Mendoza Dimas v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 3, 2026
• Docket: 24-5554
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DESENIA MENDOZA DIMAS, et al., No. 24-5554 Agency Nos. Petitioners, A246-088-574 A246-088-575 v. A246-088-576 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 27, 2026** Richland, Washington

Before: SUNG, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Desenia Mendoza Dimas and her two children, natives and citizens of

Mexico, petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of

their applications for asylum and relief under the Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the

petition.

“Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather

than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision.”

Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020). “We review factual findings for

substantial evidence and legal questions de novo.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37

F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022).

1. While the standard of review for assessing whether harm rose to the

level of persecution is unclear, Lapadat v. Bondi, 145 F.4th 942, 951-52 (9th Cir.

2025), even under the more favorable de novo review standard, we conclude the

harm Mendoza Dimas suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution.

“Credible death threats alone can constitute persecution, [but] they constitute

persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats are so

menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Duran-Rodriguez v.

Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Unfulfilled threats are very rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution.”

Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021).

Mendoza Dimas was threatened three times. First, individuals pointed

firearms at her and her children, told her to give them information about her ex-

husband or leave town, and said they’d make her disappear if she didn’t comply.

2 24-5554 Second, she alleges the same individuals followed her in a truck and told her they

had her “very well-monitored.” Third, individuals in the same truck said her “hours

were few.” While concerning, we agree with the agency that these unfulfilled

threats were not so specific, menacing, and credible that they rise to the level of

persecution. Compare Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028 (two unfulfilled threats,

unaccompanied by physical violence, did not compel a finding of past

persecution), and Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir.

2021) (multiple death threats over the course of weeks, without more, did not

compel a finding of past persecution), with Corpeno-Romero v. