Mesa Water, L.P. and G&J Ranch, Inc. v. Texas Water Development Board

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 13, 2011
• Docket: 07-11-00153-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 07-11-00153-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

JULY 13, 2011

MESA WATER, L.P. AND

G&J RANCH, INC., APPELLANTS

v.

TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, APPELLEE

 FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY;

NO. D-1-GN-10-000819; HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

ORDER

            Appellants, Mesa Water, L.P. and G & J Ranch, Inc., have filed an unopposed motion to abate this appeal so that they may continue a transaction in which appellants intend to convey their interests in groundwater rights to the Canadian River Municipal Water Authority (CRMWA).  Appellants have represented to this Court that said motion is unopposed and such representation is supported by appellants’ counsel’s certificate of conference.  We grant the unopposed motion to abate this appeal for a period of sixty days from the date of this order.

            Pursuant to a joint sale agreement between the appellants and a sales contract between appellants and CRMWA, appellants intend to convey their interests in the groundwater rights and, if the transaction is successful, appellants will no longer hold any interest in the groundwater rights at issue in the instant appeal.  In furtherance of the sales contract, it would appear that the parties have undertaken certain further actions prior to the contemplated closing.  During the period of time in which the parties complete these actions and finalize the sale, appellants seek to have their appeal abated.  Appellants explain that this period of time may extend over the course of several months, perhaps until November 2011.

            Judicial economy may be best served by permitting the parties to the contemplated sale the opportunity and time to fulfill their obligations under the contract the successful completion of which will likely render the appeal moot.  To require the parties to the appeal to prosecute the appeal during the pendency of the sale could be to waste both counsels’ and this Court’s time and resources.  So, to possibly expedite disposition of this appeal and in the interest of conservation of judicial resources, we suspend the operation of the applicable appellate timetables and order that the appeal be abated for a period of sixty days from the date of this order.  Tex. R. App. P. 2.

            Before the expiration of the sixty-day abatement period or upon any development that might cause the Court to reinstate the appeal, the parties are directed to advise the Court of the status of the transaction.  At the end of the sixty-day abatement period, the Court will entertain a motion to further abate the appeal should the need be present to do so.  We suspend all appellate deadlines and abate this appeal, removing it from our active docket and treating it as a closed case, until the sixty-day abatement period expires or until further order of this Court.  See Tex. R. App. P. 2, 43.6.

            IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                                                    Per Curiam

00%'>            On November 19, 2009, the State filed a new motion to revoke in cause number 7388.  On September 10, 2010, the trial court called all three causes for hearing[1] on the State’s live motions.[2]  Following a hearing, during which appellant pleaded true to certain allegations and not true to others, the trial court sentenced appellant to seven years’ incarceration in cause numbers 7227 and 7388, and two years’ incarceration in cause number 7228. Each of the sentences was ordered to run concurrently.

            Appellant has appealed this judgment by one issue.  Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting documentary evidence that constituted inadmissible hearsay.

Analysis

            The documentary evidence challenged by appellant’s issue is a “Request/Response Form” purportedly from appellant’s Potter County community supervision officer.  This form indicates that appellant failed to report to the Potter County Community Supervision Department for the months of July through September of 2009.  It also identifies appellant’s current address in Amarillo.  At most, this document would evidence appellant’s violation of the community supervision conditions that she report to the Potter County Community Supervision Department on a monthly basis and that she obtain permission before changing her place of residency.  However, this evidence has no relevance to any of the other violations of the conditions of community supervision alleged by the State’s motions.

            To support a revocation of community supervision, the State must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his community supervision.  Greer v. State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex.App.—Houston [14^th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (citing Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)).  Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support a revocation.  Id.  When reviewing a trial court’s order revoking community supervision, appellate courts must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Id.  In making this determination, the reviewing court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the order.  Id.  A plea of true to an alleged violation of a condition of community supervision, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision.  Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (citing Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979)).

            In the present case, appellant pled true to violations of the conditions of her community supervision in each of the three causes, specifically that she was delinquent in payment of restitution, fines, and/or costs applicable to each case.  Further, other violations unrelated to any information contained in the “Request/Response Form” challenged by appellant in this appeal were found true by the trial court.  In fact, in her brief, appellant properly concedes that “the trial court had before it other violations of community supervision on which it could legitimately base its decision to revoke [appellant’s community supervision].”  As such, the trial court’s admission of the “Request/Response Form” into evidence, even if erroneous, would not justify this Court reversing the trial court’s judgment.  See Greer, 999 S.W.2d at 486 (proof of single violation sufficient to support revocation); Hays, 933 S.W.2d at 661 (plea of true to a violation, standing alone, sufficient to support revocation).  Consequently, we must overrule appellant’s issue.

            Appellant urges this Court to reverse the trial court’s findings of violations of appellant’s duty to report[3] and to remand to the trial court for reconsideration because, without the failure to report violations, “the trial court may very well have given [appellant] the benefit of the doubt given the hardships in her life.”  A similar argument was rejected by our sister court in Sanders v. State, 657 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.App.—Houston [1^st Dist.] 1983, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).  We agree with the Sanders court’s analysis of this argument.

Conclusion

            Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                                                                                Mackey K. Hancock

                                                                                                            Justice

Do not publish. 

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[1]  By order of the trial court, these three causes were consolidated for trial.

[2] At the September 10, 2010 hearing, the trial court acknowledged that some of the allegations contained in the live motions had already been decided by appellant’s plea of true on June 10, 2009.  To the extent that any alleged violation in cause numbers 7227 and 7228 were addressed in the June 10, 2009 hearing on cause number 7388, the trial court acknowledged that those had already been determined.  Therefore, the September 10, 2010 hearing addressed only those allegations that were not previously determined in June of 2009.

[3] It is unclear to this Court how a determination that the “Request/Response Form” was erroneously admitted into evidence would have any bearing on the trial court’s determination that appellant failed to report to the Gray County Community Supervision Department as required by the conditions of her community supervision.