USCA4 Appeal: 22-1403 Doc: 34 Filed: 12/15/2023 Pg: 1 of 18
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-1403
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT GROUP AT COOL SPRING, LLC, a Virginia limited liability company, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COOL SPRING ROAD, LLC, a Maryland limited liability company; LIBBY ADELPHI ROAD LLC, a Maryland limited liability company; LL COLLEGE PARK LLC, a Maryland limited liability company; REBECCA B. SWANSTON, a Maryland resident; CHARLES B. BOSWELL, a Maryland resident,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:20-cv-03237-GJH)
Argued: October 26, 2023 Decided: December 15, 2023
Before NIEMEYER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion, from which Judge Quattlebaum wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Nicholas M. DePalma, VENABLE LLP, Tysons, Virginia, for Appellant. Steven A. Allen, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Henry F. Brandenstein, Jr., Caleb E. McCallum, Tysons Corner, Virginia, Ashleigh J.F. Lynn, VENABLE LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-1403 Doc: 34 Filed: 12/15/2023 Pg: 2 of 18
PER CURIAM:
This case involves the interpretation of a “Joint Venture Formation Agreement” (the
“Agreement”) between Metropolitan Development Group at Cool Spring, LLC, a Virginia
limited liability company, and Cool Spring Road, LLC, a Maryland limited liability
company, for the development of 17.3 acres of land in Hyattsville, Maryland.
Metropolitan, a developer, approached Cool Spring, the property owner, with the proposal
to construct at least 120 market-rate multifamily rental units, and the two reached an
agreement to form a joint venture when Metropolitan’s proposed development had reached
a specified stage. At such time, Metropolitan would be made a member of the Cool Spring
limited liability company and thus would become a co-owner of the property. The
Agreement gave Metropolitan up to three years to reach the specified stage and the right to
terminate the Agreement if it did not believe it could or if it would be too onerous to do so.
When, after three years, Metropolitan was unable to obtain the requisite “Land Use
Approvals” from government officials for its proposed development, Cool Spring notified
Metropolitan that the Agreement, by its terms, “terminate[d]” because such Approvals
were a condition precedent to consummation of the joint venture. Metropolitan then
commenced this action, claiming that Cool Spring breached the Agreement, and Cool
Spring filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to the parties’
rights under the Agreement. The district court, on cross motions for summary judgment,
granted judgment to Cool Spring, holding that Metropolitan’s obtainment of the “Land Use
Approvals” was a condition precedent to the formation of the joint venture and
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Metropolitan’s entitlement to be given co-ownership of the property. Metropolitan filed
this appeal.
The core issue presented on this appeal is whether the Agreement required
Metropolitan to actually obtain the Land Use Approvals before it could become a co-owner
of the 17.3-acre property. Metropolitan contends that it was not required to obtain the
Approvals but only to “use its commercially reasonable efforts to pursue and obtain” the
Approvals, quoting from Paragraph 3.3(a) of the Agreement. The provision on which
Metropolitan relies provides more fully:
The parties agree that, from and after the Effective Date, Metropolitan shall have the right to pursue and obtain the Land Use Approvals and shall use its commercially reasonable efforts to pursue and obtain the Land Use Approvals.
(Emphasis added). Cool Spring argues, however, that the contractual language relied on
by Metropolitan should be read to require Metropolitan both (1) to use commercially
reasonable efforts to pursue the approvals and (2) to actually obtain them. It maintains that
since Metropolitan did not obtain the Approvals within the time specified in the
Agreement, Cool Spring was entitled to end the arrangement. We agree.
Focusing first on the language from Paragraph 3.3(a) relied on by Metropolitan and
applying fundamental rules of contract interpretation, we note that if the language means
what Metropolitan argues — that “commercially reasonable efforts” modifies both
“pursue” and “obtain” — it raises the interpretational problem of superfluity by rendering
either “pursue” or “obtain” superfluous because the “commercial reasonable efforts”
necessary to pursue the Approvals are the same as those necessary to obtain them.
