Menke v. Klamath County Assessor

16 Or. Tax 293, 2000 Ore. Tax LEXIS 61
CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedNovember 29, 2000
DocketTC-MD 000602F
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 16 Or. Tax 293 (Menke v. Klamath County Assessor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Menke v. Klamath County Assessor, 16 Or. Tax 293, 2000 Ore. Tax LEXIS 61 (Or. Super. Ct. 2000).

Opinion

SALLY L. KIMSEY, Magistrate.

Plaintiffs’ appeal concerns the 1999-2000 tax year. The property is listed as Account Number R386406 by the Klamath County Assessor.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A case management conference in the above-entitled case was held July 24, 2000. Carlos Menke appeared for Plaintiffs. Don Ringgold, of the assessor’s office, appeared for Defendant. Plaintiffs claim that “Property taxes are unconstitutional, according to our ‘unions Constitution, and the Peoples authority.”1 Further, they argue that “you are entitled to tax the allotted ‘land’ only, Oregon Constitution.” Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 19, 2000. Defendant did not file its Answer until June 8, 2000. On June 19, 2000, Plaintiffs filed some additional materials with the court, noting the late filing of Defendant’s Answer. While not specifically asking for a default order, Plaintiffs did state that “their ‘Due Process of law’ has been violated.” The court treated the filing as a Motion for Default and discussed it with the parties at the July 24, 2000, case management conference.

Also discussed at the case management conference was a briefing schedule and a date for oral argument. The parties agreed that Plaintiffs would submit any additional materials by September 7, 2000, and Defendant would submit its materials by September 28, 2000. The parties agreed to hold oral argument on October 25, 2000, at 9:00 a.m. The notice for the oral argument was mailed July 25, 2000. On July 26, 2000, the court mailed the parties a letter setting forth the dates agreed to by the parties at the case management conference. Neither of those mailings were returned as undeliverable. Defendant received the notice and letter. [295]*295Plaintiffs’ materials were filed on August 9, 2000. Defendant’s materials were filed August 25, 2000.

Plaintiffs do not contest the amount of valuation but, instead, contend Defendant may tax only the land, not the improvements. Plaintiffs also seek cancellation of the assessment as it relates to the improvements. Plaintiffs argue that during Oregon’s Constitutional Convention of 1857, “[t]he representatives in Convention, never used the word Property, only Real Estate, and that was one time.” Plaintiffs further argue that the Act of Congress admitting Oregon as a state allows only sections 16 and 36 of townships to be taxed. Plaintiffs state that they “reside on one of the allotted sections for school taxes, and we welcome the assessment of our land, and land only.”

Plaintiffs argue that the state seal of the state of Oregon “is not the Seal that was approved by convention representatives on Friday, the 18th of Sept. 1857[,] * * * [and] the People of Oregon have never elected to have their Seal altered or changed.” Therefore, continues their argument, “[t]his Altered Corporate Seal in effect today, has no lawful Authority to impose taxes on the Peoples Property.”2 Without lawful authority, “[u]sing unconstitutional statutes (Oregon Revised Statutes) the corporation is committing theft and loss of Rights, that belong to the People of this state.”

Defendant argues that the statutes in place are a proper exercise of the state’s authority given it by the Oregon Constitution. Defendant further points out that the Oregon Constitution provisions relating to taxation are valid because “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” US Const, Amend X.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs did not appear for the scheduled oral argument. As noted above, however, they had ample opportunity to learn of the proceeding. The court will consider the merits [296]*296of Plaintiffs’ arguments based on the written materials submitted.

Plaintiffs’Motion for Default

Defendant filed its Answer before Plaintiffs made their default request. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled on this very issue in Reeder et al v. Marshall, Admix, 214 Or 154, 328 P2d 773 (1958). The Court held that “[w]here a Plaintiff, after the time expressly granted for filing a pleading has expired, suffers further time to elapse without taking any action thereon, he in effect grants further time to plead, with the result that a general appearance made before default entered is in time.” Id. at 156 (citation omitted). Because Defendant filed its Answer before Plaintiffs asked for a default, Defendant’s Answer is considered timely.

Validity of State Seal of Oregon

Plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the seal approved by the Constitutional Convention of 1857 differs from the modern seal. They are incorrect as to the validity of the modem seal. The Oregon Legislature adopted the modern seal in 1903. SB 143 (1903) (codified at Lord’s Oregon Laws, v II, title XXIII, ch II, § 2615 (1910)). It set forth the Oregon State Seal in use today. The law provides:

“The description of the seal of the State of Oregon shall be an escutcheon, supported by thirty-three stars, and divided by an ordinary, with the inscription, ‘The Union.’ In chief — mountains, an elk with branching antlers, a wagon, the Pacific Ocean, on which a British man-of-war departing, an American steamer arriving. The second — quartering with a sheaf, plow, and a pickax. Crest — the American eagle. Legend — State of Oregon, 1859.”

Id.

To paraphrase Plaintiffs, the people of Oregon, acting through their elected representatives, the Legislature, [297]*297lawfully changed the state seal in 1903. The state seal currently in use has been consistently used since its adoption.3 The laws enacted under the modem state seal are valid.4

Taxability of Land and Improvements

The Act of Congress admitting Oregon into the Union granted land to the state for a variety of purposes. Those purposes included land for schools, a public university, public buildings, and salt springs. Act of Congress Admitting Oregon into the Union, SB 239, 35th Cong, 11 Stat 383 (approved Feb 14,1859), reprinted in Office of the Secretary of State, Oregon Blue Book 1999-2000, 351-52 (Tim Torgerson ed 1999); also reprinted in The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857, 512-13 (Charles Henry Carey ed 1927). The Act also granted 5 percent of the net proceeds of the sale of public lands for public roads and internal improvements. Id. The provisions mentioned above did not refer to the taxation of the land but to the uses of the land. When the land is not used for the specified purposes it is treated as any other privately owned land in the state. The only provision in the Act that referred to taxation stated that the state could not tax land owned by the federal government. Id.

Originally owned by the federal government, the subject property was granted to the state for the use of schools. (See Ptfs’ Brief at 2 (“[w]e reside on one of the allotted sections for school taxes”).) At some point in time the land was sold into private ownership. As privately owned land it is treated as any other privately owned land in the state and may be taxed accordingly. Cf. Crawford v. Dept. of Rev.,

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Bluebook (online)
16 Or. Tax 293, 2000 Ore. Tax LEXIS 61, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/menke-v-klamath-county-assessor-ortc-2000.