Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee

213 So. 2d 485, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5147
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedAugust 13, 1968
DocketNo. 68-341
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 213 So. 2d 485 (Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, 213 So. 2d 485, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5147 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

CHARLES CARROLL, Chief Judge.

By this interlocutory appeal, Metropolitan Dade County seeks reversal of an order of the circuit court denying its motion to dismiss a complaint filed by the appellee seeking to mandatorily enjoin the county to liberalize the zoning on his parcel of property, following refusal of his request before the county commission.

The thrust of appellant’s argument is that since the action of the county commission was by resolution rather than by an ordinance the prescribed method of review was by certiorari, citing and relying on Land Corporation of Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 222, decided by this court following Dade County v. Metro Improvement Corp., Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 202.

The appellee contends that proceeding by separate suit was proper because his complaint presents a general challenge to the validity of the zoning ordinance. To the extent the complaint challenges the constitutionality or validity of the controlling zoning ordinance, a separate suit was authorized and the motion to dismiss was properly denied. See City of Miami Beach v. Perell, Fla.1951, 52 So.2d 906; Harris v. Goff, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 642. Such a separate suit would not be appropriate to review the resolution of the county commission sought there on grounds other than a general challenge of invalidity of the zoning ordinance, and in fact in appellee’s brief it is stated that by the present suit the appellee does not seek to have the circuit court review the county commission’s resolution with reference to the bases or grounds on which the appellee there sought a change of zoning.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bama Investors, Inc. v. METROPOLITAN DADE CTY.
349 So. 2d 207 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1977)
General Elec. Credit v. Metropolitan Dade Cty.
346 So. 2d 1049 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1977)
Kasser v. Dade County
344 So. 2d 928 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1977)
Peterson v. Dade County
329 So. 2d 47 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1976)
Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County
237 So. 2d 201 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1970)
Keay v. City of Coral Gables
236 So. 2d 133 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1970)
Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee
224 So. 2d 781 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
213 So. 2d 485, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/metropolitan-dade-county-v-greenlee-fladistctapp-1968.