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Consequently, it would be redundant to use both. Indeed, Metropolitan curiously
acknowledges this in arguing, “If we drop the word ‘pursue,’ then the obligation remains:
‘use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain approvals.’ That still requires reasonable
efforts to obtain the approvals — not a particular outcome.” (Emphasis added). But by
maintaining that position, Metropolitan would be violating the established principle of
contract interpretation that “courts do not interpret contracts in a manner that would render
provisions superfluous or as having no effect.” Towson University v. Conte, 862 A.2d 941,
948 (Md. 2004). Thus, the reading of the Agreement that avoids violating this principle
and gives meaning to all of its words is the one that requires Metropolitan both to use
commercially reasonable efforts to pursue Approvals and also to obtain them.
Even more importantly, however, a reading that makes obtaining Approvals a
condition of the Agreement is the only one that is consistent with the Agreement taken as
a whole.
First, the Agreement was entered into to develop the property, not to sell an interest
in it to Metropolitan without development. As the district court noted, Metropolitan, a
developer, approached Cool Spring for the purpose of developing it, and Cool Spring
agreed. Thus, the Agreement begins with a recital, “[Cool Spring] and Metropolitan desire
to enter into a joint venture to develop the Project (hereinafter defined).” (Emphasis
added). The Agreement then defines “Project” as “Metropolitan’s intended development
of the Property,” which was to include at least 120 rental units. (Emphasis added). Without
Land Use Approvals, the obtaining of which the Agreement assigned to Metropolitan, the
Property could not be developed, and the stated purpose of the entire project would be
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frustrated. Obtaining Land Use Approvals was thus essential, which supports that it was a
condition precedent.
Second, the Agreement specifies that Metropolitan had to seek the Land Use
Approvals during a two-year “Entitlement Period,” and if it did not obtain them within that
two-year period, it was entitled to two extensions of six months each. Addressing this,
Paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement provides:
If Metropolitan is not successful in obtaining the Land Use Approvals during the Entitlement Period, but Metropolitan has applied for and is diligently pursuing the Land Use Approvals, then Metropolitan shall have two (2) options to extend the Entitlement Period for periods of six (6) months each.
(Emphasis added). Not only does this provision clearly describe the fundamental condition
that Land Use Approvals be obtained, it also adds clarity to Metropolitan’s obligation set
forth in Paragraph 3.3(a), relied on by Metropolitan, to both use reasonable efforts to obtain
the Approvals and to actually obtain them.
Third, the Agreement requires that the Land Use Approvals be obtained before
allowing any member of the Cool Spring limited liability company to sell his or her
individual interest, a privilege which necessarily had to occur at the time of the closing of
the joint venture, as that was when Cool Spring would give Metropolitan an ownership
interest. Section 3.6(a) thus provides:
If Metropolitan successfully obtains the Land Use Approvals during the Entitlement Period (including any extensions thereof), it shall notify [Cool Spring] of such fact. Promptly thereafter, the [Cool Spring members] and Metropolitan shall meet and determine which of the [Cool Spring members] wish to continue with the construction of the Project, [and which, of various options, they elect if they choose to sell their interests].
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The sequence established by Paragraph 3.6(a) of the Agreement thus is (1) that
Metropolitan obtain the Land Use Approvals, (2) that Cool Spring members then be given
the right to opt out of the Project, and (3) that thereafter Metropolitan be given an
ownership interest at closing. Thus, the first essential condition, as stated in Paragraph
3.6(a), is that Metropolitan “successfully obtain[] the Land Use Approvals during the
Entitlement Period.”
And fourth, the Agreement authorizes Metropolitan, even before the Entitlement
Period begins, to record its potential ownership interest in the property in the land records.
And coupled with that privilege is the requirement that Metropolitan release that recording
should Metropolitan not obtain the Land Use Approvals. Paragraph 2.3 provides:
Following the expiration of the study period [which precedes the Entitlement Period], Metropolitan may elect to record a memorandum of option in the land records against the Property, memorializing its rights under this Agreement. If Metropolitan records such a memorandum, then [Cool Spring] shall promptly execute and acknowledge the same, and Metropolitan shall deliver an executed release of such option to the Escrow Agent, which release shall be recorded if Metropolitan fails to obtain the Approvals during the Entitlement Period.
