Mercer v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Mercer v. City of New York

166 A.D.2d 362, 561 N.Y.S.2d 638, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12759

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 25, 1990

StatusPublished

This text of 166 A.D.2d 362 (Mercer v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mercer v. City of New York, 166 A.D.2d 362, 561 N.Y.S.2d 638, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12759 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barry Salman, J.), entered December 30, 1988, which denied petitioner’s motion to reargue and renew the court’s decision and order dated June 28, 1988, which had vacated respondent’s default and dismissed the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

It is clear to us that the contentions raised by petitioner on this appeal are barred by a prior order entered in a separate tax foreclosure proceeding, in which substantially similar relief was denied petitioner, and which petitioner never appealed. The entry of the earlier order is dispositive, and it is therefore unnecessary to reach the remaining contentions raised on this appeal. Concur—Ross, J. P., Rosenberger, Asch and Smith, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barry Salman, J.), entered December 30, 1988, which denied petitioner’s motion to reargue and renew the court’s decision and order dated June 28, 1988, which had vacated respondent’s default and dismissed the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

It is clear to us that the contentions raised by petitioner on this appeal are barred by a prior order entered in a separate tax foreclosure proceeding, in which substantially similar relief was denied petitioner, and which petitioner never appealed. The entry of the earlier order is dispositive, and it is therefore unnecessary to reach the remaining contentions raised on this appeal. Concur—Ross, J. P., Rosenberger, Asch and Smith, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

166 A.D.2d 362, 561 N.Y.S.2d 638, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12759, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mercer-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1990.