Metcalf v. Mayor of Boston

33 N.E. 586, 158 Mass. 284, 1893 Mass. LEXIS 286
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMarch 2, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 33 N.E. 586 (Metcalf v. Mayor of Boston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Metcalf v. Mayor of Boston, 33 N.E. 586, 158 Mass. 284, 1893 Mass. LEXIS 286 (Mass. 1893).

Opinion

Knowlton, J.

The street commissioners and the city council of the city of Boston laid out a street, two hundred feet wide and about two miles long, in that part of the city which was formerly Brighton. The centre of the street, to the width of sixty feet, has been wrought and fitted for public travel. The petitioners own a large tract of land abutting on the street, which they wish to sell or use for building lots, and they ask for a writ of mandamus to compel the city to grade the street, and fit it for travel through its entire width.

The fundamental question is whether, when a street or highway is laid out, the authorities are bound to make it safe and convenient for travellers through its whole width, if it is so wrought as to be reasonably fit for the public use for which it [285]*285was designed. We think it is well settled in this Commonwealth that they are not. Howard v. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189. Smith v. Dedham, 8 Cush. 522. Keith v. Easton, 2 Allen, 552. Weare v Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334. The requirements of the Pub. Sts. c. 49, § 9, that the county commissioners, whenever a highway is laid out or altered, “ shall in their return determine and specify the manner in which such new highway or alteration shall be made,” implies that the way is not necessarily to be wrought through its entire width. In many places a sufficiently good way can be constructed without occupying nearly the whole of the land taken. Sometimes the existence of ledges or the necessity of carrying the road along steep hillsides, or of making deep cuts or high embankments, renders it almost impossible to grade the road from side to side of the location. It may be necessary, for the purposes of construction and repair, to include within the location much more land than is needed for the travelled path, and it is for the tribunal laying out the way to determine how much shall be taken for the location, and how wide the way shall be wrought for public use.

It is' contended that the abutting landowners have a right to require the construction of the road up to the lines of their lots for convenience of access. Undoubtedly they have a right of access to the road from their lots; but roads are constructed for the use of the public, and there is no law requiring cities and towns to construct approaches from the houses or lots of adjacent landowners to the travelled part of the way, or to grade and construct the way up to the lines of the lots to enhance the value of the property. If the construction of the road in a reasonable way for public use will be likely to make access to the road from a neighboring lot difficult, and to require a- large expenditure on the part of the owner in the construction of a passageway, that will be taken into account in assessing the damages.

The petitioners in the present case own the fee of the street to the centre opposite their land, and they have a right to make for themselves driveways to the wrought part of the street in any reasonable way which does not interfere with the use of the street by the public.

The only remaining question is whether the order laying out the street prescribes the mode of constructing it in such a sense [286]*286that the city is bound to grade it to its full width. As we have already said, county commissioners, when they lay out a highway, are required by the statute to prescribe the mode of constructing it. Pub. Sts. c. 49, § 9. If the city or town fails to construct it in accordance with their order, it becomes their duty to construct it, and the cost can be collected from the city or town. Pub. Sts. c. 49, §§ 60, 61. If the county commissioners neglect to perform this duty, a writ of mandamus will be issued to compel them to do it. Richards v. County Commissioners, 120 Mass. 401.

By the charter of the city of Boston, the mayor and aldermen were given all the powers in regard to laying out streets that selectmen of towns had. St. 1821, c. 110, §§ 5-8, 11-15. St. 1854, c. 448. By the last mentioned statute they are also given all the powers of county commissioners. Selectmen of towns had power to lay out town ways and private ways, to be completely established by a confirmatory vote of the town. St. 1786, c. 67, § 1., Rev. Sts. c. 24, § 66. County commissioners can lay out highways. It would seem, therefore, that the mayor and alder-men of Boston, previously to the enactment of the law creating the board of street commissioners, could lay out town ways and report them for confirmatory action by the city council, and could also lay out highways in the performance of their duties as county commissioners. By the St. of 1870, c. 837, (Pub. Sts. c. 22, §§ 30, 31,) all the powers of the board of aldermen in regard to laying out streets are conferred on the street commissioners, with a provision requiring in certain cases a concurrent vote of both branches of the city council. This street was laid out under the authority of this statute, the mayor and aldermen and common council acting concurrently with the street commissioners. The street commissioners were not merely performing the functions of county commissioners, and it is at least doubtful whether the provisions of the Pub. Sts. c. 49, § 9, requiring county commissioners to specify the manner of construction of a way, and the time within which it shall be completed, were applicable to them.

The order is silent in regard to the time within which the work is to be completed, and also in regard to the manner of construction, except that the grade is given. Doubtless it would have been more in conformity with the usual mode of [287]*287procedure in such cases, if details had been given showing the condition in which the street was to be left on completion; but we are of opinion that fixing a grade of the street cannot be deemed equivalent to a statement that the street is to be wrought to its full width, or to any particular width, in fitting it for the use of the public.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Anderson v. Healy
629 N.E.2d 312 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1994)
Sturdy v. Planning Board
586 N.E.2d 11 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1992)
Marcus v. County Commissioners
181 N.E.2d 654 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1962)
Pima County v. De Concini
285 P.2d 609 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1955)
Breinig v. Allegheny County
2 A.2d 842 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1938)
Shuptrine v. Herron
180 So. 620 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1938)
Anzalone v. Metropolitan District Commission
153 N.E. 325 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1926)
Preston v. City of Newton
100 N.E. 641 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1913)
Crawford v. Town of Marion
69 S.E. 763 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1910)
McCarthy v. Street Commissioners
74 N.E. 659 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1905)
Attorney General v. Mayor of Boston
186 Mass. 209 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1904)
Como v. City of Worcester
59 N.E. 444 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1901)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 N.E. 586, 158 Mass. 284, 1893 Mass. LEXIS 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/metcalf-v-mayor-of-boston-mass-1893.