Metelski v. Commissioner

2000 T.C. Memo. 95, 79 T.C.M. 1705, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 109
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMarch 21, 2000
DocketNo. 12307-98
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 T.C. Memo. 95 (Metelski v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Metelski v. Commissioner, 2000 T.C. Memo. 95, 79 T.C.M. 1705, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 109 (tax 2000).

Opinion

JOSEPH HENRY METELSKI, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Metelski v. Commissioner
No. 12307-98
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2000-95; 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 109; 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1705;
March 21, 2000, Filed

*109 Decision will be entered for respondent.

Joseph Henry Metelski, pro se.
Robert T. Bennett, for respondent.
Carluzzo, Lewis R.

CARLUZZO

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

CARLUZZO, SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE: Respondent determined a deficiency of $ 3,764 in petitioner's 1995 Federal income tax. The issue for decision is whether a lump-sum payment received by petitioner from his former employer is excludable from income under section 104(a)(2). Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year 1995.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioner filed a timely 1995 Federal income tax return. At the time the petition was filed, he resided in Bedminster, New Jersey.

Petitioner began employment with AT&T Communications, Inc. (AT&T) in December 1963 and remained so employed until his employment was terminated, as discussed below, on May 18, 1995. As of that date, and during all other times relevant here, he was a manager in AT&T's international operations division. As a manager, petitioner's employment relationship with AT&T was described as "at-will", which, according to an AT&T publication, meant that*110 petitioner had "the right to terminate * * * [his] employment at any time for any reason, and * * * [AT&T reserved] the right to terminate * * * [petitioner] on the same basis, regardless of any statements, written or oral, by * * * [AT&T], or any of its employees or representatives, which may seem to be the contrary."

In early 1994, petitioner received formal notification that senior managers within his division had elected to implement AT&T's Force Management Program (the retirement program). He was 57 years old at the time. As described in literature provided to petitioner by AT&T, the retirement program was designed "to give * * * [AT&T's] managers the flexibility they need to reduce the number of management employees when necessary" because of "force or skills imbalances resulting from conditions such as changes in business strategy, technological changes, unfavorable economic circumstances, decisions to exit a particular market or business, and facility/office closings or consolidations, position eliminations, business process reengineering and skills mismatch." Later that year petitioner was advised that he was within a category of manager/employees eligible to "voluntarily" *111 terminate employment with AT&T in return for specified payments. In general, the payments were determined by a formula that took into account the number of years that the employee was employed by AT&T and the employee's age.

On August 31, 1994, petitioner signed the first of a series of documents that terminated his employment with AT&T pursuant to the retirement program. Under the options selected by petitioner, he was entitled to remain as an active AT&T employee for 35 weeks following the date of the above agreement. During this time, although not required to report to work, petitioner was compensated by periodic payments at his then salary (the periodic payments) and eligible for other employee benefits. At the conclusion of the 35 weeks, after signing several other program documents, releases, and waivers, petitioner became entitled to, and received, a lump-sum payment of $ 12,417.62 (the lump-sum payment). The amount of the lump- sum payment was specified under the terms of the retirement program to be 20 percent of the periodic payments.

The release/waiver that petitioner signed in connection with the lump-sum payment contained the following paragraphs:

   4. I realize*112 that there are various state and federal laws

    that govern my employment relationship with * * *

    [AT&T] and/or prohibit employment discrimination on the

    basis of age, color, race, gender, sexual

    preference/orientation, marital status, national

    origin, mental or physical disability, religious

    affiliation or veteran status and that these laws are

    enforced through the courts and agencies such as the

    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Department of

    Labor and State Human Rights Agencies. Such laws

    include, but are not limited to, Title VII of the Civil

    Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in

    Employment Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981,

    etc. In consideration of * * * [the lump-sum payment],

    I intend to give up any rights I may have under these

    or any other laws with respect to my employment and

    termination of employment at * * * [AT&T] and

    acknowledge that * * * [AT&T] * * * [has] not (a)

    discriminated against*113 me, (b) breached any express or

    implied contract with me, or (c) otherwise acted unlawfully

    toward me.

   5. Subject to paragraph 6 herein, on behalf of myself, my

    heirs, executors, administrators, successors and

    assigns, I release and discharge * * * [AT&T], and * * *

    [its] successors, assigns, subsidiaries, affiliates,

    shareholders, directors, officers, representatives,

    agents and employees ("Releases") from any and all

    claims, including claims for attorney's fees and costs,

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Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.
348 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court, 1955)
Commissioner v. Schleier
515 U.S. 323 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Albert J. Taggi & Ann D. Taggi v. United States
35 F.3d 93 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Bagley v. Commissioner
105 T.C. No. 27 (U.S. Tax Court, 1995)
Glynn v. Commissioner
76 T.C. 116 (U.S. Tax Court, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2000 T.C. Memo. 95, 79 T.C.M. 1705, 2000 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/metelski-v-commissioner-tax-2000.