Meridian Trust v. Loboguerrero

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0557
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0557 Meridian Trust v Loboguerrero 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0557 Jefferson County District Court No. 23CV31291 Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge

Meridian Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Marianna Loboguerrero and Maurice Loboguerrero,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Grove and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 12, 2026

Michael T. Kane, Evergreen, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Robinson & Henry, P.C., Benjamin C. Whitney, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Meridian Trust, appeals the judgment in favor of

defendants, Mariana1 and Maurice Loboguerrero, on their claims for

adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence and the parties’

competing claims for quiet title and trespass. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Meridian Trust and the Loboguerreros own two adjacent

properties, which we will refer to as the Meridian Property and the

Loboguerrero Property. The Meridian Property is a thirty-five-acre

lot that borders the much smaller Loboguerrero Property to the east

and south. In the aerial photo below, the Meridian Property is the

large lot that occupies most of the photo. The Loboguerrero

Property is the trapezoid-shaped lot at the top center-left.

1 Although the caption spells Mariana Loboguerrero’s first name as

“Marianna,” we use the spelling used in the parties’ briefs, the pleadings and orders in the district court, and the deeds.

1 (The Meridian and Loboguerrero Properties)

¶3 The source of the parties’ dispute is a fence that runs between

the two properties along (or near) a portion of the Loboguerrero

Property’s eastern boundary. The fence — drawn in the photo

below — extends from the home on the Loboguerrero Property out

to the property line, runs generally along the property line, and

then returns to the home, thus forming a yard for the home. The

fence was constructed by the prior owner of the Loboguerrero

2 Property, along with the home, no later than July 29, 1993.

Meridian Trust contends that the fence encroaches on its property.

(Fence Between the Meridian and Loboguerrero Properties)

¶4 Between 1993 and 2006, the prior owner of the Loboguerrero

Property used the fenced-in yard as his property. In 2006, Mariana

bought the property, and her brother, Maurice, moved in.2 Mariana

later transferred title to Maurice and herself as joint tenants. Since

2 Because the defendants in this case share the same last name, we

refer to them by their first names, intending no disrespect.

3 2006, Maurice has treated the yard as part of the Loboguerrero

Property, as has his partner, who has lived there since 2016.

¶5 Rhonda Lore, the trustee of Meridian Trust, along with her

then husband, bought the Meridian Property in June 2012, later

conveying it to Meridian Trust. Lore bought the Meridian Property

from the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), which had

acquired it through a foreclosure sale on February 18, 2011.

¶6 In April 2014, Lore came to believe that the Loboguerreros’

fence had been moved and encroached onto the Meridian Property.

She told Maurice and asked him to move the fence. Maurice,

however, insisted that the fence was on the property line and

refused to move it. In 2020, he made improvements to the fenced-

in yard, leveling the land and adding a retaining wall. In 2023, he

replaced sections of the original chain-link fence with a wooden

corral fence.3 And when Lore later crossed the fence to look at the

property boundaries, Maurice called the police to report a trespass.

3 When he replaced part of the fence in 2023, Maurice moved the

fence line and extended the fence by ten to fifteen feet. During the litigation, the Loboguerreros agreed to return the fence to its pre- 2023 location, and the district court ordered them to do so. The 2023 modifications are therefore not at issue in this appeal.

4 ¶7 Meridian Trust filed this action against the Loboguerreros,

claiming that the fence encroached onto the Meridian Property and

seeking to quiet title in accordance with the deeded property line.

Meridian Trust also claimed that Maurice had trespassed by

performing work on the encroaching portion of the yard.

¶8 The Loboguerreros counterclaimed for quiet title, adverse

possession, boundary by acquiescence, and trespass, seeking to

establish the fence as the boundary between the properties. They

asserted that the fence was on the property line, but if not, they had

acquired ownership of the fenced-in area by adverse possession or

by the acquiescence of Meridian Trust and its predecessors. They

also alleged that Meridian Trust had trespassed when its agents

entered the Loboguerrero Property to conduct a survey.

¶9 After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the

Loboguerreros on all claims. It found that neither party had

successfully established the physical location of the property line.

But it concluded that, even if the fence lies on the Meridian

Property, the Loboguerreros had established adverse possession of

the area within the fence because they and their predecessors had

continuously possessed the land since the fence was built in 1993.

5 The district court therefore quieted title to the disputed land in

favor of the Loboguerreros and granted their request to establish

the fence as the property boundary. It then found in favor of the

Loboguerreros and against Meridian Trust on the parties’ respective

trespass claims, awarding the Loboguerreros nominal damages.

