion
Appeal versus Writ
Meyer argues that this writ application should be denied because Coushatta has
an adequate remedy through an appeal. We do not agree. If Coushatta’s writ
application is not considered, it must participate in these proceedings to a final
judgment before it can appeal, and its defense of sovereign immunity will be
effectively lost. Guidry v. Shelter Ins. Co., 535 So.2d 393 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988).
Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes
Pursuant to federal law, Indian tribes are subject to suit only where authorized
by Congress or the tribe has waived its sovereign immunity. Kiowa Tribe of Ok. v.
Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998). In Kiowa, the Court
reiterated its long-held position that “[t]ribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts,
whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether
they were made on or off a reservation.” Id. at 760, 118 S.Ct. at 1705. Unless
3 Congress abrogates this immunity or the tribe waives it, immunity governs
contractual claims against the tribe. Id.
An Indian tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and express but
need not employ the specific words “waive” and “sovereign immunity” to be
effective. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Ok., 532
U.S. 411, 121 S.Ct. 1589 (2001). A tribe’s agreement “by express contract, to adhere
to certain dispute resolution procedures” and to be bound by those resolution
procedures has been held to constitute an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Id.
at 420, 121 S.Ct. at 1595.
At the heart of this matter are various provisions in the agreements executed
by Coushatta and Meyer which they contend address sovereign immunity. The
Agreement for Professional Services provided that it would be “governed by the law
of the state in which the principal office of the CMC [Coushatta] is located” and that
binding arbitration would be utilized to resolve any disputes that arose with
enforcement of the arbitration being enforced in the Coushatta Tribal Court.
The Supplemental Agreement was the subject of a lengthy and detailed
Resolution passed by the Tribal Council the same date which authorized the Tribal
Chairman “to negotiate and execute all necessary Agreements with Meyer and
Associates, Inc.” and “to negotiate and execute . . . all Other Agreements as may be
necessary to Develop and Implement the [Power Plant Project].” It also authorized
the Tribal Chairman to designate someone to act in his stead in conjunction with the
Power Plant Project. The Resolution did not, however, specifically waive sovereign
immunity.
4 The Supplemental Agreement revised the Agreement for Professional Services
in a number of respects, one being that it and amendments thereto would be
“interpreted, governed and construed under the laws of the State of Louisiana.” In
the Supplemental Agreement, the parties also “irrevocably consent[ed] to the
jurisdiction” of Louisiana state courts and agreed that any dispute arising under the
contract would be heard “by a court of competent jurisdiction in the Parish of Allen,
or any other Parish mutually agreed to, State of Louisiana,” and Coushatta
“specifically waive[d] any rights, claims or defenses to sovereign immunity” with
regard to the Agreement. The subsequent Memoranda of Agreement provided that,
if either party had to file suit, it had to be “filed in the Fourteenth Judicial District
Court, State of Louisiana.”
Coushatta contends that it did not waive its sovereign immunity and is not
subject to suit in state court because the January 14, 2003 Resolution does not satisfy
its Judicial Code’s requirements for waiver of sovereign immunity. Title 1, Section
1.1.05 of Coushatta’s Judicial Code provides:
The Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, as a sovereign government, is absolutely immune from suit . . . Nothing in this code shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana except as expressly provided herein or as specifically waived by a resolution or ordinance approved by the Tribal Council specifically referring to such.
Coushatta urges that the trial court should have abstained from exercising
jurisdiction and not addressed the issue of waiver of sovereign immunity in light of
federal policy considerations which favor allowing tribal courts to determine whether
they have jurisdiction to adjudicate matters pending before them.
Meyer urges that Coushatta waived its sovereign immunity by executing the
Agreement for Professional Services, the Supplemental Agreement, and the
5 Memoranda of Agreement and that there is no need to apply the exhaustion of tribal
remedies doctrine. It contends that the trial court’s judgment is correct and should
be affirmed.
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Doctrine
The federal government favors and encourages tribal self-government, and in
furtherance of these policies, the Supreme Court has held that a tribe whose
jurisdiction has been challenged should have the first opportunity to determine the
validity of such a challenge. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct.
971 (1987); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
105 S.Ct. 2447 (1985). In Iowa, 480 U.S. at 16, 107 S.Ct. at 976 (quoting National
Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857, 105 S.Ct. at 2454), the Court stated, “[r]egardless of the
basis for jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a
federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a ‘full opportunity to
determine its own jurisdiction.’” This policy favors abstention by non-tribal courts
to allow self-government and self-determination by Indian tribes of which tribal
courts play an important role. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447. The
policy allows tribal courts to be the first to respond to the invocation of or a challenge
to their jurisdiction. It is prudential not jurisdictional. Therefore, it does not establish
adjudicatory authority over lawsuits filed in tribal courts. Id. A tribal court’s
determination that it had jurisdiction is reviewable after tribal remedies have been
exhausted. Id.
There are exceptions to the application of the doctrine. It does not apply in
situations where: “an assertion of tribal jurisdiction ‘is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith,’ . . . or where the action is patently violative of
6 express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of
the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 856,
105 S.Ct. at 2454, fn. 21 (internal citations omitted). It also does not apply “[w]hen
. . . it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’
conduct on land covered by Montana [v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245,
(1981)]’s main rule,” and the exhaustion requirement “would serve no purpose other
than delay.” Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416, fn.
14 (1997).
Comity
Being a prudential rule, the doctrine is applied as a matter of comity. Nat’l
Farmers, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447; Iowa, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971. Comity is
a discretionary policy where “the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another
state or extend immunity to a sister sovereign not as a rule of law, but rather out of
deference or respect. Courts extend immunity as a matter of comity to foster
cooperation, promote harmony, and build goodwill.” Levert v. Univ. of Ill., 02-2679,
p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), 857 So.2d 611, 618, writ denied, 03-2994 (La.
1/16/04), 864 So.2d 635 (citations omitted). Unless there is an abuse of discretion
by the trial court, the decision not to extend comity should not be overturned. Id.
The Supreme Court has not specifically held that the exhaustion of tribal
remedies doctrine applies to state courts. However, the Court stated in Iowa, 480
U.S. at 16, 107 S.Ct. at 977 (emphasis added), that “[a]djudication of such matters by
any nontribal court . . . infringes upon tribal law-making authority, because tribal
courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.”
7 The Louisiana Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, but prior decisions
of this court appear to favor application of the doctrine where appropriate. In Ortego
v. Tunica Biloxi Indians of Louisiana d/b/a Paragon Casino, 03-1001 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/4/04), 865 So.2d 985, writ denied, 04-587 (La. 4/23/04), 870 So.2d 306, a former
nonmember tribal employee sued the tribe for workers’ compensation benefits. The
tribe filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the state
court should abstain from deciding the issue on the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal
remedies and that there was no waiver of sovereign immunity. Another panel of this
court noted two factors which weighed against application of the doctrine in that
proceeding: the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation was grounded in
Louisiana law, not tribal law; and, suit was initially filed with the Louisiana Office
of Workers’ Compensation, not in the Tunica-Biloxi tribal court. The panel
determined that those circumstances did “not lend themselves to an unbending
application of the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies as propounded by the
Supreme Court in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, where claims were
pending in tribal court before suit was filed in federal court,” Id. at 998, and
concluded that the tribe’s defense of tribal sovereign immunity was the appropriate
basis for dismissal not exhaustion of tribal remedies. See also, Webb v. Paragon
Casino, 03-1700 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/04), 872 So.2d 641, where the findings and
reasoning of Ortego were adopted by a second panel of this court.
Unlike Ortego and Webb, the following circumstances present here favor
application of the exhaustion doctrine: 1) a contract between a tribe and a
nonmember, not a Louisiana statute, is at issue; 2) the stated purpose of the contract
is to provide economic support for Coushatta; 3) suit was filed first by Coushatta in
8 its Tribal Court; and 4) interpretation and application of a tribal ordinance bears on
the determination of whether the tribe waived sovereign immunity.
Courts of other states have also applied the exhaustion doctrine, finding that
federal policy considerations favor application of the doctrine when suit is pending
in tribal court and suit is then filed in state court. See Teague v. Bad River Band of
Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 01-1256 (7/17/03), 265 Wis.2d 64, 665
N.W.2d 899; Drumm v. Brown, 15809 (7/28/98), 245 Conn. 657, 716 A.2d 50; and
Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, C6-95-279 (Minn.App. 8/1/95), 535
N.W.2d 379.
Meyer assigns a number of reasons why the doctrine should not be applied
here. First, it points out that the doctrine is discretionary and is prudential not
jurisdictional. It also contends that the structure of the Coushatta ordinance negates
the need to observe the exhaustion doctrine. It argues that the introductory phrase in
the sentence, “[n]othing in this Code shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of this
sovereign immunity, except as expressly provided herein or as specifically waived by
a resolution or ordinance approved by the Tribal Council specifically referring to
such,” renders the provision illogical and without application here because it applies
only to other provisions of the Judicial Code.
We agree that the sentence is not well constructed; however, we do not believe
Meyer’s interpretation is accurate. Furthermore, we find this argument supports
application of the exhaustion doctrine to allow the Tribal Court to determine the
Tribal Council’s intent when it enacted the ordinance.
Meyer also argues that the Tribal Court does not have jurisdiction over it. In
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. at 1258 (1981), the Supreme Court held that as
9 a general rule tribal courts do not have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, stating:
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes,
and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.” The Court has
identified two exceptions to this general rule. The first is a tribe’s regulation
“through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Id. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258. The second
is a tribe’s “inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians
on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.” Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. at 1258.
Coushatta contends that its claims against Meyer satisfy these exceptions
because the contracts are a consensual relationship between it and Meyer and because
it has expended a significant investment under the contracts, which has a direct effect
on the economic security and/or wealth of the tribe. Meyer disagrees and argues that
the choice of law and forum selection provisions of the contracts evidence that it
consented to trial in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court only, not Coushatta’s
Tribal Court; therefore, the consensual relationship exception of Montana does not
apply. Meyer seems to argue that Supreme Court decisions after Montana require
that a nonmember affirmatively consent to a tribe’s jurisdiction for the consensual
relationship exception to apply. This argument is without merit.
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S.Ct. 1825 (2001), the
Supreme Court clarified that for the consensual relationship exception to apply in the
10 context of the imposition of a tax or regulation there must be a nexus between the
consensual relationship and the tax or regulation imposed by the tribe. Accordingly,
“[a] nonmember’s consensual relationship in one area . . . does not trigger tribal civil
authority in another.” Id. at 656, 121 S.Ct. at 1833-34. The Supreme Court held that
a nonmember hotel owner whose hotel was situated on non-Indian fee land, i.e.,
privately-owned land within reservation boundaries, could not be required to collect
a hotel occupancy tax from its hotel guests, finding the hotel owner did not consent
to collect the tax simply because he was an “Indian trader” authorized to conduct
commerce with the tribe under federal law. There was no nexus between the hotel
owner’s consensual relationship with the tribe as Indian trader and the hotel owner’s
relationship with his nonmember hotel guests, which was the basis for the tax.
Atkinson reiterated that Montana requires only that the consensual relationship
stems from “commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” Montana,
450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, and demonstrated that the nature of the
relationship with the tribe determines whether the nonmember consented to tribal
jurisdiction. It does not support Meyer’s argument.
Strate, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct. 1404, also does not support Meyer’s position.
In Strate, two individuals were involved in an automobile accident on a portion of a
North Dakota state highway that was situated within an Indian reservation. Neither
individual was a member of the tribe whose reservation was the site of the accident.
The plaintiff sued the defendant in tribal court to recover for injuries she sustained
as a result of the accident. The defendant, who contracted with the tribe to perform
landscape work on the reservation, filed suit in federal court seeking a judgment
declaring that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The
11 Supreme Court concluded that there was no nexus between the defendant’s
consensual relationship with the tribe (contract to provide landscape work) and the
suit by the plaintiff. The tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and the
defendant did not have to wait until the those proceedings concluded to challenge that
court’s jurisdiction.
In Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (2001), the Supreme Court
held that a tribal court could not assert jurisdiction over a civil rights claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 filed by a tribe member against a state official, who executed a search
warrant on the tribe member’s home with regard to suspected state law violations
outside the reservation, because tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction and
regulation of state officers in that situation was not essential to the tribe’s self-
government or internal relations. The Supreme Court again concluded that the tribal
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and there was no need to adhere to the
exhaustion doctrine because the only purpose it would serve was to delay the matter.
The relationships in these cases are not comparable to the relationship at issue
here, and the holdings therein do not support Meyer’s claims. There is a direct nexus
between Coushatta and Meyer’s consensual, contractual relationship and Coushatta’s
suit in Tribal Court which is based on that relationship. Therefore, if Coushatta did
not waive its sovereign immunity, the Tribal Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
Coushatta’s claims as explained in Montana and Atkinson, and it is appropriate to
allow the Tribal Court to address the issue of waiver first.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Meyer also urges that particular provisions of the contracts, i.e., the arbitration
provision of the Agreement for Professional Services and the choice of law and
12 choice of forum provisions of the contracts Supplemental Agreement and Memoranda
of Understanding, waive Coushatta’s sovereign immunity. Therefore, the trial court
has subject matter jurisdiction, and it is not necessary for the trial court to defer to the
Tribal Court.
The exhaustion doctrine was not at issue in any of the cases cited by Meyer.
Therefore, while discussion in those cases addressed the validity of waivers of
sovereign immunity, they are distinguishable from this case and do not support
Meyer’s claim that the exhaustion doctrine should not be applied by this court.
Additionally, actual authority was not at issue in three of the cases Meyer cites
in support of its position. In C & L Enterprises, 532 U.S. 411, 121 S.Ct. 1589, the
Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause which provided for enforcement of any
arbitration award in accordance with the laws of Oklahoma waived sovereign
immunity; however, the Court specifically noted that authority to waive sovereign
immunity was not at issue. The issue in Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe, 03-0517 (Colo.App. Div.II 8/12/04), 107 P.3d 402, was apparent authority,
not actual authority, to waive sovereign immunity, as the tribe did not have any
procedure for waiving sovereign immunity, and in Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
02-474 (Mont. 4/15/03), 67 P.3d 306, proof of the contract waiving sovereign
immunity, not authority to waive sovereign immunity, was at issue.
In Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, A093277 (Cal.App.1st Dist.
1/9/02), 95 Cal.App. 4th 1, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, a tribal chairman’s authority to
waive sovereign immunity was at issue, but the entire contract containing the waiver
was presented to and accepted by the entire tribal council, rendering the issue of
authority to waive immunity moot. Consequently, the court’s lengthy discussion of
13 other factors regarding sovereign immunity was dicta. Lastly, in Warburton/Buttner
v. Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana, D040158 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 11/26/02), 103
Cal.App. 4th 1170, the determination of waiver was made in the context of whether
the plaintiff should be allowed to conduct discovery to prepare an opposition to the
tribe’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not in the context of the merits
of the exception itself.
Meyer also points to the affidavits of the former Tribal Council Chairman and
former Tribal Council members in which they aver that waivers of sovereign
immunity were customarily included in contracts without specific resolutions
authorizing them, that they had plenary power to govern Coushatta, and that they
knew Coushatta had to waive its sovereign immunity to do business with
nonmembers to support its position that the contracts waived Coushatta’s sovereign
immunity. Coushatta refutes the import of Meyer’s arguments with evidence
establishing that nonmembers doing business with the Tribe regularly obtained
specific resolutions waiving sovereign immunity as provided in the Judicial Code.
These arguments and the contradictory supporting evidence favor allowing the Tribal
Court to determine whether Coushatta waived its sovereign immunity in its contracts
with Meyer.
Res Judicata
Meyer urges that the Tribal Court’s determinations will be res judicata as a
reason for not extending comity in this matter. We do not view this as a valid reason
to refuse to allow the Tribal Court the opportunity to determine whether Coushatta
waived its sovereign immunity. Furthermore, as previously stated, a tribal court’s
exercise of jurisdiction is reviewable. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447.
14 Conclusions
Louisiana and its courts clearly have an interest in seeing that their citizens are
protected when they contract with Indian tribes. By the same token, Indian tribes and
their courts are interested in insuring that they will be able to contract with
nonmember businesses for the products and services needed to sustain the tribe and
to allow the tribe to grow and prosper, as evidenced by Coushatta’s Power Plant
Project. Unfair treatment of nonmembers in Tribal Court will discourage legitimate
business concerns from doing business with Coushatta.
For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the doctrine of exhaustion
of tribal remedies applies to the facts of this case. Therefore, we stay these
proceedings to allow the Coushatta Tribal Court to determine whether Coushatta
Tribe of Louisiana waived its sovereign immunity in the contracts with Meyer. If the
Tribal Court determines Coushatta did not waive its sovereign immunity, proceedings
will continue therein, and Meyer may seek a review of that ruling. If the Tribal Court
determines Coushatta did waive its sovereign immunity, the parties can return to the
Fourteenth Judicial District Court and proceed therein.