Merritt v. Kijakazi

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedFebruary 1, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-00168
StatusUnknown

This text of Merritt v. Kijakazi (Merritt v. Kijakazi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Merritt v. Kijakazi, (S.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 23CV168-BLM 11 KENNETH MERRITT,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 13 v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 [ECF NO. 2] Defendant. 16

17 18 The instant matter was initiated on January 30, 2023 when Plaintiff filed a complaint 19 seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s “application for Social Security 20 Disability Insurance benefits for lack of disability.” ECF No. 1 at 1. That same day, Plaintiff 21 filed an Application To Proceed In District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF No. 2. 22 Having reviewed the complaint and motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to 23 proceed (“IFP”) and finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to survive 24 screening. 25 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs 26 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 27 States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 1 she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: 2 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution 3 or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or 4 security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or 5 give security therefor. 6 7 The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's 8 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 9 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 10 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is 11 well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont 12 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his 14 poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for himself and dependents 15 with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must 16 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, 17 ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 18 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to 19 reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to 20 other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff 21 initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement 22 proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because 23 the plaintiff possessed savings of $ 450 and that was more than sufficient to pay the filing fee). 24 Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 25 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 26 Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to IFP status. 27 According to his affidavit in support of application, Plaintiff receives $1100.00 per month in 1 $1020.00 per month on rent or home mortgage payment, $75.00 per month on utilities, $23.00 2 per month on transportation, and $250.00 per month on food. Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not have 3 any dependents who rely on him for support or a spouse and no one owes him any money. Id. 4 at 3. Plaintiff anticipates major changes to his monthly income because he “was getting SSI but 5 [] expect[s] that to be cut off any day now.” Id. at 5. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds 6 that Plaintiff has established that he is unable to pay the $402 filing fee without impairing his 7 ability to pay for life’s necessities. See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339–40. Accordingly, the Court 8 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. 9 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) 10 Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are 11 subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 12 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Social Security, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) 14 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a 15 defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 16 1126–27. 17 To survive, all complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 18 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 19 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 20 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 21 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, 22 “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not 23 suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning the 24 pleaded “factual content [] allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 25 is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 26 570)). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, 27 and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 1 cases proceeding under § 1915(e). Montoya v. Colvin, 2016 WL 890922, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2 2016) (citing Hoagland v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2521753, *1 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012)).

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Bartlett v. Strickland
556 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ali v. Cuyler
547 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1982)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Merritt v. Kijakazi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/merritt-v-kijakazi-casd-2023.