Mercury Insurance Company v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 25-cv-10480-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

10 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, [Re: ECF No. 14] INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13 Before the Court is Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc.’s (“Samsung”) motion 14 to dismiss. ECF No. 14 (“Mot.”); see also ECF No. 19 (“Reply”). Plaintiff Mercury Insurance 15 Company (“Mercury”) opposes. ECF No. 18 (“Opp.”). The Court previously determined that this 16 motion was suitable for resolution without oral argument and vacated the hearing. ECF No. 24; 17 see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Samsung’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED 18 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 This subrogation action arises from a fire allegedly caused by a defective electric range. 21 See ECF No. 1-1 (“Compl.”). Mercury is an insurance company and brings this action to recover 22 damages caused by a July 26, 2024, kitchen fire in the home of its insured in Los Gatos, 23 California. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 13. According to the complaint, the Samsung model NE58H9950WS 24 slide-in electric range stove (the “stove”) had a defect that created a fire hazard. Compl. ¶¶ 7–9. 25 In particular, the stove allegedly had front-mounted knobs that could be turned on accidentally and 26 lacked necessary precautions to prevent it from being switched on by mistake. Compl. ¶ 9. Just a 27 few weeks after the fire, on August 8, 2024, the stove was recalled on the ground that “[f]ront- 1 fire hazard.” Compl. ¶ 8. Mercury alleges that, as a consequence of the defect, the insured’s stove 2 was accidentally activated and caused a fire in the kitchen, resulting in a loss of at least 3 $263,115.53. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 20–21. Standing in the shoes of the insured, Mercury brings a single 4 cause of action for strict products liability against Samsung. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14, 15–21. Mercury 5 seeks damages in the amount of $263,115.53, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and 6 attorney’s fees. Compl. at 3. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Dismissal of a complaint is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) “if the complaint fails to state 9 a cognizable legal theory or fails to provide sufficient facts to support a claim.” Sinclair v. City of 10 Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2023). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must 11 “take all allegations of fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 12 party.” Id. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain 13 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 15 570 (2007)). 16 In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the Court must consider the factors set forth 17 by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), and discussed at length by the 18 Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). A district 19 court ordinarily must grant leave to amend unless one or more of the Foman factors is present: 20 (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 21 amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, or (5) futility of amendment. Id. at 1052. 22 “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Id. 23 However, a strong showing with respect to one of the other factors may warrant denial of leave to 24 amend. Id. 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 “Under California law, ‘[t]he elements of a strict products liability cause of action are a 27 defect in the manufacture or design of the product or a failure to warn, causation, and injury.’” 1 Nelson v. Superior Ct., 144 Cal. App. 4th 689, 695 (2006)). Samsung seeks to dismiss the strict 2 products liability claim, arguing that Mercury fails to allege that the at-issue stove had a defect 3 that actually and proximately caused the fire. Mot. at 3–9. According to Mercury, the complaint 4 sufficiently states that the stove was defective and caused the kitchen fire. Opp. at 4–7. 5 A. Product Defect 6 Beginning with the issue of whether the existence of a product defect is adequately 7 alleged, Samsung argues that Mercury states “no facts showing a defect.” Mot. at 5–9. According 8 to Mercury, this contention is “flatly wrong” because the complaint asserts that the stove was 9 defective as it lacked the necessary safety precautions to prevent inadvertent activation. Opp. 10 at 4–6. 11 “California recognizes strict liability for three types of product defects—manufacturing 12 defects, design defects, and warning defects (inadequate warnings or failure to warn).” Lucas 13 v. City of Visalia, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Owens- 14 Corning Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 995 (1991) and Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co., 15 140 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1208 (2006)). Here, the complaint asserts that the stove was defective in 16 that its front-mounted knobs were suspectable to inadvertent activation and lacked protective 17 features. Compl. ¶ 9. Mercury also alleges that the stove was recalled just a few weeks after the 18 fire, based on the risk that the front-mounted nobs on the ranges can be activated by accidental 19 contact and therefore pose a fire hazard. Compl. ¶ 8. As a consequence, the stove allegedly 20 “contained defects within its manufacture, design, and/or warnings . . . rendering the Subject 21 Product unreasonably dangerous and defective.” Compl. ¶ 18. The Court considers whether the 22 complaint passes muster under any of the three asserted theories. 23 1. Design Defect 24 Under a design defect theory, a design may be defective in one of two ways. “First, under 25 the ‘consumer expectations test,’ a product’s design is defective if it has failed to perform as safely 26 as its ordinary consumers would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable 27 manner.” Lucas, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. “Second, under the ‘risk-benefit test,’ a product’s 1 danger inherent in the design outweighs the benefits of such design.” Id. (quoting Barker v. Lull 2 Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 (1978)). 3 As Samsung correctly argues, Mot. at 6, the complaint alleges no facts that go to the 4 elements of either design defect test. Plaintiff alleges that the stove was recalled for posing a fire 5 hazard, Compl. ¶ 8, but the fact of a recall, by itself, is insufficient to establish the existence of a 6 design defect. Samsung contends that the at-issue recall did not identify a defect or require users 7 to stop using the range. Mot. at 7. According to Samsung, the voluntary recall notice was merely 8 a precaution that made knob locks or covers available, which does not, without more, give rise to a 9 plausible inference of a design defect. Id. The remaining allegations that go to the elements of a 10 design defect are bare legal conclusions. