Mercer v. The Florida

17 F. Cas. 29, 3 Hughes 488
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJanuary 15, 1878
StatusPublished

This text of 17 F. Cas. 29 (Mercer v. The Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mercer v. The Florida, 17 F. Cas. 29, 3 Hughes 488 (E.D. Va. 1878).

Opinion

HUGHES, District Judge.

The cause is one of a steamer coming into a harbor studded with vessels at anchor and lined with vessels moored at the wharves, in what its witnesses called a dark night, and colliding with a vessel at anchor. A collision by a steamer running into a vessel lying at anchor anywhere, raises the presumption of fault against the steamer. Much stronger is this presumption where the collision is in a harbor at night when and where the utmost caution is required of the moving vessel. And steamers in motion are held to stricter responsibility for fault than sailing vessels in motion; because of the greater facility with which their navigators can manage them. 1 need not cite authority for these obvious propositions. • They are well-settled laws. On the other hand, I held in The J. D. Everman Case [Case No. 7,591], that in an open road-stead several miles square, where there was no harbor master and no known or conceded line of channel, a vessel might anchor anywhere at will. While that is emphatically the case in Hampton Roads, it is not the case in the harbor of Norfolk and Portsmouth, [30]*30deep water in which constitutes a channel in most of the harbor of only the width of a few hundred yards. Here they have a han. bor-master, who ought to be held to a very strict attention to his work and to an un-remitted discharge of his duty day and night. He ought to be an active, energetic, ever-watchful, never-negligent, earnestly-faithful man to his duties. Any other sort of harbormaster will be the cause of frequent collisions, much dissatisfaction to navigators frequenting the port, and continual and indefinite injury to the commerce of the two cities. X say that a harbor-master is here who ought to be on hand to assign vessels to proper and safe places of anchorage at all times. A vessel placed at anchor by him is presumptively free from fault as to the place of lying at anchor. Vessels, indeed, inust often cast anchor at times when they cannot avail of the services of the harbor-master. A vessel which casts anchor at such a time selects its place of anchorage on its own responsibility. If a vessel anchors at an improper place anywhere it is at fault, though if a steamer run into her when thus at fault the presumption is against the steamer and the burden of proof is upon the steamer to show the fault of the vessel. If a vessel chooses a wrong anchorage in a much-frequented and narrow harbor it will be held to more strict responsibility, and to be more violently in fault, because of^its being in a harbor; but if she is run into by ■■a steamer while lying there the presumption will be violently against the steamer, and the burden of proving fault in the vessel will rest still upon the steamer.

It is for the interest of all that settled rules of law on these subjects should be enforced. It will not do to say that the public interest of a city requires that steamers should be favored by the courts at the expense of smaller craft. Nor will it do on the other hand to maintain that men of small means and having small properties, like sloops and schooners, ought to be favored by the courts at the expense of wealthy companies owning great steamers. Ideas of what class of vessels do most service to the public cannot enter into the deliberations of court in cases of collision. Neither class of vessels can be allowed to proceed upon the notion that the other class has no right which it is bound to respect.

If steamers run out of the channel or too close to the edge of the channel of a harbor, and in doing so strike a vessel at anchor, ■ it will be always held in this court to be responsible for the consequences. It has- no right to try experiments of nice running in a narrow and much-frequented harbor. It must seek the middle of the channel and not swerve from it if possible.

On the other hand, vessels cannot be countenanced by the court in anchoring within the channel. Their duty is to get on the edge of it or out of it. If they obstruct the channel they must nit expect to recover damages If they are run down or run into by vessels in motion. The master of a vessel may think it will do no harm for his vessel alone to anchor in the channel, it being very easy for a steamer to go around one vessel. But the exercise of such a liberty by one vessel demoralizes the whole discipline of a harbor, and no one vessel has a right to take a position in which, if a hundred other vessels took like positions there would be an obstruction of navigation. Example is always contagious, especially vicious example.

I think I have said enough to indicate that I consider this case to turn entirely upon one single question; and that is, whether the Marion A. was anchored in the channel too far from the edge of it at the time of the collision. As to the light, the Florida’s witnesses only say that they did not see a light on the schooner. But the testimony of the witnesses of the schooner is positive, consistent and outspoken on that point. Captain Dehart saw the light was put up, the seaman Post testifies that it was put up, and Mr. Robert Mercer saw it hanging and burning after the collision. Nor is it worth while to consider the -point made by claimant’s counsel as to the lookout of the Marion A. A vessel must have proper lookouts until she is anchored, and is always held strictly to the duty of keeping a lookout when not anchored; but when once anchored the lookout, who is an officer of navigation on a vessel in motion, becomes then a mere watchman for purposes of patrol, protection, and warning on the anchored vessel. So that the case turns solely upon the question, where was this schooner anchored?

The libel recites that, at the time of the collision, the Marion A. was lying “just south of the Red Buoy,” which is fixed on the edge of the channel on the Portsmouth side. The answer admits and alleges that “the point at which said schooner was then anchored is about south by east of said buoy, and about midway between the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth, to the southward of the United States custom-house at Norfolk.” Without reciting and commenting upon the evidence of each witness who testified in the case on this point, I think I can safely say that their evidence on either side is substantially epitomized in the language I have quoted from the libel and answer. I shall take the position of the schooner at anchor to be that assigned to it by the answer, which was deliberately drawn and intelligently and deliberately sworn to by Captain Dawes. The only point left open to doubt by the allegation of the answer is as to the distance at which the schooner lay from the Red Buoy on the course of south by east. The schooner’s testimony is that this distance was fifty yards, though Hubbard places it at one hundred and fifty yards. I shall assume that it was a hundred yards, and this distance would place it about due south of the custom-house. I have no better guide in ascertaining the po[31]*31sition of the schooner from these data than the official chart of the harbor made by the officers of the United States coast survey, a copy of which I have before me.

The testimony of witnesses as to depth of water is always perplexingly inaccurate; and there is no safe guide but the charts. The official chart gives a channel north of the Red Buoy of more than three hundred yards in width, clear of wharves, slips, and docks. All these charts lay down three dotted lines: one representing the line of six feet depth of water on each side of the channel; another of twelve feet depth; and the third of eighteen feet depth.

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Bluebook (online)
17 F. Cas. 29, 3 Hughes 488, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mercer-v-the-florida-vaed-1878.