Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedFebruary 19, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-07182
StatusUnknown

This text of Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd. (Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd., (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 FACEBOOK, INC., Case No. 20-cv-07182-JCS

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS

10 BRANDTOTAL LTD., et al., 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 77

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Facebook, Inc. brought this action asserting various claims against Defendants 15 BrandTotal Ltd. and Unimania, Inc. (collectively, “BrandTotal”1) based on BrandTotal’s 16 collection and marketing of data from Facebook’s websites—specifically, its eponymous social 17 network (hereinafter the “Facebook Network,” in order to distinguish that product from the 18 corporate entity) and Instagram. BrandTotal asserts counterclaims based on Facebook blocking its 19 access to those products, and the Court previously denied BrandTotal’s application for a 20 temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Facebook now moves to dismiss BrandTotal’s 21 counterclaims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 22 Procedure. The Court held a hearing on February 19, 2021. For the reasons discussed below, 23 Facebook’s motion is GRANTED, and BrandTotal’s counterclaims are DISMISSED, with leave 24 to amend some counterclaims as discussed below. The shall file a joint letter proposing a schedule 25 on February 22, 2021.2 26

27 1 Unimania, Inc. is a software development subsidiary of BrandTotal Ltd. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 A. The Parties’ Allegations and Claims 3 The following subsections summarize the parties’ factual allegations as context for their 4 respective claims and positions. Nothing in these subsections should be construed as resolving 5 any issue of fact that might be disputed at a later stage of the case. 6 1. Facebook’s Allegations and Claims 7 Facebook is a social networking company with billions of individual users across multiple 8 products, including the Facebook Network and the Instagram social network.3 See Compl. (dkt. 1) 9 ¶ 13. All users of the Facebook Network agree to contractual terms including that users will not 10 do anything that would “impair the proper working or appearance” of Facebook’s products, will 11 not access or collect data from Facebook’s products “using automated means” without Facebook’s 12 permission, and will not attempt to access data that the particular user lacks permission to access. 13 Id. ¶¶ 21, 24, 26. All Instagram users similarly agree not to do “anything to interfere with or 14 impair the intended operation” of Instagram, not to “collect[] information in an automated way 15 without [Facebook’s] express permission,” not to access information “in unauthorized ways,” and 16 not to violate anyone else’s rights, including intellectual property rights. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 27. Users 17 of both networks agree not to do anything unlawful, misleading, or fraudulent, or to facilitate such 18 activity. Id. ¶ 23. According to Facebook, BrandTotal agreed to these terms when it created 19 accounts on the Facebook Network and Instagram. See id. ¶¶ 35–39. 20 Facebook employs various measures to prevent “scraping”—bulk automated collection— 21 of content from its products, including monitoring usage patterns, using “CAPTCHA” tests to 22 determine whether users are human as opposed to automated programs, and disabling accounts 23 that violate its rules. Id. ¶ 29. 24 BrandTotal offered programs called UpVoice and Ads Feed that users could install as 25 extensions for the Google Chrome internet browser, which Facebook alleges worked as follows:

27 3 This case concerns only the Facebook and Instagram social networks. References herein to 1 Once installed by the users . . . [BrandTotal] used the users’ browsers as a proxy to access Facebook computers, without Facebook’s 2 authorization, meanwhile pretending to be a legitimate Facebook or Instagram user. The malicious extensions contained JavaScript files 3 designed to web scrape the user’s profile information, user advertisement interest information, and advertisements and 4 advertising metrics from ads appearing on a user’s account, while the user visited the Facebook or Instagram websites. The data scraped by 5 [BrandTotal] included both public and non-publicly viewable data about the users. 6 [BrandTotal’s] malicious extensions were designed to web scrape 7 Facebook and Instagram user profile information, regardless of the account’s privacy settings. The malicious extensions were 8 programmed to send unauthorized, automated commands to Facebook and Instagram servers purporting to originate from the user 9 (instead of [BrandTotal]), web scrape the information, and send the scraped data to the user’s computer, and then to servers that 10 [BrandTotal] controlled. 11 Id. ¶¶ 45–46. Facebook alleges that BrandTotal collected information including “the user’s ID, 12 gender, date of birth, relationship status, and location information,” users’ “Ad Preferences” 13 information that Facebook used to determine what ads to show them, and—with respect to 14 advertisements that users viewed while using the extension—“information about the advertiser, 15 the image and text of the advertisement, and user interaction and reaction metrics (e.g., number of 16 views, comments, likes) associated with an advertisement.” Id. ¶ 54. According to Facebook, the 17 UpVoice and Ads Feed extensions used nearly identical code and functioned materially the same 18 way. See id. ¶ 57. 19 Facebook provides a searchable public library of all advertisements published on its 20 networks, which includes data such as the “Page” responsible for running the ad, the geographic 21 region it is directed to, and the number of users that viewed the ad on a particular day. See id. 22 ¶¶ 17–19. Facebook’s public library does not include demographic information about users that 23 viewed a particular ad, or information regarding how users interacted with an ad (e.g., “likes” and 24 comments). Id. ¶ 20. 25 BrandTotal induced users to install these browser extensions by offering gift cards as 26 payment for UpVoice users, by allowing Ads Feed users to review lists of ads they had seen in the 27 last ninety days so that users could return to ads that interested them, and by telling users that they 1 BrandTotal analyzed and sold the data that it obtained from users to corporate clients. Id. ¶ 37. 2 BrandTotal used different trade names for its browser extensions (which gathered data) and its 3 marketing intelligence product (which incorporated that data), and advertised its products to both 4 potential individual users (who might install the browser extensions and provide data) and 5 potential corporate clients (who might purchase data) on the Facebook Network. Id. ¶¶ 39–40, 42, 6 47. 7 According to Facebook, BrandTotal made misleading representations to users of its 8 browser extensions, both by including the Facebook Network in a list of “participating sites” when 9 Facebook had not agreed to work with BrandTotal or authorized it to access Facebook’s data, and 10 by failing to include Instagram in the list of “participating sites” even though the browser 11 extension scraped data from Instagram. Id. ¶ 50. 12 On September 30, 2020, Facebook disabled BrandTotal’s accounts on Instagram and the 13 Facebook Network and instated other technological measures to block BrandTotal’s access to 14 Facebook’s products. Id. ¶ 58. On October 1, 2020, Facebook filed a civil action against 15 BrandTotal in California state court alleging that the browser extensions breached Facebook’s 16 terms of service. Id. ¶ 59.4 Later that day, Google removed the browser extensions from its 17 Chrome Web Store, which disabled their functionality. Id. ¶ 60. On October 3, 2020, 18 BrandTotal’s chief product officer created accounts on Instagram and the Facebook Network using 19 false names. Id. ¶ 61.

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Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meta-platforms-inc-v-brandtotal-ltd-cand-2021.