Merrimac Hat Corp. v. Crown Overall Mfg. Co.

Second Circuit

Merrimac Hat Corp. v. Crown Overall Mfg. Co.

186 F.2d 505

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJanuary 5, 1951

DocketNo. 66, Docket 21551

StatusPublished

This text of 186 F.2d 505 (Merrimac Hat Corp. v. Crown Overall Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Merrimac Hat Corp. v. Crown Overall Mfg. Co., 186 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1951).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Under Rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A., Crown, of course, did not waive lack of service by joining a motion to dismiss the complaint with its motion to quash service. As it was not served, no restraining order could be issued against it.

Since, however, Excello was served, we proceed to consider, on the merits, the denial of a restraining order as to it.² We need not consider whether, in some circumstances, a federal court may properly enjoin, pendente lite, a party from continuing with an opposition in the Patent Office. Suffice it to say that it would be an abuse of discretion to issue such an injunction where, as here, the plaintiff, long before bringing suit for such an injunction, had itself initiated the Patent Office proceedings. Accordingly, the denial of injunctive relief was correct.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Under Rule 12(b), 28 U.S.C.A., Crown, of course, did not waive lack of service by joining a motion to dismiss the complaint with its motion to quash service. As it was not served, no restraining order could be issued against it.

Since, however, Excello was served, we proceed to consider, on the merits, the denial of a restraining order as to it.² We need not consider whether, in some circumstances, a federal court may properly enjoin, pendente lite, a party from continuing with an opposition in the Patent Office. Suffice it to say that it would be an abuse of discretion to issue such an injunction where, as here, the plaintiff, long before bringing suit for such an injunction, had itself initiated the Patent Office proceedings. Accordingly, the denial of injunctive relief was correct.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

186 F.2d 505, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/merrimac-hat-corp-v-crown-overall-mfg-co-ca2-1951.