Merritt v. Cogley

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedFebruary 21, 2025
Docket3:23-cv-01031
StatusUnknown

This text of Merritt v. Cogley (Merritt v. Cogley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Merritt v. Cogley, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IAN MERRITT, Case No.: 3:23-cv-01031-CAB-KSC

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 13 v. MOTION 14 JONATHAN COGLEY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 On January 28, 2025, the jury in this matter found in favor of Plaintiff Ian Merritt. 18 [Doc. No. 143.] On February 13, 2025, Defendant Jonathan Cogley filed this ex parte 19 motion seeking leave to conduct juror interviews. [Doc. No. 148.] Plaintiff Ian Merritt 20 filed a response in opposition. [Doc. No. 149.] For the reasons set forth below, 21 Defendant’s motion is DENIED. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Defendant seeks leave from the Court to interview the jury to explore whether the 24 jury “consulted extraneous prejudicial information.” [Doc. No. 148 at 7.] Defendant’s 25 proffered basis is that (1) Plaintiff’s counsel made repeated references to Defendant’s 26 wealth allegedly in violation of a motion in limine and (2) that the awarded damages were 27 so high it “creates a strong inference that the jury conducted its own research into 28 [Defendant’s] publicly verifiable wealth.” [Id. at 3.] Defendant argues that there is no 1 basis for the jury’s verdict and, therefore, there is an “unmistakable inference” that 2 extraneous information influenced the jury. [Id. at 6.] Thus, Defendants purportedly 3 should be granted leave to interview jurors. The Court disagrees. 4 II. ANALYSIS 5 “It is incumbent upon the courts to protect jurors from the annoyance and 6 harassment” of being interviewed “on the course of their deliberations in the jury room.” 7 Bryson v. U.S., 238 F.2d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1956). Indeed, “it is improper and unethical 8 for lawyers to interview jurors to discover what was the course of deliberation of a trial 9 jury.” Smith v. Cupp, 457 F.2d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit has held 10 that “in cases where there has been no showing of juror misconduct . . . a district d[oes] not 11 abuse [its] discretion in refusing to allow postverdict interrogation of jurors.” Mitchell v. 12 U.S., 958 F.3d 775, 787 (9th Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 13 omitted). 14 Defendant Cogley fails to show any juror misconduct or that any extraneous 15 prejudicial information was brought to the jury’s attention. Indeed, Defendant only 16 speculates that the jury may have done its own research into Defendant’s wealth because it 17 heard evidence that Defendant sold his damaged Porsche after the incident for half its 18 purchase price, immediately purchased another for over $300,000, and then took a flying 19 lesson—all allegedly in violation of a motion in limine to preclude reference to wealth. 20 Defendant states that such behavior is “out of the ordinary for an American not of 21 considerable wealth” and “could have prompted internet research about [Defendant].” 22 [Doc. No. 148 at 7 (emphasis added).] 23 The Court previously ruled on Defendant’s challenge that the aforementioned 24 evidence violated the motion in limine. [Doc. No. 128 at 491–92.] The Court stated that 25 it did not violate the motion, that the evidence was relevant to Defendant’s post-incident 26 behavior, and that the jury would be instructed to not “make any speculation about wealth 27 or consider wealth in determining liability in the case.” [Id.] Indeed, the Court instructed 28 the jury in Jury Instruction No. 36 to not consider any party’s wealth in reaching its verdict. 1 [Doc. No. 141 at 16.] Moreover, regarding Defendant’s speculation of research by the jury, 2 Court instructed the jury daily to not do its own research into the case. [See, e.g., Doc. 3 || No. 128 at 76; see also Doc. No. 135 at 117.] Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent 4 || instruct that a jury is presumed to follow court instructions. See Deck v. Jenkins, 814 F.3d 5 979 (9th Cir. 2016); see Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). The Court 6 || finds the uncertain language Defendant employs in his own motion as demonstrative of the 7 || speculative basis for this request. As such, the ex parte motion is DENIED. 8 It is SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: February 21, 2025 (GR 11 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Related

Weeks v. Angelone
528 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Hugh Bryson v. United States
238 F.2d 657 (Ninth Circuit, 1956)
Lalli v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc.
814 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2016)

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Merritt v. Cogley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/merritt-v-cogley-casd-2025.