Meredith Lawrence v. Dentons Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP F/K/A Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: October 31, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-1215
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 31, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1215-MR

MEREDITH L. LAWRENCE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GALLATIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00123

DENTONS BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL, L.L.P. F/K/A BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL, L.L.P. APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND A. JONES, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: By our specific order entered on December 4, 2024, the

appellant, Meredith Lawrence, is limited to a single issue in this appeal: a

challenge to the validity of the master commissioner’s sale of property confirmed

by the Gallatin Circuit Court in its order entered on September 9, 2024. We have examined the relevant portions of the record and considered the pertinent

arguments of counsel. After our review, we affirm.

Our analysis of the only issue subject to appeal is not dependent upon

the protracted litigation between the parties. For that reason, we omit a

comprehensive recitation of the procedural history (spanning more than a decade)

underlying entry of the circuit court’s order confirming the judicial sale. Instead,

we note only that the circuit court’s order of sale was entered on May 28, 2024,

and that no timely appeal of that order was filed.

The master commissioner’s sale was conducted on July 25, 2024. The

report of sale was filed the following day, July 26, 2024. Thereafter, Lawrence

served written objections. He challenged the appraisal of the property; the manner

in which the sale was advertised; and the judgment lien of the appellee, Dentons

Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP. The circuit court conducted an evidentiary

hearing on August 16, 2024. In its order entered on August 22, 2024, the circuit

court denied these objections and others presented at the hearing. It confirmed the

report of sale. This appeal followed.

We restrict our discussion to the issue to which Lawrence has been

limited by our previous order -- the validity of the sale. Lawrence contends that

the sale was defective because the notice of sale failed to conform to the

-2- requirements of KRS1 426.700 by omitting the sum of money for which it was to

be made and because the appraisers appointed by the court lacked the necessary

experience and training.

The party taking exception bears the burden to prove his allegations.

Burchett v. Bank Josephine, 474 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Ky. 1971) (citing Will v. City of

Louisville, 176 Ky. 450, 195 S.W. 822 (1917); E’town Shopping Center, Inc. v.

Lexington Finance Company, 436 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1969)). Generally, a trial

court’s decision to confirm a judicial sale is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Lerner v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 423 S.W.3d 772, 773

(Ky. App. 2014). However, the nature of our review of this matter is impacted by

the deficiencies inherent in Lawrence’s brief.

The Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) govern the

organization and content of briefs filed with this Court. RAP 32(A)(4) provides

that the argument section of an appellant’s opening brief “shall contain at the

beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing

whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.”

Lawrence’s brief provides that his argument concerning the alleged defect in the

notice of sale proceedings was “[p]reserved through out [sic] the circuit court case

and (R 963, 964, 1083)” and that his argument concerning the appraisal process

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-3- was “[p]reserved at: (R. # 610, 791, 812, 813, 814, 825, 826[)]”. These statements

are woefully inadequate. As a consequence, we review the assertions concerning

the alleged defects in the sale proceedings only for manifest injustice. See Ford v.

Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021); CR 61.02 (“A palpable error

which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on

motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though

insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted

upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”); Hibdon

v. Hibdon, 247 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Ky. App. 2007) (an error is palpable if it is

“easily perceptible, plain, obvious and . . . so serious that it would seriously affect

the fairness to a party if left uncorrected.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)).

The specific manner in which Lawrence now contends that the notice

of sale was deficient is an entirely new issue. Nevertheless, the master

commissioner’s notice included the specific amount of the judgment underlying

the judicial sale. It also expressly referenced the court’s judgment and order of

sale. The judgment referred to the liens, and Lawrence had actual knowledge of

them. On these bases, we conclude that the circuit court’s decision to deny

Lawrence’s objection to the sufficiency of the master commissioner’s notice of

sale did not result in manifest injustice.

-4- With respect to his assertion that the sale was fatally defective

because the appraisers were unqualified, Lawrence’s brief includes only the

following conclusory commentary: “The Commissioner chose unqualified

appraisers to appraise the property when qualified appraisers were known and

available. Neither of the two appraisers in this case have [sic] the required

experience or training in the field of real estate.” Lawrence fails to identify the

appraisers or point to any evidence offered to show that they were unsuitable to

the task.

In lieu of further analysis, we simply note that following an

evidentiary hearing conducted before the sale, the circuit court observed that the

disputed property was “appraised by two disinterested, intelligent sworn

housekeepers of the county.” One of the appraisers testified that he had performed

over one hundred appraisals for the master commissioner in Gallatin County

beginning in the 1980s. The other appraiser testified that he had performed

appraisals for the master commissioner for approximately fifteen years. The

court’s conclusion that the appraisers were qualified did not result in manifest

injustice. There was no abuse of discretion.

In our order entered on December 4, 2024, we ruled that arguments

related to the validity of the appellee’s underlying judgment lien are frivolous, and

we prohibited Lawrence from challenging the lien. Nevertheless, he devoted the

-5- vast majority of his appellate brief to that very issue. In addition to our specific

order of December 4, 2024, Lawrence is subject to a standing order of this Court

entered as a result of his persistent and abusive litigation practices. While the

Appellee has not requested that we sanction Lawrence, we note that he has

impudently tested the forbearance of this forum.

The Appellee has filed a motion requesting that we take judicial notice

of two previous opinions, and we see no valid reason to support that request. By

separate Order of this Court, we shall deny that motion.

The order of the Gallatin Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Meredith L. Lawrence Aaron A. Vanderlaan Warsaw, Kentucky Frank K. Tremper Covington, Kentucky

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