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 19 (“The Subject Product and Subject 11 Property were being used in a reasonably foreseeable manner at the time of the Subject Loss.”). 12 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mercury has failed to allege a design defect. If Mercury 13 wishes to procced on a design defect claim, it should indicate which design defect theory or 14 theories it wishes to use and allege facts sufficient to make each theory plausible. See Lucas, 15 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. 16 2. Manufacturing Defect 17 Turning to the manufacturing defect theory, “a ‘manufacturing or production defect is 18 readily identifiable because a defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer’s 19 intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line.’” Id. at 1154–55 20 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 429). Here, the complaint lacks even a single factual allegation that 21 can be reasonably read to suggest that the insured’s stove deviated from the intended 22 manufacturing design. To the extent Mercury intends to allege a manufacturing defect, it “must 23 identify/explain how the [stove] either deviated from [Samsung’s] intended result/design or how 24 the [stove] deviated from other seemingly identical . . . models.” Id. at 1155; see also Ruiz 25 v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 24-cv-00489-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 278029, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2025) 26 (finding that a manufacturing defect claim that lacked allegations as to the way in which the 27 product “differed from its intended design” was a “bare conclusion” that was “not enough to 3. Failure to Warn 1 Finally, with respect to failure to warn, “[m]anufacturers are strictly liable for injuries 2 caused by their failure to provide adequate warnings of known or reasonably scientifically 3 knowable dangers at the time they manufactured and distributed their product.” Marroquin 4 v. Pfizer, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2019). A claim for failure to warn should 5 include allegations that “identify which danger was not warned against, explain that the danger 6 was substantial, and that the danger was known or reasonably knowable, or explain how any 7 warning that was given was inadequate.” Id. at 1160–61. 8 As Samsung persuasively argues, Mercury “does not allege a single fact about the 9 warnings that accompanied the Samsung range or how they were inadequate.” Mot. at 9. 10 Mercury offers no opposition to this argument, declining to address its failure to warn theory in its 11 brief. A bare legal conclusion that the stove “contained defects within its manufacture, design, 12 and/or warnings,” Compl. ¶ 18, unsupported by any factual allegations, is insufficient. See Ruiz, 13 2025 WL 278029, at *5. Absent any facts that give rise to a plausible inference that Samsung 14 failed to warn consumers, Mercury will be unable to procced on a failure to warn theory. 15 * * * 16 In sum, the Court concludes that Mercury has not alleged sufficient facts to identify a 17 defect. While Mercury protests generally that the complaint “surely does not fail for lack of 18 detail,” Opp. at 4, the opposition does not engage with the elements of any of the three theories of 19 strict products liability. Mercury correctly argues that it “may seek the specific mechanical details 20 of the defect during discovery,” Opp. at 5 (quoting Tappana v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 21 609 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2022)). Nonetheless, Mercury has not even alleged the 22 most basic facts that would transform the complaint from mere conclusions of law to plausible 23 allegations that support a claim. Mercury should clearly identify which theories it seeks to 24 proceed on and state facts that make the existence of a defect plausible under those theories. 25 B. Causation 26 Turning to the causation element, Samsung takes the position that the complaint’s 27 allegations are rote conclusions that do not establish causation. Mot. at 3–5. Mercury contends 1 that the complaint is specific enough to support a plausible inference that the alleged defect caused 2 the kitchen fire. Opp. at 6–7. 3 To state a strict products liability claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish 4 that the alleged defect caused the injury. See Higginbottom v. Dexcom, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 3d 5 1058, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 2024). Here, the complaint alleges that the fire would not have occurred if 6 the “front-mounted knobs were not susceptible to accidental activation.” Compl. ¶¶ 10–11. 7 Mercury further alleges that the stove lacked necessary precautions to prevent this kind of 8 accident, “such as requiring front-mounted knobs to be both depressed and turned, to prevent 9 inadvertent activation.” Compl. ¶ 9. While the Court agrees with Mercury that it “is not 10 necessary for Plaintiff to explore every scenario in which these precautions would or would not 11 prevent the fire this early into litigation,” Opp. at 6, Mercury has failed to allege sufficient facts to 12 permit a plausible inference that the insured’s stove was the cause of the kitchen fire. Other than 13 the date and the existence of the stove, no other details about the circumstances of the fire are 14 included in the complaint. The remaining facts are nothing more than bare conclusions. See, e.g., 15 Compl. ¶ 10 (“The Subject Loss occurred because the Subject Stove was activated 16 inadvertently.”). 17 * * * 18 Because Mercury has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the existence of the defect 19 and causation, the strict products liability claim is DISMISSED. Because the Court determines 20 that none of the Foman factors weigh against permitting amendment, the dismissal is WITH 21 LEAVE TO AMEND.

22 23 24 25 26 27 IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Samsung’s motion to dismiss, 2 ECF No. 14, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Mercury SHALL file a first amended 3 complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order, on or before June 3, 2026. Leave to amend is 4 limited to the defects identified in this Order. Mercury may not add new claims or parties absent 5 express leave of the Court. 6 7 Dated: May 4, 2026

9 TH LABSON FREEMAN 10 United States District Judge 1] a 12

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