Menifee v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedOctober 15, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-05039
StatusUnknown

This text of Menifee v. Social Security Administration Commissioner (Menifee v. Social Security Administration Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Menifee v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, (W.D. Ark. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

LADONNA F. MENIFEE PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 20-5039

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Ladonna F. Menifee, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying her claim for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background: Plaintiff protectively filed her current application for SSI on December 8, 2016, alleging an inability to work due to seizures, a neck fusion, and heart problems. (Tr. 93, 196). An administrative hearing was held on November 15, 2018, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 27-51). By written decision dated March 19, 2019, the ALJ found that during the relevant time period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 12). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a herniated nucleus pulposus at C4-7 status post fusion, a seizure disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, anxiety, and depression. However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 12). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except that the claimant is limited to occasional overhead reaching, must avoid unprotected heights, and must avoid driving or working around dangerous machinery. In addition, the claimant is limited to work that involves simple tasks and simple instructions.

(Tr. 14). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work as a power screwdriver operator, a cleaner/housekeeper, and an assembler. (Tr. 21). Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, which denied that request on January 27, 2020. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. 2). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is before the undersigned for report and recommendation. (Docs. 13, 14). The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary. II. Applicable Law: This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that her disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial

gainful activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Only if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Higgins v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. III. Discussion:

After reviewing the entire record, the Court believes that the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between the vocational expert’s opinion and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The ALJ’s RFC determination states that Plaintiff “is limited to occasional overhead heading.” (Tr. 14). With this reaching limitation in mind, the vocational expert indicated Plaintiff could perform the jobs of power screwdriver operator, cleaner/housekeeper, and assembler, all of which require frequent reaching according to the DOT. See DICOT §§ 699.685-026, 323.687-014, 706.687-010 at www.westlaw.com. Consequently, there is a conflict between the DOT and the vocational expert’s opinion. See Moore v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Menifee v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/menifee-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-arwd-2020.