(Emphasis added).
None of these provisions have meaning if Metropolitan were only required to make
reasonable commercial efforts to obtain the Land Use Approvals. Indeed, they state that
the failure to obtain Approvals would preclude further steps required by the Agreement.
Thus, the Agreement clearly and unambiguously establishes that Metropolitan must obtain
— not make efforts to obtain — the Land Use Approvals as a condition to the formation
of the joint venture.
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Quite apart from the linguistic difficulties with respect to Metropolitan’s posited
interpretation and the interpretation’s inconsistency with numerous other provisions of the
Agreement, Metropolitan’s interpretation would undermine the entire purpose of the
Agreement and thus ignore common sense. The Agreement was structured such that the
joint development effort would continue only when certain gating items to the development
of the property were fulfilled. Most fundamental was the need to obtain the necessary Land
Use Approvals. By ignoring that condition, Metropolitan’s interpretation makes little sense
in light of the whole purpose of the Agreement — to develop the property. Moreover, and
troublingly, Metropolitan seeks the benefits of such a development, which includes its
acquiring co-ownership of the property, without providing the development that it had
proposed. Thus, we can and do also rely on this common sense. See Credible Behavior
Health Inc. v. Johnson, 220 A.3d 303, 313 (Md. 2019) (“As a bedrock principle of contract
interpretation, Maryland courts consistently strive to interpret contracts in accordance with
common sense” (internal quotations omitted)).
At bottom, we agree with the district court that obtaining the Land Use Approvals
was a condition precedent to closing the joint venture and that Metropolitan’s failure to
obtain them within the specified Entitlement Period entitled Cool Spring to refuse to admit
Metropolitan as a member of the joint venture. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Parties, especially sophisticated ones, should be able to count on courts to enforce
the terms of their written agreements. But rather than doing that, the majority re-writes the
Joint Venture Formation Agreement between Cool Spring, LLC, the owners of roughly 17
acres in Maryland, and Metropolitan Development Group. When the dust of that re-write
settles, Metropolitan will be left without the benefit of a right it bargained for—the right to
continue its efforts to develop the property to hopefully make a profit. Because the
majority’s decision strays from the express terms Metropolitan and Cool Spring agreed to,
I respectfully dissent.
I.
In the agreement, Cool Spring and Metropolitan said that they wanted to jointly
develop apartments on the property. The agreement did not actually form a joint venture.
Instead, it established rights and obligations that allowed for the possibility of Metropolitan
becoming the majority owner in Cool Spring. Among other things, the agreement
contemplated that before the property could be developed, as is often the case, local
government officials had to issue certain land use approvals. And as it turns out, at least so
far, no land use approvals have been issued. So, the question we must decide is whether
the agreement required Metropolitan to obtain those approvals before it could become an
owner in Cool Spring.
To the majority, the answer is yes. It concludes that in order for Metropolitan to
become an owner, it had to first obtain the land use approvals to develop the property.
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Adopting Cool Spring’s argument, the majority labels this requirement a condition
precedent. No approvals, no ownership interest.
But that is not what the parties agreed to. Three provisions directly contradict this
conclusion.
First, paragraph 3.3(a) says that Metropolitan “shall use its commercially reasonable
efforts to pursue and obtain” the land use approvals. Metropolitan’s only obligation is to
use “commercially reasonable efforts.” It never agreed that it had to obtain the approvals
before the joint venture could be formed. That is because “commercially reasonable
efforts” modifies both “pursue and obtain.” Such a reading follows the series-qualifier
canon. Under it, “[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all
nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the
entire series.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 147 (2012).
The Supreme Court recently invoked this canon in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.
Ct. 1163 (2021). There, the question involved interpreting a statute which defined an
autodialer as “equipment which has the capacity . . . to store or produce telephone numbers
to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Id. at 1169. Facebook argued
that “using a random or sequential number generator” modified both verbs (“store or
produce”) while Duguid argued it modified only the closest verb (“produce”). Id. The Court
agreed with Facebook and used the series-qualifier canon to qualify both antecedent verbs
“store” and “produce” with the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator”
because it produced the “most natural construction.” Id. Similarly, here “commercially
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reasonable efforts” most naturally applies to both “pursue” and “obtain.” Metropolitan was
not required to obtain the land use approvals. It was only required to use its “commercially
reasonable efforts” to do so.
