Merco Group at Akoya, Inc. v. General Computer Services, Inc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-0322
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed December 10, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0322 Lower Tribunal No. 2006-26218-CA-01 ________________

Merco Group at Akoya, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

General Computer Services, Inc., Appellee.

An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Law Offices of Geoffrey B. Marks, and Geoffrey B. Marks (Vero Beach), for appellant.

Crabtree & Auslander, LLC, and John G. Crabtree, Charles M. Auslander, and Brian C. Tackenberg, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Appellant, Merco Group at Akoya, the corporate judgment debtor in

proceedings supplementary involving an unsatisfied nearly decade-old final

judgment, appeals from an order appointing a post-judgment receiver under

section 56.10, Florida Statutes (2025), at the request of appellee, General

Computer Services, Inc., the judgment creditor. Casting aside the fact that

there is no transcript of the pivotal hearing, the cases cited in furtherance of

relief are inapposite because the plain language of section 56.10 of the

Florida Statutes plainly authorizes the trial court to appoint a receiver for the

corporate judgment debtor for the purpose of collecting the unsatisfied

judgment. See § 56.10, Fla. Stat. (“If an execution cannot be satisfied in

whole or in part for lack of property of the corporate judgment debtor subject

to levy and sale . . . the circuit court in chancery . . . may appoint a receiver

for the corporate judgment debtor.”); see also Applegate v. Barnett Bank of

Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the

trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying

factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not

supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory.”). We decline the

invitation to engraft further language onto the statute and affirm the order

2 under review. 1 See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789

So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001) (“Under fundamental principles of separation of

powers, courts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes where the

Legislature clearly has not done so.”).

Affirmed.

1 We further note that chapter 56 proceedings are exempted from the scope of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(a)(15). See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.200(a)(15) (“The requirements of this rule apply to all civil actions except . . . all proceedings under chapter 56, Florida Statutes . . . .”). 3