Mertz v. Von Schlemmer

13 So. 2d 133, 1943 La. App. LEXIS 309
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 26, 1943
DocketNo. 17827.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 13 So. 2d 133 (Mertz v. Von Schlemmer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mertz v. Von Schlemmer, 13 So. 2d 133, 1943 La. App. LEXIS 309 (La. Ct. App. 1943).

Opinion

This is a suit for workmen's compensation. Plaintiff, Henry Mertz, was employed by the defendant, Steve Von *Page 134 Schlemmer, as a baker at the defendant's bakery in the city of New Orleans. He was injured on May 19th, 1940, when he tripped and fell against a roller in the bakery. His right arm caught in the roller and, as a result, he suffered a compound fracture of that member. Defendant paid plaintiff compensation amounting to $187 from the date of the accident until August 24th, 1940, at which time defendant contended that plaintiff had fully recovered and was able to go back to work.

On May 19th, 1941, or one year after the accident, plaintiff filed this suit in which he claims that, as a result of the accident, his right arm is totally and permanently disabled and that he is unable to perform the duties of his former occupation of baker. He prays for an award of compensation for 400 weeks, less credit for $187 compensation previously paid by the defendant.

After the institution of the suit, viz. — on June 11th, 1941 — the defendant had plaintiff examined by Dr. H. Theodore Simon, an orthopedist, who advised defendant that plaintiff's disability in his hand and forearm amounted only to ten or fifteen percent and that plaintiff was fully able to return to his former occupation of baker. However, Dr. Simon recommended that an operation be performed on plaintiff's arm, known as a "styloid process", which Dr. Simon believed would reduce the percentage of disability to plaintiff's arm and any alleged discomfort caused by the fracture. On June 14th, 1941, in accordance with this recommendation, plaintiff underwent the operation which was performed successfully by Dr. Simon. Thereafter, he received heat treatments at the doctor's office until October 22d 1941, when he was advised that he was fully cured; that his disability had been reduced to less than five percent and that he could easily perform the duties required of him as a baker. The cost of this operation amounted to $302.91 and it was agreed by opposing counsel that, in the event the court should find that there was any compensation due the plaintiff, the amount of the expense of the operation over and above $250 would be credited against such compensation.

Defendant, in his answer to plaintiff's suit, resists liability on the ground that the injury to plaintiff did not arise out of his employment as baker or within the scope of said employment. In the alternative, defendant maintains that, in the event compensation is found to be due, plaintiff's recovery should be limited to compensation payable from May 19th, 1940, until October 22d 1941 (when plaintiff was discharged by Dr. Simon as cured), or a period of 74 weeks, and further, that the rate of compensation should be based on plaintiff's daily rate of pay of $4.26 for three days per week, rather than the usual 40 hour week basis, for the reason that plaintiff worked only three days a week and did not desire to work for more than three days a week, notwithstanding that he was able to obtain regular employment for a forty hour per week period.

After a trial in the district court on the foregoing issues, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for compensation for 74 weeks at the rate of $13.85 per week (which is 65% of the daily rate of pay of $4.26 based on a five day work week), less credit for $187 previously paid and less the amount of $52.91, representing the cost of the operation performed upon plaintiff over and above the $250 allowed by the compensation statute. Both parties have appealed from the decision.

In this court, the defendant has abandoned the contention made in his answer that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment as a baker and his counsel have frankly stated to us that the evidence does not justify the maintenance of this point. In addition, counsel do not seriously question the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge that plaintiff suffered disability for at least 74 weeks, since the evidence plainly authorizes this finding and even Dr. Simon, defendant's expert, concedes that plaintiff's arm was not restored to full use until after he successfully performed the operation known as a "styloid process". In fact, the only real complaint made by counsel for the defendant is that the district court should have based the award of compensation on a three day working week rather than the usual 40 hour week.

Conversely, the sole complaint of the plaintiff, with respect to the judgment of the court below, is that he should be awarded compensation for 400 weeks because he is unable to perform the work required of him in his occupation and is therefore totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the Employers' Liability Act. Act No. 20 of 1914. *Page 135

Defendant's contention that the compensation due plaintiff should be based on a three day working week is founded on the premise that the evidence in the record shows that plaintiff was known as a "part time worker"; that he had refused to work over three days per week, although he had numerous opportunities to obtain regular employment from the year 1928 up to the date of the accident and that, in these circumstances, his compensation should be based on the maximum time that he was willing to work rather than upon the time that he could have worked if he had so desired. In advancing this argument, counsel concede that it has been well-settled in this State, since the decision of the Supreme Court in Rylander v. T. Smith Son, 177 La. 716,149 So. 434, that, under section 8 of Act No. 20 of 1914 as amended by Act No. 242 of 1928, the rate of compensation to be allowed the injured workman is based upon his daily rate of pay; that, in computing the compensation, it makes no difference how many days per week the employee works and that he is entitled to recover on the basis of a full work week whether he actually works the whole week or not. Counsel say that the conclusions reached in the Rylander case and the similar rulings of the other appellate courts of the State (see Bolden v. Plant Line Stevedoring Co., La.App., 169 So. 189, and authorities there cited), are founded upon the fact that, in those cases, it appeared that the employees were not able to work for a full week because of economic conditions. Hence, it is said that the reasoning of those decisions is inapplicable to the present situation for, here, it appears that the employee has been able to obtain employment and he has refused to accept such employment because he does not wish to work over three days per week.

The argument of counsel for defendant might have much force, if the evidence in the case justified the resolution that the plaintiff was unwilling to work over three days per week. The evidence produced by the defendant in support of the proposition consists of his own testimony; that of Edward Naudon, another baker, and that of Lionel Morris, a member of plaintiff's union. The defendant stated that he had asked plaintiff to do extra work on several occasions but that the latter refused, asserting that he was satisfied with part time employment. Naudon declared that the plaintiff had previously worked for him as a bench hand; that he quit the job; that he later offered to employ him but that plaintiff refused the employment. Morris stated that he was acquainted with plaintiff for many years and that he had never known him to be employed regularly.

On the other hand, plaintiff testifies that he has never, at any time, refused regular employment; that, while it is true that he declined to work for Mr. Naudon, he did so because Naudon had previously discharged him and that a feeling of ill will existed between them.

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Bluebook (online)
13 So. 2d 133, 1943 La. App. LEXIS 309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mertz-v-von-schlemmer-lactapp-1943.