Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA LLC v. Wheelchair Transp. Serv. Inc.

2025 NY Slip Op 30078(U)

• Court: New York Supreme Court, New York County
• Decided: January 9, 2025
• Docket: Index No. 154428/2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA LLC v Wheelchair Transp. Serv. Inc. 2025 NY Slip Op 30078(U) January 9, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 154428/2024 Judge: Lyle E. Frank Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. INDEX NO. 154428/2024 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 25 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2025

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. LYLE E. FRANK PART 11M Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 154428/2024 MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL SERVICES USA LLC, MOTION DATE 12/04/2024 Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 001 -v- WHEELCHAIR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE INC, DECISION + ORDER ON GEORGE GAO, MOTION Defendant. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY .

Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiff Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC brings the present motion for

summary judgment against defendants Wheelchair Transportation Service Inc. (“Corporate

Defendant”) and George Gao (“Individual Defendant”, collectively with Corporate Defendant

“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that the Corporate Defendant defaulted on loans taken out for

two vans, with a total amount due of $58,310.65. Plaintiff also alleges that the Individual

Defendant is liable as a personal guarantor for the two loans. The pro se Individual Defendant

has answered, stating that he signed “certain documents” in the capacity of an officer for

Corporate Defendant, but denies any “knowledge or information relating to any Personal

Guarantee.” The Individual Defendant also disputes the calculation of damages and the amount

allegedly due.

The complaint lists four causes of action. The First and the Third causes of action are for

default of a written promissory obligation regarding two vehicles, as pled against “Defendant(s)”

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– presumably the Corporate Defendant, although in group pleading form. The Second and Fourth

causes of action allege that the Individual Defendant is a personal guarantor on the two vehicle

loans and therefore is personally liable. In support of their argument, Plaintiff has submitted the

following documents, many of which are barely legible: a guaranty agreement between the non-

party dealer and Plaintiff; an authorization to conduct a credit investigation signed by Individual

Defendant; a blank, unsigned form for a commercial van credit application; a financing approval

for two vans; a New York retail installment contract for the two vans; a dealer direct loan

agreement with Corporate Defendant for the two vans; and a termination quotation for Corporate

Defendant, listing the total balance due of $58, 310.65.

On a motion for summary judgment, the motion “shall be granted if, upon all the papers

and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant

the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party.” CPLR § 3212(b). Once

the movant makes a showing of a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the

burden then shifts to the opponent to “produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to

establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action.” Stonehill

Capital Mgt. LLC v. Bank of the W., 28 N.Y.3d 439, 448 (2016). The facts must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, but conclusory statements are insufficient to defeat

summary judgment. Id.

Here, while Plaintiff has met their burden as to the Corporate Defendant’s liability for the

two vans, they have failed to eliminate material issues of fact as to the Individual Defendant’s

liability. To begin with, a personal guaranty agreement between Plaintiff and dealer is not

sufficient to establish the liability of a non-party to that agreement. All that Plaintiff has, from

the documents submitted, that would tend towards showing that the Individual Defendant is

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personally liable on the loan for the two vans is that two of the documents simply list “personal

guarantor” next to the Individual Defendant’s name. This is not enough to eliminate all material

issues of fact as to liability. A guaranty must be read in “a manner that accords the words their

fair and reasonable meaning and achieves a practical interpretation of the expressions of the

parties.” NCCMI, Inc. v. Bersin Props., LLC, 226 A.D.3d 88, 96 (1st Dept. 2024). An agreement

that “speaks only of plaintiff’s liabilities and obligations, contains no language of guaranty, and

nowhere mentions the note” is not a valid guaranty agreement. Weissman v. Sinorm Deli, 88

N.Y.2d 437, 447 (1996).

Here, Plaintiff has submitted no purported guaranty agreement with Individual

Defendant, let alone any agreement listing the relevant terms showing the reasonable

expectations of the parties as to the Individual Defendant’s liability. All they have submitted is

two other agreements that happen to have “personal guarantor” in the signature block next to

defendant Gao’s name. This is patently insufficient to eliminate any triable issue of fact as to the

Individual Defendant’s liability. As regards damages, there are disputed issues of facts as to

amounts due. For instance, Plaintiff submits an affidavit stating that they were able to repossess

one of the vans and sell it auction, thus reducing the amount due for that vehicle. But the

complaint clearly states that the same amount is due for both vehicles, as it separates the causes

of action by VIN. Defendants argue that both vans were repossessed, and they dispute the unpaid

amount Plaintiffs claim. Accordingly, it is hereby

ADJUDGED that the motion is denied as to the second and fourth causes of action; and it

is further

ADJUDGED that the motion is granted with regard to liability on the first and third causes

of action only; and it is further

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ORDERED that an assessment of damages against defendant Wheelchair Transportation

Service Inc. is ordered to occur at the time of trial or other such resolution of the instant matter.

1/9/2025 DATE LYLE E. FRANK, J.S.C. CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

□ □ GRANTED DENIED X GRANTED IN PART OTHER

APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER

□ CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE

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