Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Manufacturers National Bank

189 S.E. 83, 54 Ga. App. 771, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 755
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedDecember 4, 1936
Docket25691
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 189 S.E. 83 (Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Manufacturers National Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Manufacturers National Bank, 189 S.E. 83, 54 Ga. App. 771, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

Jenkins, P. J.

The beneficiary in a contract for life insurance and total-disability benefits, issued under a “ group plan,” sued the insurer and recovered $3000, the full amount of the policy. The contract contained provisions as to -permanent and total disability, and a requirement that the disease or injury prevent the insured from “engaging in any occupation and performing any work for wage or profit,” similar to the provisions in the Cato and South cases, supra. The certificate of insurance was issued to the insured in May, 1931, while he was employed as the manager of an ice-plant at Newnan, Georgia. Under his corporate employer, he had long experience as an ice-plant manager and refrigeration engineer. In 1933, the employer transferred him to the management of its ice-plant at Knoxville, Tennessee. His salary was $275 a - month. About January 24, 1934, while in this employment, he was stricken with lobar pneumonia, resulting in the formation of a large abscess about the size of a “goose egg” in one lung; and he was seriously ill at a hospital until about March 5, 1934. The evidence for the plaintiff showed that he remained away from any work, incapacitated and under the treatment of physicians, until April 13, 1934, when, upon his application to his former employer for work, the manager of its plant at LaGrange, Georgia, who was familiar with his condition, informed the officer in charge of the employer’s southeastern territory that outside work would be better for the insured, and on April 16 he was given work at LaGrange, selling refrigerators, collecting, and doing small repair jobs, using a car for which the employer supplied gas and oil. He was paid $25 a week. His salary was paid until about October 11, 1934, when he was released. During the period of this employment, under the evidence for the plaintiff, he was obliged continually to lose time, and was in the hospital under treatment of doctors, or unable to leave his bed, for thirty or more days of the time. From May 1 to May 11 he spent in a hospital; between May 1 and July 18 he was ill, and was treated by a doctor on twenty-two different days; from May 26 to June 5 he was ill and confined at home; on June 17 he had three teeth [773]*773pulled, with, an unfavorable reaction; June 18 he spent in a hospital; on September 4 he was ill and had to go to bed. After he was dropped from the pay-roll of his employer on October 11, he did no work of any kind. In November he was confined to his bed for about nine days, and remained ill. On December 7 he went to the home of his sister in Miami, Florida, and “continued to cough and spit up blood.” On January 22, 1935, his sister took him to Columbus, Georgia. He “coughed all the way” to. that city. In February be was stricken with influenza, had lobar pneumonia, and died on February 8, 1935.

Able counsel for the insurer submit that the evidence is entirely insufficient to support a finding that the insured became permanently and totally disabled, within the construed meaning of the policy, while he was engaged in the employment of manager. In their brief they contend as follows: “While it may be true that upon direct examination, and in answer to hypothetical questions, some of the doctors testified that [the insured] was totally and permanently disabled [from January 24, 1934], yet on cross-examination, when they were advised that he had actually worked, they stated that if he actually worked he was not totally and permanently disabled.” Dr. George W. Holcombe testified: “He had pneumonia to begin with, and then developed an abscess of the lung about the size of a goose egg. . . In my opinion [after stating facts appearing in his treatment of the insured during his first attack of pneumonia, and other facts stated hypothetically], I would say that I don’t think he had recovered from the lung abscess which he had while under my care in Nashville. Assuming the same facts as above set out, in my opinion I would say that this man was not physically able to resume any occupation from March 5, 1934, until his death; and I would say, from the condition I saw him in in Nashville, in my opinion he really was not in condition to work that year at all, and if he had undertaken to work he probably would have died sooner.” On cross-examination,-he said: “I don’t know how much he worked; but if he actually worked from April 13th to October 11th, 1934, with the exception of a couple of weeks, I would say he was incapacitated and should not have worked, and I would say that he was disabled to work. From my records and the condition he was in when I saw him, he should not have done any work in from three [774]*774to six months. What I am testifying to is that he should not have worked, and I don’t mean to testify that he was totally and permanently disabled • which prevented him from working.” On redirect examination, he stated: “Assuming [hypothetically-stated facts under testimony of other witnesses], and knowing the condition he was in on March 5th, in my opinion, I would say he was totally and permanently disabled during that period.” On recross-examination, he said: “A perfectly well man who never had a day’s illness in his life might catch flu and have pneumonia and be dead to-morrow. So far as his death is concerned, I would say that his other trouble necessarily had something to do with it, but he could have died without ever having had that. But he had had this other trouble, and he was in good condition to have developed any condition there in that lung, and a perfectly well man could not so easily have done the same thing, but he could have done it, and probably might have died, but not so easily.”

Dr. P. J. Manson testified: “Judging from the examination I made of him around the first of April, at that time he was totally disabled and unable to work. . . I think he was sicker than he thought he was, and on April 1st he was unable to undertake any work. . . Assuming that he had lobar pneumonia in January, 1934, and an abscessed lung, and in view of his condition as revealed in my examination on April 1st, as to when he would be able to return to his work, that question is again hard to answer; but in my opinion at the time, it would take him quite a while to recuperate, several months, probably a year, before he would be able to work. During that time the kind of work he was accustomed to would be detrimental to his physical condition, which was my reason for advising him to rest as much as possible. The time it takes normally for an abscessed lung to heal varies according to the size of the abscess and the resistance of the individual, but it usually takes months. [His] resistance when I saw him was quite low. Lobar pneumonia . . is one of the worst forms of pneumonia. Assuming [hypotlietically-stated facts], and in addition to the assumption of the above facts, from my examination it is my opinion that he had been disabled Cor the full term. Further assuming that when he returned here in December he was still spitting up blood and still weak and nervous, I would say he was disabled, and that it was the result of his previous pneumonia; [775]*775and again assuming all of the above facts to be true, I would say he was totally disabled during this entire period.” On cross-examination he stated: “I have already testified that I believed he was permanently disabled, from all the assumptions and from the information I had, for at least a year.

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772 F. Supp. 2d 750 (W.D. Virginia, 2011)
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Bluebook (online)
189 S.E. 83, 54 Ga. App. 771, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 755, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/metropolitan-life-insurance-v-manufacturers-national-bank-gactapp-1936.