Metcalf v. Tra-Minw, Ps

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 24-6845
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIRACLE METCALF, No. 24-6845 D.C. No. 3:24-cv-05288-DWC Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

TRA-MINW, PS, doing business as TRA Medical Imaging; TRA-MINW JV, LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington David W. Christel, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted May 26, 2026***

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Miracle Metcalf appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

her action alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Rehabilitation Act, and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Saloojas, Inc. v.

Aetna Health of Cal., Inc., 80 F.4th 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Metcalf’s ADA claim for lack of

Article III standing because Metcalf failed to allege facts sufficient to show a

future injury. See Langer v. Kiser, 57 F.4th 1085, 1092-94 (9th Cir. 2023)

(explaining that a private plaintiff proceeding under Title III of the ADA “must

establish a sufficient future injury by alleging that they are either currently deterred

from visiting the place of public accommodation because of a barrier, or that they

were previously deterred and that they intend to return to the place of public

accommodation, where they are likely to reencounter the barrier”).

The district court properly dismissed Metcalf’s Rehabilitation Act and

Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) claims because Metcalf

failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she was denied public accommodation

because of her disability. See Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th

Cir. 2010) (setting forth requirements of a Rehabilitation Act claim, and explaining

that “[a]n organization that receives federal funds violates [the Rehabilitation Act]

if it denies a qualified individual with a disability a reasonable accommodation that

the individual needs in order to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits of public

services”); Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1328 (Wash. 1996)

2 24-6845 (setting forth elements of WLAD claim, including that the plaintiff was

“discriminated against by receiving treatment that was not comparable to the level

of designated services provided to individuals without disabilities by or at the place

of public accommodation”).

The district court properly dismissed Metcalf’s state law outrage claim

because Metcalf failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See

Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1012-13 (Wash. 1989) (setting forth elements of

outrage claim, and explaining that “mere insults and indignities, such as causing

embarrassment or humiliation, will not support imposition of liability on a claim of

outrage”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

because Metcalf has not shown that she could cure the deficiencies of her

complaint.1 See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041

(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend

1 Although the district court determined that leave to amend was not appropriate because it was “improbable” that Metcalf could cure the deficiencies of her complaint, rather than determining that amendment would be futile, this error was harmless.

3 24-6845 may be denied when amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-6845