II. Adverse Possession

¶ 10 Meridian Trust challenges the district court’s adverse

possession ruling in only one respect. It argues that the foreclosure

of the Meridian Property and the associated public trustee’s deed in

February 2011 — seventeen years and seven months after the fence

was built — interrupted the Loboguerreros’ and their predecessor’s

possession of the disputed land, meaning they did not possess it for

an uninterrupted period of eighteen years. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 Our review of a judgment after a bench trial presents a mixed

question of fact and law. State ex rel. Weiser v. Ctr. for Excellence in

Higher Educ., Inc., 2023 CO 23, ¶ 33. We review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.

Kroesen v. Shenandoah Homeowners Ass’n, 2020 COA 31, ¶ 55.

6 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Lind-Barnett

v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr., Inc., 2025 CO 62, ¶ 20.

¶ 12 To obtain ownership of real property by adverse possession, a

claimant must prove that their possession was “actual, adverse,

hostile, under a claim of right, exclusive, and uninterrupted” for

eighteen years. Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 549 (Colo. App.

2006). Eighteen years of adverse possession of land is “conclusive

evidence of absolute ownership.” § 38-41-101(1), C.R.S. 2025.

B. Effect of Foreclosure

¶ 13 Meridian Trust does not appeal the district court’s findings

that the Loboguerreros’ possession of the disputed land within the

fence was actual, adverse, hostile, exclusive, and under a claim of

right. Nor does it challenge the finding that, aside from the 2023

modifications, the fence has remained in the same location since it

was built in 1993, and thus, the Loboguerreros and their

predecessor have possessed the disputed land for more than

eighteen years. See Trueblood v. Pierce, 179 P.2d 671, 677 (Colo.

1947) (combining successive owners’ periods of adverse possession

under doctrine of tacking). Meridian Trust contends only that,

under section 38-41-101(2), any adverse possession of the land

7 enclosed by the fence was interrupted by the county’s “possession”

of the Meridian Property during the foreclosure proceedings.

¶ 14 Section 38-41-101(2) provides that adverse possession does

not apply against the state and that “[n]o possession . . . , no matter

how long continued, of any land . . . . dedicated to or owned by the

state of Colorado, or any county . . . shall ever ripen into any title,

interest, or right against the state of Colorado, or such county.” In

short, one may not adversely possess land owned by the state or its

subdivisions. Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 38; see

Bd. of Comm’rs v. Timroth, 87 P.3d 102, 103 (Colo. 2004) (“[O]ne

cannot adversely possess against the sovereign.”).

¶ 15 We reject Meridian Trust’s contention that this statute bars

the Loboguerreros’ adverse possession claim for two reasons. First,

the Loboguerreros do not assert their claim “against the state” or

any other governmental entity. § 38-41-101(2); see also Glover, ¶ 8

(noting that section 38-41-101(2) prohibits adverse possession

claims “against any city or county”). They claim “title, interest, or

right against” Meridian Trust — a private entity. § 38-41-101(2).

¶ 16 Second, and relatedly, the disputed land was never “dedicated

to or owned by the state of Colorado” or its subdivisions. Id.; cf.

8 Martini v. Smith, 18 P.3d 776, 780 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting that

parties could not claim ownership of road by adverse possession if it

“remain[ed] a public roadway”), aff’d, 42 P.3d 629 (Colo. 2002).

Meridian Trust’s argument that the public trustee “possessed” the

Meridian Property misunderstands the statute, as well as the public

trustee’s role in foreclosure proceedings.

¶ 17 A deed of trust grants the public trustee the authority to sell

property if the property owner defaults on the underlying debt. See

State ex rel. Coffman v. Robert J. Hopp & Assocs., LLC, 2018 COA

69M, ¶ 6; § 38-38-100.3(7), C.R.S. 2025. But the public trustee

does not “own” the foreclosed property. See § 38-35-117, C.R.S.

2025 (providing that deeds of trusts “shall not be deemed a

conveyance . . . but . . . shall be deemed a lien”). Instead, legal title

remains with the grantor of the deed of trust until it is conveyed to

the purchaser via a confirmation deed. See § 38-38-501, C.R.S.

2025; 2 Stephen A. Hess, Colorado Practice Series, Methods of

Practice § 68:5, Westlaw (7th ed. database updated June 2025)

(“Although a deed of trust to the public trustee purports to convey

legal title . . . , actually, legal title to such real property remains in

the grantor of the deed of trust or his subsequent transferee.”).

9 Thus, although the public trustee issued the confirmation deed,

consistent with her statutory authority, title to the Meridian

Property transferred from the prior owners directly to FNMA.

