Mercer County Housing Authority v. Mercer Gas Light & Fuel Co.

14 Pa. D. & C.2d 158, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 454
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Mercer County
DecidedApril 22, 1957
Docketno. 117
StatusPublished

This text of 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 158 (Mercer County Housing Authority v. Mercer Gas Light & Fuel Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Mercer County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mercer County Housing Authority v. Mercer Gas Light & Fuel Co., 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 158, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957).

Opinion

Rodgers, P. J.,

This matter comes before the court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on behalf of defendant Mercer Gas Light & Fuel Co.

In deciding this matter, the court must assume facts and inferences as .they appear in the pleading, in the light most favorable to plaintiff. We will not consider matters extraneous to the pleading. On this basis, we [159]*159will consider that the Mercer County Housing Authority, on January 30,1953, entered into contracts for the construction of a' multiple Public Housing Project in the Borough of Mercer. The project was to consist of five buildings, containing 30 apartments. The buildings were substantially completed on December 4,1953, when defendant gas company turned on the gas from its main line, permitting it to flow to a shut off at the meter but short of the interior lines of the building without making any inspection of the meter connection or the interior lines.

An additional act was necessary to open the shut off and allow the gas to enter the interior lines.

On December 5, 1953, an explosion took place in the middle apartments of building no. 5, causing considerable damage to the property of plaintiffs.

The explosion was due to leakage of gas from a loose cap at the end of the gas line which was to serve a gas range in the middle apartment of building no. 5 and from a defective gas line between the meter and the furnace. These items were both on the interior lines, installed by defendant Renick. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant was negligent in furnishing and permitting the installation of its gas meter through which gas could flow to interior lines of building no. 5 without making the installation' or supervising the same. There is, however, no allegation that there was any defect in the meter or its installation.'

In a brief to this court, plaintiff argues strongly that the gas company is guilty of negligence in turning on the gas “into the interior of á building without ascertaining from the plumber the availability of the line to receive gas”, and repeats this assertion of fact on many other occasions in the brief. We think that it should be made clear that from this court’s view, there is no allegation in the pleadings Which supports the inference [160]*160that the gas company turned, the gas into the interior lines. We believe that they only support the inference that the company turned the gas from its main lines into the service line to the shut off at the meter or immediately beyond the meter.

We believe that defendant has fairly stated the question before the court: May a gas company be held negligent in failing to test the interior gas pipelines within a building on the customer’s side of the meter before permitting gas to be introduced in the service line leading from the curb box to the meter?

If this were not a “new construction job”, the matter would without question be controlled by previous appellate decision. Our Supreme Court has held many times that there is “a distinction between the responsibilities of a distributor of natural gas in those cases where the leak is in the lines of the company . . . and where the leak is in a line installed, controlled and maintained by the consumer or patron. In the first situation the rule is ‘that natural gas companies are held to a degree of care which is commensurate with the dangerous character of the agency which is handled. The measure of care is not that of an insurer to everyone who sustains loss by reason of gas escaping and exploding, but it is liable for an explosion where it knew or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known of the defect in its pipes or mains’. ... A gas company has not performed its full duty if it merely installs proper lines and fixtures, but it is required to maintain them. This entails inspection from time to time and the company must be on the lookout for conditions incident to natural wear and tear.

“As to conditions arising from defects in the lines of consumers, the responsibilities of the gas company are different for there it is the duty of the consumer to see that his lines are maintained in serviceable condition. The company knows that it is dealing with a [161]*161dangerous agency and if it knows or should have known that the consumer’s lines are not safe it is its duty to require the lines to be repaired or else to shut off the gas at the curb”: Stephany v. Equitable Gas Company, 347 Pa. 110, 113.

Plaintiff concedes that if this were a used building they would have no cause of action, but contends that:

(1) The only thing which prevents liability in the used building cases is that the gas company has a right to presume that the lines have been used in the past with safety and that a fact which is once in being is presumed to continue, and contends that this argument has no validity here because there has been no previous use on which to base a presumption.

(2) The high degree of care to which the gas company is committed in the handling of the gas in its lines should be extended to the interior lines of a new building because the danger involved in dealing with gas is great and the burden which would be placed on the company by requiring them to test interior lines before making gas available to them is incurred.

(3) A proper application of our law to the effect that “the company knows that it is dealing with a dangerous agency and if it knows or should have known that the customer’s lines are not safe it is its duty to require the lines to be repaired or else to shut off the gas at the curb”, (gtephany v. Equitable Gas Company, 347 Pa. 110-113), as applied to new construction, would hold that the company when making gas available to be turned into main lines should know that the lines may not be safe and therefore they should not be permitted to assume that they are safe.

We do not say here that the company may assume that the lines are safe. We do hold that they have a right to assume that users of new lines will determine their condition before using them. Plaintiff contends that there is a very simple method of testing interior [162]*162lines which should have been used by the gas company prior to turning on the gas from the main line to the meter. If this is correct, it must also be true that this device was available to the other professional builders involved here who could just as reasonably be expected to make use of it before turning gas into the lines. We believe that plaintiff is arguing for an extension of liability beyond that previously expressed by our law and we find nothing in our Pennsylvania cases, or in the equities of the situation, which would justify this extension. We believe this case is governed by the thinking of the Supreme Court in the case of Greed v. The Manufacturers’ Light & Heat Company, 238 Pa. 248, 251. There, the court said that the gas company:

“. . . had nothing to do with the installation of the gas pipes. They were placed in the building by the owner or tenant of the property and the duty of the gas company was to supply gas to the occupants when requested. It had not installed the pipes; it had no control over them, and was in no manner responsible for the condition in which they were to be maintained. That responsibility rested exclusively upon the owner or tenant of the house; and when Mrs.

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Related

Stephany Et Ux. v. Equit. Gas Co.
31 A.2d 523 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1943)
Greed v. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co.
86 A. 95 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1913)
Soles v. People's Natural Gas Co.
48 Pa. Super. 84 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1911)
Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Goudelock
79 So. 2d 718 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1955)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 Pa. D. & C.2d 158, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mercer-county-housing-authority-v-mercer-gas-light-fuel-co-pactcomplmercer-1957.