Merritt's Truck and Auto Repair, Inc. v. Bullard Trucking Company, L.L.C. (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 9, 2019
Docket18A-PL-2010
StatusPublished

This text of Merritt's Truck and Auto Repair, Inc. v. Bullard Trucking Company, L.L.C. (mem. dec.) (Merritt's Truck and Auto Repair, Inc. v. Bullard Trucking Company, L.L.C. (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Merritt's Truck and Auto Repair, Inc. v. Bullard Trucking Company, L.L.C. (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 09 2019, 8:34 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Alan D. Wilson Jacob M. O’Brien Kokomo, Indiana Scott L. Starr Starr Austen & Miller, LLP Logansport, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Merritt’s Truck and Auto Repair, September 9, 2019 Inc., Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Defendant, 18A-PL-2010 Appeal from the v. Howard Superior Court The Honorable Bullard Trucking Company, Daniel C. Banina, Special Judge L.L.C., Trial Court Cause No. Appellee-Plaintiff 34D02-1606-PL-427

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

[1] Bullard Trucking Company, L.L.C. (“Bullard”) sued Merritt’s Truck and Auto

Repair, Inc. (“Merritt’s”) in relation to the repair of a broken-down semi-truck

engine. Bullard made seven claims against Merritt’s: (1) breach of contract; (2)

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2010 | September 9, 2019 Page 1 of 5 breach of express warranty; (3) negligent bailment; (4) fraud; (5) breach of

implied warranty of merchantability; (6) breach of implied warranty of fitness

for a particular purpose; and (7) promissory estoppel. The case proceeded to a

jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bullard. The jury found

that Bullard had suffered $70,000 in damages but actually awarded a total of

$200,000 as treble damages, indicating that it had found fraud by Merritt’s. See

Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1(1) (authorizing award of treble damages for fraud).

[2] Merritt’s now appeals, raising seven issues of its own. Specifically, Merritt’s

contends that: (1) Bullard’s fraud claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds,

Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1; (2) the trial court should not have allowed

Bullard to ask the jury for an award of treble damages under Section 34-24-3-1;

(3) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to issue a pre-trial order

pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 16(J); (4) the trial court should have allowed

Merritt’s to rely on various warranty disclaimers; (5) the trial court should not

have sent Bullard’s negligence claim to the jury; (6) the trial court should have

given the jury a verdict form that allowed for the apportionment of a percentage

of fault to a non-party; and (7) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict.

[3] In its appellee’s brief, Bullard convincingly argues that Merritt’s failed to raise

any of these seven issues in the trial court and that it therefore waived them for

purposes of appeal. Despite having filed a 54-page appellant’s brief, Merritt’s

did not file a reply brief to respond to Bullard’s waiver arguments. We have

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2010 | September 9, 2019 Page 2 of 5 reviewed the record, and we agree with Bullard that Merritt’s waived all the

issues it raises on appeal.

[4] Merritt’s argues that Bullard’s fraud claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds,

Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1. Merritt’s did not make this argument to the

trial court, so it is waived for purposes of appeal. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17

N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. 2014).

[5] Merritt’s argues that Bullard waited too long to announce its intent to seek

treble damages under Indiana Code section 34-24-3-1 and that the trial court

therefore erred by allowing Bullard to seek treble damages at trial. Merritt’s did

not make this argument to the trial court, so it is waived for purposes of appeal.

See id.

[6] Merritt’s argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to enter

a pre-trial order pursuant to Trial Rule 16(J). Merritt’s did not complain to the

trial court about the lack of a pre-trial order, so this argument is waived for

purposes of appeal. See id.

[7] Merritt’s argues that the trial court erred by entering a directed verdict

prohibiting it from making arguments to the jury based on a warranty

disclaimer that appeared on various documents. However, when Bullard

moved for the directed verdict on the issue, Merritt’s offered no opposition. Tr.

Vol. IV p. 38 (“Well, you’ve already got me on that one. I guess.”). As such,

Merritt’s waived the issue for purposes of appeal. See Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at

264.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2010 | September 9, 2019 Page 3 of 5 [8] Merritt’s argues that Bullard’s negligence claim should not have been sent to the

jury “because, as a matter of law, no duty was owed.” Appellant’s Br. p. 43.

Setting aside the fact that the jury found Merritt’s liable for fraud, not

negligence, Merritt’s did not make this argument to the trial court, so it is

waived for purposes of appeal. See Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 264.

[9] Merritt’s argues that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a verdict

form allowing for the apportionment of fault to a non-party (Midwest Engines,

Inc.) and to instruct the jury accordingly. However, when the trial court

indicated its intent to use a different verdict form, Merritt’s did not object. As

such, Merritt’s waived this argument for purposes of appeal. See id.

[10] Merritt’s argues that Bullard did not present sufficient evidence to support a

jury verdict for fraud. In the trial court, however, Bullard did not file a motion

for judgment on the evidence or a motion to correct error making such a claim.

By failing to do so, Merritt’s waived this argument for purposes of appeal. See

Henri v. Curto, 908 N.E.2d 196, 208-09 (Ind. 2009) (holding that claim of

insufficient evidence cannot be raised on appeal in civil jury case “if not

previously preserved in the trial court by either a motion for judgment on the

evidence filed before judgment or in a motion to correct error”); see also Ind.

Trial Rule 50(A)(5) (providing that challenge to sufficiency of evidence in jury

trial may be raised “upon appeal for the first time in criminal appeals but not in

civil cases”).

[11] Affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2010 | September 9, 2019 Page 4 of 5 Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2010 | September 9, 2019 Page 5 of 5

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Related

Henri v. Curto
908 N.E.2d 196 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2009)
Gersh Zavodnik v. Irene Harper
17 N.E.3d 259 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2014)

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