¶ 18 Meridian Trust cites Harrison v. Everett, 308 P.2d 216, 219

(Colo. 1957), for the proposition that “[t]itle by adverse possession

vanishes” upon the issuance of a treasurer’s deed following the sale

of a tax lien. But unlike a foreclosure, which typically involves a

lien by a private party, a tax lien is held by the government. See

Arnold v. Brent, 2024 COA 104, ¶¶ 16-17. Indeed, in Harrison, the

county acquired the property (not just the tax lien) through the

treasurer’s deed and owned it for seven years, thus implicating the

rule that “[t]here can be no adverse possession against the

government.” Harrison, 308 P.2d at 219 (citation omitted).

¶ 19 Additionally, a treasurer’s deed arising from a tax lien is

unique in that it “has nothing to do with the previous chain of title;

does not in any way connect itself with it[; and] is a breaking up of

all previous titles.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, it “create[s] a virgin

title erasing all former interests in the land.” Id. In contrast, a

confirmation deed after a foreclosure sale extinguishes only “liens

and encumbrances junior to the lien foreclosed.” § 38-38-501(1).

10 The chain of title otherwise remains intact. Aside from citing

section 38-38-501(1), Meridian Trust does not develop any

argument that an unripened period of adverse possession that

began before the deed of trust was recorded and which could be cut

off by the new owner is a junior lien or encumbrance within the

meaning of the statute. See Campbell v. Summit Plaza Assocs., 192

P.3d 465, 474 (Colo. App. 2008) (defining “encumbrance” as “a right

or interest in land of a third party”); see also Woodbridge Condo.

Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 44 (declining to

consider undeveloped, conclusory arguments), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.

¶ 20 Indeed, the supreme court has held that a foreclosure of the

adverse possessor’s property does not interrupt the period of

adverse possession. See Lively v. Wick, 221 P.2d 374, 378 (Colo.

1950). We see no reason, based on the arguments presented in this

case, why the same should not be true of a foreclosure of the

adversely possessed property. See Ocmulgee Props. Inc. v. Jeffery,

53 P.3d 665, 667-68 (Colo. App. 2001) (holding that period of

adverse possession spanned change in ownership of disputed

property where prior owner “did not dispossess plaintiff” or take

“legal action to regain possession of the land”); Compart v.

11 Wolfstellar, 906 N.W.2d 598, 607 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (holding

that foreclosure sale of land in possession of adverse claimant does

not interrupt continuity of adverse possession).

¶ 21 Finally, Meridian Trust correctly points out in passing that the

district court erroneously stated that the burden of proof was a

preponderance of the evidence. In fact, the burden of proof for an

adverse possession claim is clear and convincing evidence. § 38-

41-101(3)(a). But Meridian Trust makes no argument that the

district court’s misstatement of the burden of proof affected its

analysis or Meridian Trust’s arguments on appeal — which turn

entirely on the legal question of whether the foreclosure interrupted

the period of adverse possession. We therefore conclude that this

error was harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may

disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of

the parties.”); Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 382 (Colo. 2004) (holding

that erroneous application of preponderance of evidence standard

rather than clear and convincing evidence standard was harmless).

¶ 22 Thus, because the foreclosure of the Meridian Property did not

interrupt the Loboguerreros’ possession of the disputed land and

Meridian Trust does not challenge the district court’s adverse

12 possession ruling on any other ground, we affirm the judgment in

favor of the Loboguerreros on their adverse possession claim.

III. Other Claims

¶ 23 Meridian Trust also contends that the district court erred by

quieting title to the disputed land in favor of the Loboguerreros,

finding that the fence is the boundary between the parties’

properties, and finding in favor of the Loboguerreros on the parties’

competing trespass claims. But these arguments all depend on

Meridian Trust prevailing on the first issue. Because, as we have

concluded, the Loboguerreros own the land inside the fence based

on adverse possession,4 the district court correctly quieted title to

that land in their favor, declared the fence the property boundary,

and found that one or more agents of Meridian Trust had

trespassed by intentionally crossing the fence to enter the land.

See Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (defining

trespass as “a physical intrusion upon the property of another

4 The Loboguerreros maintain that the fence hewed to the property

line and that Meridian Trust failed to prove otherwise. Because we affirm the district court’s ruling that the Loboguerreros adversely possessed all land within the fence, we need not address whether Meridian Trust proved that the fence encroached on its property.

13 without the proper permission from the person legally entitled to

possession of that property”). We therefore affirm the district

court’s rulings on these claims as well.

IV. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE YUN concur.