Mengis v. Lebanon Manuf'g Co.

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York

Mengis v. Lebanon Manuf'g Co.

10 F. 665, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2318

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York

DecidedJanuary 24, 1882

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 10 F. 665 (Mengis v. Lebanon Manuf'g Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mengis v. Lebanon Manuf'g Co., 10 F. 665, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2318 (circtsdny 1882).

Pincite

Opinion

Wallace, D. J.

As one of the questions of fact in this caso, tho jury were called on to decide whether the plaintiff understood Mr. Meily to have general authority to represent the defendant in making a contract for the sale of cars, or understood him to be a broker for the defendant in the particular transaction. There was undoubtedly cogent evidence to show that the defendant’s officers held Meily out to the plaintiffs as having general authority to bind the defendant in making such a contract; but, on tho other hand, there was explicit testimony to the effect that the officers of the defendant had told one of the plaintiffs very recently that Meily was not their agent; that they would not appoint any agent; and that they acted, and intended to act, personally in such transactions. It was also fairly inferable, from the fact that plaintiffs asked for evidence of Meily’s authority, that they were not satisfied to treat with him as a general agent without the proof of his agency. It was a question of credibility of witnesses whether such written authority was or was not furnished by Meily. There was also indicia in the transaction which might justify an inference that the plaintiffs and Meily were co-operating together more with a view to securing commissions for themselves than to obtain a satisfactory contract for the defendant. Upon the whole case, therefore, I am of opinion that a case is not made which would justify setting aside the verdict. It is not enough that the judge might have arrived at a different conclusion, nor even that there may have been a strong preponderance of evidence in favor of the defeated party. It is only where it is so palpable that tho j ary have erred as to suggest the probability that the verdict was the result of misapprehension or partiality, that the court will interfere.

Motion denied.

See Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Wallace, D. J.

As one of the questions of fact in this caso, tho jury were called on to decide whether the plaintiff understood Mr. Meily to have general authority to represent the defendant in making a contract for the sale of cars, or understood him to be a broker for the defendant in the particular transaction. There was undoubtedly cogent evidence to show that the defendant’s officers held Meily out to the plaintiffs as having general authority to bind the defendant in making such a contract; but, on tho other hand, there was explicit testimony to the effect that the officers of the defendant had told one of the plaintiffs very recently that Meily was not their agent; that they would not appoint any agent; and that they acted, and intended to act, personally in such transactions. It was also fairly inferable, from the fact that plaintiffs asked for evidence of Meily’s authority, that they were not satisfied to treat with him as a general agent without the proof of his agency. It was a question of credibility of witnesses whether such written authority was or was not furnished by Meily. There was also indicia in the transaction which might justify an inference that the plaintiffs and Meily were co-operating together more with a view to securing commissions for themselves than to obtain a satisfactory contract for the defendant. Upon the whole case, therefore, I am of opinion that a case is not made which would justify setting aside the verdict. It is not enough that the judge might have arrived at a different conclusion, nor even that there may have been a strong preponderance of evidence in favor of the defeated party. It is only where it is so palpable that tho j ary have erred as to suggest the probability that the verdict was the result of misapprehension or partiality, that the court will interfere.

Motion denied.

See Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

10 F. 665, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mengis-v-lebanon-manufg-co-circtsdny-1882.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack