Mest v. Dugan

790 P.2d 38, 101 Or. App. 196, 1990 Ore. App. LEXIS 334
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedApril 4, 1990
DocketA8706-04032; CA A50101
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 790 P.2d 38 (Mest v. Dugan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mest v. Dugan, 790 P.2d 38, 101 Or. App. 196, 1990 Ore. App. LEXIS 334 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

*198 WARREN, J.

Plaintiff, one of the beneficiaries 1 of a trust established in 1964 by James O. Fisher, Sr., brought this action against two of the trustees 2 for their claimed mismanagement of the only assets of the trust, two pieces of real property, one in Portland and one in Klamath Falls. The properties were operated as auto dealerships when the trust was established: James O. Fisher, Jr., owned and operated Jim Fisher Downtown Imports on three-quarters of a city block in Portland and George Dugan and Bob Mest, sons-in-law of the trustor, ran a Chevrolet dealership in Klamath Falls. Plaintiff alleged three claims for breach of fiduciary duty: (1) execution of the 1979 lease of the Portland property to Fisher Imports; (2) execution of a new lease in 1985 for the Portland property to Fisher Imports; and (3) renewing in 1985 the lease on the Klamath Falls property to George Dugan Chevrolet Co. 3 The effect of the transactions was that defendants had leased both trust properties to themselves.

The trial court found that the trust instrument allowed defendants to engage in self-dealing and that exculpatory language in the instrument required plaintiff to prove that they had acted in bad faith. The trial court also found that defendants did not obtain an appraisal or evaluation of the property before the 1985 leases were executed and held that defendants’ actions in leasing to themselves without first determining the fair market rental value constituted bad faith. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff on his second and third claims. 4

*199 We deal first with a procedural issue raised by defendants. The trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss for plaintiffs failure to join all of the beneficiaries, not all of whom are vested. Plaintiffs action sought the damages that he claims to have suffered as a result of the trustees’ conduct and would not affect the trust to the damage of other beneficiaries. They were not necessary parties. Condon v. Bank of California, 92 Or App 691, 759 P2d 1137 (1988).

In plaintiffs cross-appeal, he challenges the court’s conclusion that he had to prove bad faith in connection with all three claims, because, even if the trustees acted in good faith, self-dealing would be a breach of the trust. We do not agree. The standard of care for the trustees here is stated in the exculpatory clause contained in Article V(m) of the trust instrument and provides:

“The Trustees shall not be liable for any action taken, or for failure to take any action, on the advice of legal counsel or otherwise, save and except where such act or failure to act is due to fraud or bad faith.”

Plaintiff argues that the exculpatory clause does not specifically mention self-dealing and should not be held to apply to the challenged actions because of the strict principle that a trustee has a duty of loyalty to act on behalf of the beneficiaries to the exclusion of the trustee’s own interest. See Waterbury v. Nicol, supra n 1, 207 Or at 606.

On de novo review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the trust instrument permitted self-dealing by the trustees and that the exculpatory clause exonerates them, in the absence of bad faith. Exculpatory clauses do not reduce or enlarge the standard of care owed by a trustee, but a clause may relieve a trustee of personal liability and be valid in the absence of an attempt to eliminate liability completely. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 542 (2nd ed 1978). The trustees here were given broad discretion in the management of the trust. The instrument does not require them to use the properties for the highest and best use, absolves them of liability for any investment loss and permits them to treat the property as *200 if they were the owners. 5 The quoted exculpatory language comports with the instrument as a whole, which shields the trustees’ decisions from scrutiny, in the absence of bad faith.

In their appeal, defendants assign error to the trial court’s holding that plaintiff pled and proved facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. They argue that because, under the terms of the trust, they were allowed to self-deal, leasing the properties to themselves could not constitute “bad faith.” Defendants urge that bad faith requires some kind of ill will or evil motive, see Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F 321 (3rd cir 1918), which plaintiff did not prove. Plaintiff urges that bad faith is not dependent on moral guilt but, rather, may rest on a selfish or interested motive that results in reckless indifference to the rights of a beneficiary. See Black’s Law Dictionary 176 (4th ed 1968).

No Oregon cases have analyzed bad faith in the context of an exculpatory clause in a trust instrument. Although “good faith” and “bad faith” suggest a subjective element in the actor’s state of mind, see Maine Bonding v. Centennial Ins. Co., 298 Or 514, 519, 693 P2d 1296 (1985), we conclude that, in a self-dealing situation, a conscious or intentional element is not required to prove bad faith. A trustee’s act that completely ignores the interests of beneficiaries, intentional or not, constitutes bad faith. To hold otherwise would negate a primary purpose of the trust — administration of the assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries. See Grandy et al v. Robinson, 180 Or 315, 324, 175 P2d 463 (1946). As the Supreme Court stated in addressing the standard of care owed by an insurer in a conflict of interest situation:

“Good faith requires the insurer * * * to treat the conflicting interests of itself and the insured with impartiality, giving equal consideration to both interests.” Eastham v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 273 Or 600, 607, 540 P2d 364 (1975).

No less a standard can apply to a trustee. Even if the trust *201 instrument allows a trustee to consider his own interests, he cannot do so without consideration of the interests of the beneficiaries. If he does, he acts in bad faith. See Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 767 P2d 903, mod 96 Or App 658, 774 P2d 500, rev den 308 Or 592 (1989).

The issue, then, is whether the trustees’ actions here were in total disregard of the interests of the beneficiaries. We conclude that, in the execution of the 1985 leases, they were. The bad faith of defendants was not in deciding to keep the leases in auto dealerships in which they were involved. As trustees, they could decide to continue to lease the property to the dealerships; that decision, in and of itself, is not actionable under the trust. What makes it actionable is the failure to determine the fair rental value of the property when used for dealerships.

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Bluebook (online)
790 P.2d 38, 101 Or. App. 196, 1990 Ore. App. LEXIS 334, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mest-v-dugan-orctapp-1990.