Mercer v. Dunscomb

293 P. 836, 110 Cal. App. 28, 1930 Cal. App. LEXIS 117
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 24, 1930
DocketDocket No. 6999.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 293 P. 836 (Mercer v. Dunscomb) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mercer v. Dunscomb, 293 P. 836, 110 Cal. App. 28, 1930 Cal. App. LEXIS 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

THE COURT.

Plaintiffs sued the defendants above named for $13,000' and obtained a judgment against two of them, Munro and Huey, for the sum of $12,680.26. The third defendant, Cornwall, was not served with summons, and consequently as to him no relief was granted; and the remaining two, Dunscomb and Marston, were absolved by the trial court from all liability on the indebtedness sued upon. From the latter part of the judgment plaintiffs have appealed.

As will hereinafter more particularly appear, the amount plaintiffs sued for had been deposited by them with the Security Bond and Finance Company, a corporation, of which the defendant Dunscomb and the deceased Wm. H. Marston were two of the five directors, for the purpose of. purchasing for plaintiffs certain bonds, and substantially all of it was misappropriated to the use and benefit of the corporation by the defendants Cornwall and Huey, with the consent of Munro, the three being at the time the remain-' ing members of the board of directors, and also, respectively, the vice-president and manager, the secretary, and the president of the corporation.

The amended complaint contained two causes of action, separately stated. The first was based upon the liability created against directors of corporations by section 3 of article XII of the state Constitution; but the trial court held that such liability applies only to the embezzlement or misappropriation of funds belonging to the corporation, and that therefore, since the money here sought to be recovered admittedly belonged to plaintiffs and not to the corporation, the liability created by said constitutional provision could not be invoked by plaintiffs. The second cause of action, as against Cornwall, Huey and Munro, was based upon the fact of the actual misappropriation by them of the entrusted funds; and as against Dunscomb and Mar *30 ston, upon allegations to the effect that such misappropriation was the result of the negligent manner in which the latter performed their duties as directors. The trial court found, however, that the evidence on this issue was legally insufficient to establish negligence on their part, and consequently, as stated, judgment was entered in their favor, but against the defendants Munro and Huey for $12,680.26, the amount of the defalcation.

The first question presented for determination is whether, as the trial court held, the directors’ liability created by section 3 of article XII of the Constitution applies only to the cases of embezzlement or misappropriation of funds belonging to the corporation; or whether, as- plaintiffs contend, it extends to eases, such as we have here—-the misappropriation of funds entrusted to a corporation in the regular course of its business. The portion of said section 3 of article XII, which is pertinent, reads as follows: “ . • . The directors or trustees of corporations and joint-stock associations shall be jointly and severally liable to the creditors and stockholders for all moneys embezzled or misappropriated by the officers of such corporation or joint-stock association, during the term of office of such director or trustee.”

So far as our attention has been called, no case has been decided by the reviewing courts involving facts analogous to those presented here; but on several occasions said constitutional provision has been construed in actions involving the embezzlement or misappropriation of corporate funds and in all of them it is clearly indicated, we think, that said constitutional liability extends only to the embezzlement or misappropriation of funds belonging to the corporation itself, in whose services the defaulting officer is employed.

As said in the case of Fox v. Hale & Norcross Silver Min. Co., 108 Cal. 369 [41 Pac. 308, 326], “It does seem that it was the intention of the framers of the constitution to make each director of a corporation severally liable, whether individually culpable or not, for'certain hinds of losses to the corporation occurring during his term of office; that is to say, he is made liable for embezzlement or misappropriation of corporate funds by officers of the corporation.” Later, in the case of Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432 [89 Am. *31 St. Rep. 153, 64 Pac. 692, 69 Pac. 77, 81], it was said: “The design plainly was to prevent speculating in corporate funds by directors and to make them vigilant for their beneficiaries. ... I think it clear that when an officer of a corporation knowingly appropriates funds entrusted to him, for unlawful and unauthorized purposes, and loss ensues to the corporation, the directors are liable under this clause of the constitution.” And again in Dean v. Shingle, 198 (Cal. 652 [46 A. L. R. 1156, 246 Pac. 1049, 1054], the court says: “The design plainly was to prevent speculation and misappropriation of corporate funds. . . . But before the directors can be held liable for moneys so misappropriated as to make the officer misappropriating liable, and authorizing the creditors and stockholders to sue, it must be established, first, that there has been a misappropriation; and second, that a loss to the corporation has resulted.” (All italics ours.)

Moreover, in the case of Dean v. Shingle, supra, it is said that the action authorized to be maintained against directors under the constitutional provision above mentioned “is one in effect to recover assets of the corporation which constitute a fund to which all the creditors may look for satisfaction of their claims (Winchester v. Mabury, 122 Cal. 522, 524 [55-Pac. 393]) V; and continuing, the court said that the recovery, if any be had, constitutes a fund for the benefit of all the creditors; and that if after satisfying their claims, any of the fund remains, it will belong to the stockholders. The foregoing construction would seem to be wholly at variance with the theory advanced by plaintiffs herein to the effect that said constitutional provision confers upon the creditors of a corporation the right to maintain separate actions against the directors for the recovery of money entrusted by said creditors to the corporation and by the officers thereof embezzled or misappropriated, because, manifestly, any money recovered in such actions would belong to the creditor who had entrusted it to the corporation, and would not, as contemplated by the decision in Dean v. Shingle, supra, “constitute a fund for the benefit of all creditors”.

In support of their theory, plaintiffs emphasize certain language employed in the case of Fox v. Hale & Norcross Silver Min. Co., supra, in interpreting the meaning of the *32 word “misappropriation” as used in said constitutional provision, wherein it was said: “ ... In my opinion, the word 1 misappropriation ’ is to be construed by the maxim noscitur a sociis;

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Bluebook (online)
293 P. 836, 110 Cal. App. 28, 1930 Cal. App. LEXIS 117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mercer-v-dunscomb-calctapp-1930.