Meredith v. Bear, Stearns & Co.

99 F.R.D. 629, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12358
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided October 25, 1983·No. Civ. A. No. 83-0953·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ARTHUR L. BURNETT, United States Magistrate.

The Court (Oberdorfer, J.) has referred to the Magistrate certain discovery disputes which have arisen between the parties to this litigation. Relevant to the resolution of the scope of discovery issues as to what is relevant to the subject matter is an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the issues as they now appear in view of the answer thereto, including affirmative defenses.

The several causes of action allege conduct by the defendants in violation of Sections 10(b) and 15(b) and (c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and related SEC rules implementing these provisions,1 in [630] connection with the representations made by the defendants Gordon Randolph Cox and Samuel R. Shapiro to the plaintiff Maurice M. Meredith encouraging him to purchase, and thereafter, retain common shares of stock of USLife Corporation during the period of April 3, 1981 through August 27, 1981. Plaintiff has asserted that these representations were false and misleading and that as a result of his actions and reliance on the defendants’ representations his cash investment in April of 1981 in the common shares of this company of $151,443.00, by July, 1982 had declined to $7,139.00.2

Specific allegations in the complaint highly relevant to the resolution of the scope of discovery to be allowed follow. Plaintiff asserts he is an “elderly, frail, retired man who has based all of his investment decisions on the advice of brokerage firms and their personnel. He has always invested in equity securities which offer medium to long term capital appreciation opportunities. Further, he never maintained a margin account for the purchase of securities other than the account created for him by defendants and was unfamiliar with its attendant obligations.” (Paragraph 8 of the Complaint.) Plaintiff has also averred that as a result of the losses and declination in value of this stock, he became “physically and psychologically incapable of managing his deteriorating investment situation.” (Paragraph 19 of the Complaint.) He has further asserted: “As a direct consequence of the devastating loss of assets in what he was told would be an essentially riskless investment, plaintiff has suffered irreparable psychological harm. He has required regular psychiatric attention. He has become paralyzed with fear and anxiety and rarely ventures from the shelter of his home. He has lost all confidence in his ability to cope with his daily life.” (Paragraph 21 of the Complaint.) Plaintiff has demanded $150,400.00 as compensatory damages for out-of-pocket losses, interest thereon at the prevailing market rate from April 6, 1981 to date of judgment, compensatory damages of $500,000.00 for severe mental anguish and psychological pain and suffering, exemplary damages of $1,951,-200.00 for knowing and purposeful deceit as part of a scheme to defraud, costs of this suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, and such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

In their Answer filed May 25, 1983, the defendants denied any false representations, fraud or deceit in their dealings with the plaintiff. They further denied that Mr. Meredith was unfamiliar with the obligations attendant to a margin account.

On September 28, 1983 counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion to modify subpoenas and for a protective order with reference to deposition subpoenas directed by the defendants to representatives of seven (7) securities brokerage firms and four financial institutions. Plaintiff requested that the Court prohibit the production of all documents in the non-public files of these individuals or their employer institutions pertaining to the plaintiff, other than those relating to the period from January 1, 1981 through September 1, 1981.3 Plaintiff fur[631] ther requested a protective order prohibiting deposition questioning (orally or in written form) of these individuals regarding the status or contents of plaintiff’s securities or banking accounts with their employer institutions for any time period other than January 1, 1981 through September 1, 1981, with the exception of questions relative to (a) any margin accounts plaintiff may have maintained with their organization prior to April 1, 1981 for the purchase of securities and (b) any arbitrage investments plaintiff may have made through their organization for more than $150,000.00.

Counsel, in his affidavit, argued that obtaining information about Mr. Meredith beyond the scope he outlined would be an unreasonable and unnecessary invasion of Mr. Meredith’s privacy and would not be relevant to the issues in this case, citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1649, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979), stressing that district courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery where justice requires protection for a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. He has further argued that the trial court must approve the reasonableness of the subpoena by balancing the possibility of exposing relevant information against “the incalculably precious right of the citizen to be let alone ... in the absence of evidence that the material sought is relevant ... and [must determine] that, under the law, there is justification for the invasion of the individual’s treasured privacy,” citing Herron v. Blackford, 264 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir.1959).

Defendants have opposed this motion- arguing that the allegations in the complaint and discovery already conducted4 make the information sought by their deposition subpoenas relevant to Mr. Meredith’s fraud claims, his reliance on the investment advice he received from the defendant Cox, and the impact his reverses with reference to the USLife Corporation stock had on him in view of his prior sophistication and experience in stock investments and the securities market and what his activities have been since July, 1982 to date with reference to his claim for “severe mental anguish and psychological pain and suffering” for $500,-000.00.

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Meredith v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 99 F.R.D. 629, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12358 (D.D.C. 1983).

99 F.R.D. 629 (Meredith v. Bear, Stearns & Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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