Nowhere does the agreement say that, before it may be issued an ownership interest
in Cool Spring, Metropolitan must obtain the land use approvals. Nowhere does the
agreement identify obtaining those approvals as a condition precedent. If obtaining the
approvals were a condition for Metropolitan to become an owner in Cool Spring, you’d
think the agreement might mention it somewhere. 1 But it doesn’t. Cool Spring even
admitted as much at oral argument. Even so, the majority writes into the agreement an
obligation of Metropolitan to obtain the approvals.
Second, paragraph 3.3(b) says that if the government does not issue its approvals
for the project by the end of what the parties called the “Entitlement Period,” 2 then “in
Metropolitan’s sole and absolute discretion, . . . Metropolitan may deliver written notice of
such event” to Cool Spring and the agreement “shall terminate.” Under this provision, if
the land use approvals are not obtained, Metropolitan had the discretion to terminate the
agreement by notifying Cool Spring. How can language that says it’s up to Metropolitan’s
“sole and absolute discretion” whether it wants to terminate the agreement if the approvals
1 Indeed, the parties knew how to craft express obligations using “shall” in the agreement for arguably less important items. See J.A. 23 (“Parcel Owners’ LLC shall provide to Metropolitan copies of [the property information].”); J.A. 26 (“Metropolitan shall provide Parcel Owners’ LLC with quarterly reports.”). It would be strange to leave such a central element to the agreement unexpressed. 2 In paragraph 3.2(a), the parties agreed that the Entitlement Period was to run two years, plus any amendments. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1403 Doc: 34 Filed: 12/15/2023 Pg: 11 of 18
are not obtained be interpreted to mean that Metropolitan had to obtain the approvals to
close? This right to walk away was not a two-way street. It only belonged to Metropolitan.
Cool Spring’s interpretation, and the majority’s conclusion, writes this language out of the
agreement.
Third, paragraphs 1.1(i) and (j) of the agreement combine to require the parties to
close on Metropolitan’s acquisition of an ownership interest in Cool Spring by a certain
date. Under paragraph 1.1(i), the closing must take place on the date set by Metropolitan,
and it cannot be any later than the “Outside Date.” Paragraph 1.1(j) then defines the
“Outside Date” to be 60 days “after the earlier of [the issuance of the land use approvals
for the project] or . . . the expiration of the Entitlement Period.” The “or” in paragraph
1.1(j) is crucial. Under that language, the closing must take place by the Outside Date:
either 60 days after obtaining the approvals or 60 days after the expiration of the
Entitlement Period. If the Entitlement Period expires as it did here, closing occurs even if
the land use approvals have not been obtained. There is no way to square that language
with a requirement that Metropolitan obtain the approvals to close on the joint venture. The
majority’s decision judicially substitutes “and” for “or” in paragraph 1.1(j).
These three provisions foreclose the majority’s conclusion. We should apply them
as written. We should neither write in new obligations nor write out existing rights.
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II.
Despite paragraphs 3.3(a), 3.3(b), 1.1(i) and 1.1(j), the majority interprets the
agreement to require Metropolitan to obtain the land use approvals before it could form the
joint venture with Cool Spring. It gives two reasons for this conclusion. Neither is
persuasive.
A.
First, according to the majority, interpreting “commercially reasonable efforts” in
paragraph 3.3(a) to modify “pursue” and “obtain” renders “pursue” superfluous. If
Metropolitan only had to use “commercially reasonable efforts” to obtain the land use
approvals, the majority reasons, isn’t that the same as using such efforts to pursue them?
Not necessarily. A better reading is that the parties adopted a belt and suspenders approach
to make sure they covered the point that Metropolitan did not have to obtain the approvals,
just use its commercially reasonable efforts to try. There is nothing unusual here. Lawyers
sometimes use overlapping terms to cover their bases. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (The
president takes an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States.”) (emphasis added).
