Mercado v. Town of Goshen

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 19, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-05389·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MATTHEW L. MERCADO, Plaintiff, 20-CV-5389 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND TOWN OF GOSHEN, et al., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Orange County Jail, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants interfered with his legal mail. By order dated August 5, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Named as Defendants in this complaint are the Town of Goshen, the Orange County Correctional Facility (OCCF), the Orange County Jail “Administration/Mail,” and the OCCF Chief Administrative Officer. Plaintiff alleges that on June 30, 2020, an unknown facility employee opened a confidential piece of legal mail when Plaintiff was not present. An attachment to the complaint shows that the envelope was sent from the Ninth Judicial District Court in White Plains, New York to Plaintiff. (ECF 1 at 10.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about the incident, which was denied. According to the grievance response, no one on staff acknowledged opening the envelope, and that while the envelope should not have been opened, there was no indication that its contents had been read. (ECF at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “now” his mail “has

been delayed and sent late from here numerous times,” causing him “mental anxiety.” Plaintiff seeks money damages and his “freedom back.” (Id. at 6). DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Plaintiff filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). B. Mail Interference Claim Plaintiff’s claim regarding his mail arise under the First Amendment. A prisoner’s First Amendment rights encompass the right to “adequate, effective and meaningful” access to the

courts and to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). “[C]ourts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail, as well as greater protection to outgoing mail than to incoming mail.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)). Plaintiff’s assertion concerning his mail implicates both an access-to-courts claim and a general mail tampering claim. Access-to-Courts Claim A claim that a prisoner’s right of access to the courts has been denied may arise from the frustration or hindrance of a litigating opportunity yet to be gained.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant’s conduct (1) “was deliberate and malicious,” and (2) “resulted

in actual injury to the plaintiff such as the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 53 (1996). To demonstrate actual injury, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a valid underlying cause of action separate from the right-of-access claim; and (2) frustration or hindrance of the litigation caused by the defendant’s actions. See Harbury, 546 U.S. at 415. A mere “delay in being able to work on one’s legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F. Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Jones v. Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 151- 52 (2d Cir. 1986)).

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