Mercier v. General Electric

2003 DNH 125

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: July 11, 2003
• Docket: CV-03-125-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mercier v . General Electric CV-03-125-B 07/11/03

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gloria Mercier

v. Civil N o . 02-61-B Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 125 General Electric Company

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Gloria Mercier brings this action pursuant to the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). She asserts that her

former employer, General Electric Company (“GE”), improperly

denied her benefits due under GE’s Pension Plan and its Job and

Income Security Plan for Hourly Employees. GE has responded with

a motion for summary judgment arguing that it terminated Mercier

for cause before her right to benefits accrued.

I. BACKGROUND

Mercier was employed by GE’s Meter Business Department at

its Somersworth, New Hampshire (“Somersworth”) facility from July

1977 to February 2 0 , 2001. In 1998, GE began to transfer the Somersworth business operations to other GE locations. The

transfer took place over a number of years and resulted in the

layoff of approximately 200 hourly employees. GE posted the

layoff announcements at the Somersworth facility, which included

a list of employees with seniority. GE allowed senior employees

to “opt-in” for layoff in return for benefits in accordance with

GE’s job loss policies.

Based upon GE’s postings, Mercier knew as of December 1 5 ,

2000 that she was eighth on the seniority list. At approximately

the same time, GE announced that a further layoff would occur in

April, 2001. Relying on this information, Mercier decided to

participate in the April layoff.

Before Mercier could take advantage of the scheduled layoff,

GE terminated her because of her repeated failure to comply with

company policies. From 1997 until her termination, Mercier

received repeated warnings for a variety of violations of

policies and rules set forth in GE’s employee handbook.

Mercier’s tardiness and unauthorized absences were particularly

egregious, resulting in multiple warnings that continued

violations would be grounds for termination.

-2- In October 1999, Mercier signed a “last chance” agreement

with GE in which she acknowledged the seriousness of her conduct

and promised to comply with GE’s rules or face immediate

discharge. Although Mercier’s conduct improved after she signed

the agreement, it soured again in early 2001. Rather than

discharge Mercier immediately for these violations, GE issued

more warnings. On February 1 2 , 2001, after yet another

violation, GE emphatically notified Mercier that no further

violations would be tolerated. Nevertheless, on February 1 9 ,

2001, Mercier left her work station without authorization.

Because of the violation, Mercier’s history of disciplinary

problems, and her failure to comply with prior warnings, GE

terminated her on February 2 0 , 2001.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A genuine issue is one “that properly can be resolved

-3- only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved

in favor of either party.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 2 4 2 , 250 (1986). A material fact is one that affects the

outcome of the suit. See id. at 248.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, I must construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See

Navarro v . Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 9 0 , 94 (1st Cir. 2001). The

party moving for summary judgment, however, “bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323

(1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “produce evidence on

which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof

burden, could base a verdict for i t ; if that party cannot produce

such evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v .

Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 2 4 9 ) . Neither

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, or unsupported

-4- speculation are sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See

Carroll v . Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 2 3 1 , 236-37 (1st Cir. 2002).

III. ANALYSIS

In her opposition to GE’s motion for summary judgement,

Mercier fails to rebut the material facts presented by GE

regarding the circumstances of her termination. Specifically,

she has offered no evidence to rebut GE’s contention that it

terminated her because she repeatedly violated company rules.

Nor has she offered any evidence to support her contention that

GE based its decision to terminate her in part on a desire to

deny her ERISA benefits.1 Instead, Mercier claims that her right

to pension and layoff benefits vested before she was terminated

and thus her termination is irrelevant to her claim for benefits.

Mercier invokes the doctrine of promissory estoppel to support

this argument.

Promissory estoppel claims in the ERISA context are only

viable with respect to former employees who participate in a

1 Accordingly, Mercier has no claim that GE violated ERISA by terminating her in an effort to deprive her of pension and layoff benefits.

-5- layoff or early retirement plan in reliance on the company’s

promise to pay particular benefits. See e.g., Abbruscato v .

Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 9 0 , 101 (2nd Cir.

2001); Panto v . Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730 (1988)

(employee chose layoff based on company’s written policy;

employee’s reliance on layoff policy could create viable contract

claim). Mercier’s estoppel claim fails because she did not

participate in GE’s layoff plan. Instead, she was fired for

cause before she could participate. While Mercier may well have

planned to continue working at GE until she was able to take

advantage of a future layoff, GE never promised to retain her

until she could fulfill her plan. Accordingly, Mercier’s alleged

promissory estoppel theory is not viable.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is undisputed that Mercier was properly fired for failing

to comply with GE’s rules and policies. She was not laid off

and, thus, is not entitled to layoff benefits. Accordingly,

Mercier’s claim fails as a matter of law. GE’s motion for

summary judgement (Doc. N o . 24) is granted.

-6- SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

July 1 1 , 2003

cc: Robert E . Fisher, Esq. Barry A . Buryan, Esq.

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