PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired:
In this appeal the court is asked to decide whether a tenant holding over after foreclosure is entitled to the eviction protections of the Rental Housing Act of 1980, D.C.Code § 45-1561
et seq.
(1981).
We hold on the authority of
Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine,
490 A.2d 1165 (D.C.1985), that the eviction protections survived foreclosure.
I
Appellants, Luther and Delorise Merri-weather, have been tenants at premises 5569 Central Avenue, S.E., Washington, for 11 years under an oral lease agreement with John R. Garrison, the previous owner, whereby they agreed to pay, and did pay, $145 rent per month.
Appellants continued in possession of the property after it
was sold at a foreclosure sale in April 1983.
In May and June, appellee, the current owner, ran advertisements in the Washington Post offering the property for rent at $345 per month with an option to buy. On August 31, 1983, appellants were served a 30-day notice to quit.
Upon expiration of the 30-day period, ap-pellee filed suit for possession in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court. The complaint, dated October 5, 1983, was, on motion of the tenant, dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Appellee filed a second complaint on December 6, 1983, this time identifying appellants as “hold-over[s] following foreclosure” and demanding possession on the basis of the “30-day notice to quit following foreclosure of premises.”
Appellee survived a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and after trial was awarded a judgment for possession. Both Motions Judge Harriett Taylor and Trial Judge Stephen Eilperin reasoned that as holdovers after foreclosure, appellants were tenants at will, D.C.Code § 45-222 (1981),
and entitled to only a 30-day notice to quit, D.C.Code § 45-1403 (1981),
rather than the eviction protections of the Rental Housing Act.
II
Appellants contend that since they have occupied the premises for 11 years under an oral lease, they are tenants by sufferance, D.C.Code § 45-220 (1981),
and as such were, on the authority of
Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc. v. Gassaway,
353 A.2d 288 (D.C.1976), entitled to the eviction protections of the Rental Housing Act of 1980.
In
Gassaway, the
tenant held over after her lease had expired and the landlord filed suit for possession on the theory that the tenancy had been converted to one at sufferance. Possession was denied. On appeal, the landlord argued that the notice to quit he gave the tenant complied with D.C. Code § 45-904 (1973),
governing the termination of tenancies by sufferance, and hence was valid. This court held that the Code provision was in conflict with the more recently enacted rent control regulations
and, therefore, must yield to the eviction procedures therein prescribed. The court then held that the notice to quit, which failed to state a permissible reason for eviction under D.C.Code § 45-1561 of those regulations, was invalid.
Appellee does not quarrel with the
Gass-away
decision. Rather, it contends that, even assuming
arguendo
that appellants were tenants by sufferance with respect to the original landlord, Garrison, by the plain language of the § 45-222 proviso that status changed upon foreclosure to tenants at will: “Provided, however, that in case of a sale of real estate under mortgage or deed of trust ... the [mortgagor] ... or those in possession claiming under him, shall be construed as tenants at will....”
In support of its position that appellants are therefore not entitled to the protections of the Rental Housing Act, appellee cites
Simpson v. Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc.,
396 A.2d 212 (D.C.1978) (per curiam), and
Nicholas v. Howard,
459 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 1983) (per curiam). In
Simpson,
an owner-mortgagor held over after foreclosure and was found to be a tenant at will and denied the protections of the D.C. rent control regulations, then codified as the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975.
This was so because the owner was only “a tenant at common law — one who holds or possesses lands by any kind of right or title [mere possession] and [not] a tenant under the renter’s statute — one who stands in a contractual relationship with his landlord.”
Simpson, supra,
396 A.2d at 214. In
Nicholas,
a tenant held over after sale of the premises and the landlord was awarded possession,
but was denied a money judgment for past-due rent. The case came to this court on appeal from the denial of recovery for past-due rent. The tenant was said to be a tenant at will and reference was made to the notice provision of § 45-1403 (termination of tenancy at will).
Appellants argue that since the appeal in
Nicholas
was from the denial of a money judgment for back rent and not from the denial of possession, neither the rent control statute’s applicability nor the tenant’s status as such were before the court. We agree. The holding in
Nicholas
was simply that without a contract obligating the tenant to pay rent, the statute authorizing recovery for rent arrearages (§ 45-1411) does not come into play. The court affirmed the denial of a money judgment for past-due rent because the parties had failed
to reach an agreement regarding rent. It was then that the court in
Nicholas
added:
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PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired:
In this appeal the court is asked to decide whether a tenant holding over after foreclosure is entitled to the eviction protections of the Rental Housing Act of 1980, D.C.Code § 45-1561
et seq.
(1981).
We hold on the authority of
Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine,
490 A.2d 1165 (D.C.1985), that the eviction protections survived foreclosure.
I
Appellants, Luther and Delorise Merri-weather, have been tenants at premises 5569 Central Avenue, S.E., Washington, for 11 years under an oral lease agreement with John R. Garrison, the previous owner, whereby they agreed to pay, and did pay, $145 rent per month.
Appellants continued in possession of the property after it
was sold at a foreclosure sale in April 1983.
In May and June, appellee, the current owner, ran advertisements in the Washington Post offering the property for rent at $345 per month with an option to buy. On August 31, 1983, appellants were served a 30-day notice to quit.
Upon expiration of the 30-day period, ap-pellee filed suit for possession in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court. The complaint, dated October 5, 1983, was, on motion of the tenant, dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Appellee filed a second complaint on December 6, 1983, this time identifying appellants as “hold-over[s] following foreclosure” and demanding possession on the basis of the “30-day notice to quit following foreclosure of premises.”
Appellee survived a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and after trial was awarded a judgment for possession. Both Motions Judge Harriett Taylor and Trial Judge Stephen Eilperin reasoned that as holdovers after foreclosure, appellants were tenants at will, D.C.Code § 45-222 (1981),
and entitled to only a 30-day notice to quit, D.C.Code § 45-1403 (1981),
rather than the eviction protections of the Rental Housing Act.
II
Appellants contend that since they have occupied the premises for 11 years under an oral lease, they are tenants by sufferance, D.C.Code § 45-220 (1981),
and as such were, on the authority of
Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc. v. Gassaway,
353 A.2d 288 (D.C.1976), entitled to the eviction protections of the Rental Housing Act of 1980.
In
Gassaway, the
tenant held over after her lease had expired and the landlord filed suit for possession on the theory that the tenancy had been converted to one at sufferance. Possession was denied. On appeal, the landlord argued that the notice to quit he gave the tenant complied with D.C. Code § 45-904 (1973),
governing the termination of tenancies by sufferance, and hence was valid. This court held that the Code provision was in conflict with the more recently enacted rent control regulations
and, therefore, must yield to the eviction procedures therein prescribed. The court then held that the notice to quit, which failed to state a permissible reason for eviction under D.C.Code § 45-1561 of those regulations, was invalid.
Appellee does not quarrel with the
Gass-away
decision. Rather, it contends that, even assuming
arguendo
that appellants were tenants by sufferance with respect to the original landlord, Garrison, by the plain language of the § 45-222 proviso that status changed upon foreclosure to tenants at will: “Provided, however, that in case of a sale of real estate under mortgage or deed of trust ... the [mortgagor] ... or those in possession claiming under him, shall be construed as tenants at will....”
In support of its position that appellants are therefore not entitled to the protections of the Rental Housing Act, appellee cites
Simpson v. Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc.,
396 A.2d 212 (D.C.1978) (per curiam), and
Nicholas v. Howard,
459 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 1983) (per curiam). In
Simpson,
an owner-mortgagor held over after foreclosure and was found to be a tenant at will and denied the protections of the D.C. rent control regulations, then codified as the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975.
This was so because the owner was only “a tenant at common law — one who holds or possesses lands by any kind of right or title [mere possession] and [not] a tenant under the renter’s statute — one who stands in a contractual relationship with his landlord.”
Simpson, supra,
396 A.2d at 214. In
Nicholas,
a tenant held over after sale of the premises and the landlord was awarded possession,
but was denied a money judgment for past-due rent. The case came to this court on appeal from the denial of recovery for past-due rent. The tenant was said to be a tenant at will and reference was made to the notice provision of § 45-1403 (termination of tenancy at will).
Appellants argue that since the appeal in
Nicholas
was from the denial of a money judgment for back rent and not from the denial of possession, neither the rent control statute’s applicability nor the tenant’s status as such were before the court. We agree. The holding in
Nicholas
was simply that without a contract obligating the tenant to pay rent, the statute authorizing recovery for rent arrearages (§ 45-1411) does not come into play. The court affirmed the denial of a money judgment for past-due rent because the parties had failed
to reach an agreement regarding rent. It was then that the court in
Nicholas
added:
D.C.Code § 45-222 (1981), defines appel-lees’ status (while they remained in appellants’ townhouse) as a tenancy at will.... However, this reference to a
tenancy
does not operate to impose contractual obligations,
i.e.,
for the payment of rent, upon the parties. Its purpose was to make the expeditious ejectment procedures of the Landlord and Tenant court available to the new owner (§ 45-1410) and to assure reasonable notice to the occupier (§ 45-1403).
Nicholas, supra,
459 A.2d at 1041 (citations omitted).
Appellants contend finally that even if they are tenants at will, the Rental Housing Act is the exclusive method for evicting tenants and supersedes all previously enacted inconsistent provisions including the 30-day notice provision of the tenant-at-will statute. More specifically, they argue that the § 45-1561(a) phrase, “except as provided in this section,” clearly indicates an intention to displace all statutory and common law provisions that may previously have affected the rights of renters.
Simpson
is thus distinguishable on the ground that the holdover, as the former owner, never had a “landlord-tenant relationship to the property” making the denial of the rent control act’s eviction protections proper.
All that remains of consequence, therefore, is the law as established by
Gassaway, supra,
and most recently,
Valentine, supra,
and since appellants are tenants of property, treated before and subsequent to the foreclosure as rental property, they are entitled to all the eviction protections prescribed by § 45-1561(a) of the Rental Housing Regulations.
Reversed.
TERRY, Associate Judge, dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in
Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, supra,
490 A.2d at 1170-73.