Meraz v. City of Bakersfield

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMay 14, 2025
Docket1:21-cv-01146
StatusUnknown

This text of Meraz v. City of Bakersfield (Meraz v. City of Bakersfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meraz v. City of Bakersfield, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELICEO MERAZ, Case No. 1:21-cv-01146-KES-CDB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REQURING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT 13 v. BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 14 CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

15 Defendants. 7-DAY DEADLINE

16 17 Background 18 Plaintiff Eliceo Meraz initiated this action with the filing of a complaint in state court 19 against Defendant City of Bakersfield and Bakersfield Police Officers Sandeep Malhi and Kevin 20 Shipton on or about June 11, 2021. (Doc. 2, Exhibit 1). Defendants removed the action to this 21 Court on July 29, 2021. (Doc. 2, Notice of Removal). In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts federal 22 civil rights and related state law causes of action against Defendants arising from his encounter 23 with the defendant officers on November 30, 2020, during which the defendant officers allegedly 24 discharged their firearms at and injured Plaintiff. 25 On August 26, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to stay this action pending the 26 resolution of a state court criminal case against Plaintiff arising from the same November 2020 27 incident at issue here. (Doc. 8). The Court reasoned that a stay was warranted under the relevant factors applicable in the Ninth Circuit under Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, particularly 1 given the overlap between the criminal case and this case and the substantial risk of prejudice that 2 may result to the Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights absent a stay. Id. at 4. The Court separately 3 found that a stay was warranted pursuant to the doctrine of Younger abstention. Id. at 5-6. 4 The case now has been stayed for approximately 45 months during which Defendants, at 5 the Court’s direction, have filed approximately 23 periodic status reports. In their report of 6 December 6, 2024, Defendants state that Plaintiff pled nolo contendere to the seven underlying 7 felony and misdemeanor charges on October 17, 2024. (Doc. 48, Exhibit A). It appears from the 8 docket of the state court criminal case that Plaintiff was initially scheduled for sentencing on 9 December 5, 2024, but that, because he failed to appear, sentencing and a bench warrant hearing 10 were reset for December 10, 2024. See id. 11 On January 8, 2025, counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants filed a further status report in 12 which they expressed their “understanding that the Plaintiff did not appear for his sentencing and 13 that there is an active warrant out for Plaintiff’s arrest.” (Doc. 52). 14 In their most recent report, dated May 8, 2025, Defendants represent that neither side has 15 further information concerning the status of Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case and that 16 sentencing remains pending. (Doc. 55). 17 Discussion 18 “Generally, stays should not be indefinite in nature.” Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. 19 Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2007). 20 Here, by his reported fugitive status, Plaintiff is unnecessarily delaying litigation of this 21 action and potentially creating a de facto indefinite stay. Counsel for Plaintiff’s representation to 22 defense counsel that he is “not up to speed on the criminal proceedings” (Doc. 55 at 2) 23 exacerbates the undersigned’s concern that Plaintiff is unprepared to prosecute his action 24 diligently. 25 “District courts have inherent power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that 26 power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City 27 of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). Relevant here, the Court may dismiss an 1 | Cir. 1986). Separately, the Court may dismiss an action where, as here, a Section 1983 plaintiff is 2 | a fugitive in an underlying state criminal case. See Yuan v. City of Los Angeles, 559 Fed. Appx. 3 | 643, 644 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 4 Conclusion and Order 5 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within 7 days from the date 6 | of issuance of this order, Plaintiff SHALL show cause in writing why this action should not be 7 | dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and, separately, under the fugitive disentitlement 8 | doctrine. 9 Any failure by Plaintiff to timely comply with this Order will result in the imposition 10 | of sanctions, up to and including a recommendation to dismiss the entire action without 11 | prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that dismissal is warranted “[i]f the plaintiff fails to ... 12 | comply with ... a court order”); see Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 13 | 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). 14 | IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _-May 14, 2025 | nnd Rr 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Meraz v. City of Bakersfield, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meraz-v-city-of-bakersfield-caed-2025.