But even if the majority’s interpretation of “pursue” is correct, it’s only a small point.
That’s because superfluity exists under the majority’s approach, too. By reading
“commercially reasonable efforts” to modify only “pursue,” the majority interprets
paragraph 3.3(a) to mean that “Metropolitan shall . . . obtain” the land use approvals. But
this approach would render “commercially reasonable efforts to pursue” superfluous. That
is because if Metropolitan must actually obtain the approvals, what exactly does the
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bargained-for obligation for Metropolitan to use its commercially reasonable efforts to
pursue look like? The majority’s interpretation also renders “Metropolitan shall have the
right to” from paragraph 3.3(a), “in Metropolitan’s sole and absolute
discretion, . . . Metropolitan may” from paragraph 3.3(b) and the “or” from paragraph
1.1(j) meaningless. So, it’s hard to give too much weight to this reasoning when the
majority’s reading creates superfluity in spades.
B.
The majority also reasons that other parts of the agreement support its conclusion
that Metropolitan had to obtain the land use approvals before obtaining its ownership
interest. The majority points to four other provisions. But none of them support its
1.
First, echoing Cool Spring’s argument and the district court’s conclusion, the
majority points to the recital clauses of the agreement which state that the parties desire to
develop the property. According to the majority, the property cannot be developed without
obtaining the land use approvals. Thus, allowing Metropolitan to join Cool Spring without
the approvals in hand would frustrate the purpose of the agreement.
It’s of course true that the property cannot be developed until the land use approvals
are issued. But nothing about interpreting the agreement as written—to require
Metropolitan to be issued an ownership interest despite the lack of approvals—is
inconsistent to the parties’ desire to develop the property. Metropolitan still wants to
develop the property and is still trying to obtain the approvals. Just because the approvals
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have not yet been obtained, that does not indicate they will not be in the future. The
majority’s reasoning seems to be based on the flawed assumption that the parties’
agreement contemplating the creation of the new joint venture depended on every “t” being
crossed and every “i” being dotted so that there was only smooth sailing for the
development of the property. The parties could, of course, have agreed to such a risk-averse
arrangement. But they didn’t. And there is nothing unusual about their not doing so. Real
estate ventures are formed all the time with unresolved contingencies. That is all that is
going on here.
What seems to concern the majority more is why Cool Spring would ever agree to
give Metropolitan a 71% ownership interest when the government has not issued the land
use approvals needed to develop the property. This concern is misguided for two reasons.
One, we don’t know why the parties agreed to each and every term. And it’s really not our
business if the agreement is clear—as it is here. See Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc.,
686 A.2d 298, 304 (Md. 1996) (“[T]he clear and unambiguous language of an agreement
will not give [way] to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to
mean.” (quoting Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (Md.
1985)). Even if the agreement gave Metropolitan an oversized ownership interest, we
should enforce its terms as written.
Two, a closer look at the proposed joint venture operating agreement, which the
parties attached as an exhibit to the agreement, provides some perspective. Under that
proposed operating agreement, Cool Spring and Metropolitan were to set up capital
accounts to identify the contributions that they made to the resulting joint venture after
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Metropolitan became a majority owner. Cool Spring was to contribute the property. The
parties assigned a value of $1.4 million to that contribution, an amount that exceeded the
property’s appraised value. Metropolitan in turn, as a professional developer, agreed to do
all the work, and pay the costs of developing the property, as its contribution. Relevant
here, under the proposed operating agreement, those capital accounts had to be paid out
before the 71%-29% ownership split ever comes into play. In other words, before
Metropolitan ever received any benefit from its 71% ownership in the joint venture, Cool
Spring would be paid $1.4 million for its capital contribution. So, from an economic
standpoint, Cool Spring would receive a generous sum for the property and then 29% of
any profits from the development of the property without having to do, or pay for, any of
the work to make the development happen. Considering all this, Metropolitan’s 71%
ownership interest makes more sense.
