Merrick v. Herman

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-4464
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY JAMES MERRICK, No. 24-4464 D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00403-SPL-MTM Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* KENNETH HERMAN, Administrator of the Religious and Volunteer Services for the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, in his official and individual capacities,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Anthony James Merrick appeals pro se from the

district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging claims under 42 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act arising from

the denial of religious accommodations in prison. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) and on the basis of claim preclusion. Harris v. County of Orange,

682 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Merrick’s action because Merrick

raised, or could have raised, his claims in a prior federal action, which involved the

same parties or their privies and resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See

Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the

elements of claim preclusion under federal law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Merrick’s motions

to amend or supplement his complaint, for injunctive relief in the form of

additional legal resources, for appointment of counsel, for recusal of the magistrate

judge and district judge, and for a stay of the district court’s scheduling order

because Merrick failed to establish a basis for such relief. See Palmer v. Valdez,

560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and

“exceptional circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel); Am.

Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)

(setting forth standard of review and requirements for injunctive relief); United

States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard

2 24-4464 of review and standards for recusal of judges); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and

“good cause” requirement to modify a scheduling order, including to file untimely

pleadings); Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990)

(setting forth standard of review and factors used to assess the propriety of a

motion for leave to amend).

We reject as unsupported by the record Merrick’s contentions that the

district court was biased against him.

AFFIRMED.

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