Mercado v. Department of Social Services

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJuly 26, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-11140
StatusUnknown

This text of Mercado v. Department of Social Services (Mercado v. Department of Social Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mercado v. Department of Social Services, (D. Mass. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

LESLIE MERCADO, aka Leslie Ann ) Reis and Leslie Reis Carrington, ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action v. ) No. 23-11140-PBS ) DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ) SERVICES, et al., ) Defendants. )

ORDER

July 26, 2023

SARIS, D.J.

1. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED. 2. Because Mercado is proceeding in forma pauperis, the complaint is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Under that statute, the court must dismiss an action, or any part of it, if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). In conducting this review, the court liberally construes Mercado’s complaint because she is self-represented. See Rodi v. Southern New England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2000)). 3. Mercado shall, by August 23, 2023, file an amended complaint that complies with the basic pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Federal Rules, a

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis supplied), and “‘give [each] defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Mercado’s Complaint [Dkt. 1] fails to comply with these basic pleading requirements and is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state claim on which relief can be granted. Mercado filed her complaint using the preprinted Pro Se 1 form (complaint for a civil case) provided by the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts. Complaint [Dkt. 1]. The form complaint identifies as defendants a social worker and district attorney for the Massachusetts Department of Social Services as well as two individuals identified as foster parents.1 Id. at ¶ I (the parties to this complaint). The case caption identifies the Department of Social Services as a

1 Mercado subsequently filed a motion “to change to correct company name” explaining that the former Department of Social Services is now the Department of Children and Families. [Dkt. No. 4]. defendant. Id. The complaint states that the basis for jurisdiction is federal question based on the alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at ¶ II (basis for

jurisdiction). Specifically, Mercado states that she was subject to abuse in foster homes from 1983-1998. Id. at ¶ III (statement of claim). The damages she suffered are described as “PTSD, depression, Anger, A[n]xiety, lifetime therapy, [and she was suicidal].” Id. at ¶ IV (relief). Mercado’s complaint is not a “plain” statement of her claim. She alleges that she was subjected to assault and abuse while she was a minor and in foster homes from 1983 - 1998. The complaint names several defendants but no factual allegation is directed against any one defendant. The court concludes that the complaint does not satisfy the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).

Mercado’s contention that her rights were violated suggests that she may seek to assert a claim under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Speaking broadly, § 1983

2 “42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... furnishes a cause of action against any person who, while acting under color of state law, transgresses someone else's constitutional rights.” Alfano v. Lynch, 847 F.3d 71, 74 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While the Due Process Clause guarantees fair process, it also “includes a substantive component that provides heightened protection against government provides a remedy for the violation of federal right by a person acting under the color of state law, but its application is not without limitations. Private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful, is generally beyond the reach of § 1983. González-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 247-48 (1st Cir. 2012); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). "To act under color of state law for [Section] 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the state." Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). However, the alleged misconduct resulting in a deprivation of a plaintiff's rights must be fairly attributable to the State. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 547 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Here there are no facts alleged that the named foster parents fall under the “color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983.

As to the defendant social worker and attorney, they are immune from suit for damages in their official capacities and the agency has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Under the Eleventh Amendment, “states are immune . . . from private suit

interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that she has been deprived of “interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property,” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); and (2) that the deprivation was by some form of state action, Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). in federal courts, absent their consent.” Greenless v. Almond, 277 F.3d 601, 606 (1st Cir. 2002). That immunity extends to any entity that is an arm of the state. See e.g., McNulty v.

Mass. Dept. of Children and Families, No. 11-11569-GAO, 2014 WL 4965403, at * 2 (D. Mass. Sept.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
408 U.S. 564 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Dennis v. Sparks
449 U.S. 24 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Kalina v. Fletcher
522 U.S. 118 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Boivin v. Black
225 F.3d 36 (First Circuit, 2000)
Greenless v. Almond
277 F.3d 601 (First Circuit, 2002)
Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law
389 F.3d 5 (First Circuit, 2004)
Gonzalez-Maldonado v. MMM Health Care, Inc.
693 F.3d 244 (First Circuit, 2012)
Troxel v. Granville
530 U.S. 57 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Graf v. Hospitality Mutual Insurance C
754 F.3d 74 (First Circuit, 2014)
Alfano v. Lynch
847 F.3d 71 (First Circuit, 2017)

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