This payout structure also sheds light on why the agreement gave Metropolitan the
right, if the land use approvals had not been obtained, to either go forward and obtain its
ownership interest or walk away. Once the joint venture was formed, Metropolitan had
significantly more risk than Cool Spring. It had to do all the work and pay all the money to
pursue the development. And the development had to be successful enough to pay back the
capital contributions and then produce profit on top of that for Metropolitan to enjoy the
benefits of its 71% interest. Given those terms, it makes sense that Metropolitan would
negotiate the right to walk away if the approvals had not been obtained—if it might not
want to throw good money after bad—or go forward with the joint venture—if it was still
confident that the property could be profitably developed.
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And Cool Spring’s risk was minimal either way—if Metropolitan elected to close,
Cool Spring would receive $1.4 million before the 71%-29% profit split came into play. If
Metropolitan elected to walk away, Cool Spring had the property all to itself.
Once again, the clear terms of the agreement control irrespective of the parties’
intentions and whether or not it turned out to be a good or bad deal for either Cool Spring
or Metropolitan. But the economic fundamentals of the deal show that interpreting the
agreement as written and not writing a condition precedent into it would not frustrate the
agreement’s purpose.
2.
Second, the majority insists that paragraph 3.4 would be meaningless if
Metropolitan were only required to make commercially reasonable efforts to obtain the
land use approvals. But that is not right. Paragraph 3.4 gave Metropolitan the right to two
six-month extensions to the Entitlement Period—which once again was a two-year period
that was part of the timeline leading to the agreed deadline for closing—“[i]f Metropolitan
[was] not successful in obtaining the Land Use Approvals during the Entitlement Period.”
This simply provided Metropolitan more time to pursue the approvals. It has no bearing as
to what happens if the approvals are not obtained. In contrast, paragraphs 1.1(j) and 3.3(b)
expressly address that contingency. Paragraph 1.1(j) required the closing to take place 60
days after the end of the Entitlement Period even if the approvals had not been obtained.
And paragraph 3.3(b) gave Metropolitan the right to close or walk away if the approvals
were not obtained. Nothing about paragraph 3.4 conflicts with those provisions.
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3.
Third, the majority argues that paragraph 3.6(a) supports its conclusion. That
provision permitted the members of Cool Spring to sell their interest in Cool Spring if
Metropolitan managed to obtain the approvals during the Entitlement Period. But much
like paragraph 3.4, this provision provides a right to the members of Cool Spring if the
approvals are obtained. It doesn’t say anything about what happens if they are not. And as
already described, paragraphs 1.1(j) and 3.3(b) do.
4.
Fourth, the majority points to paragraph 2.3. That provision, after granting
Metropolitan the right to record a document identifying its potential interest in the property,
requires Metropolitan to release that recording it if did not obtain the approvals during the
Entitlement Period. But that does not support the majority’s conclusion either. During the
Entitlement Period, without Metropolitan recording its interest, there would be no notice
of that interest to the public. So, it makes sense that Metropolitan might record its interest
to protect itself during that time. But at the end of the Entitlement Period, if it had not
obtained the approvals, Metropolitan had the right under the agreement to protect itself
without the recording—it could elect to close or walk away. Since it no longer needed the
protection of a recorded interest at the end of the Entitlement Period, the requirement that
it release the recording if the approvals had not been obtained does not support the
majority’s interpretation of the agreement.
In sum, none of those identified provisions tip the scales towards the majority’s
conclusion. In fact, they undermine it. Paragraphs 3.4, 3.6(a) and 2.3 show the parties
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agreed to certain rights and obligations depending on whether or not the approvals were
obtained. Despite doing so, nowhere did they make closing of the agreement conditional
on obtaining the approvals. When parties negotiate and agree to terms based on a
contingency, their silence on other obligations mean such obligations are not part of the
III.
According to the majority, “[t]his case involves the interpretation of” the agreement.
Maj. Op. 2. But rather than interpreting, the majority decides to re-write the agreement,
adding a condition precedent that the parties never agreed to and removing Metropolitan’s
discretion to close on its ownership interest even if the land use approvals had not been
obtained. I would do neither. I respectfully dissent.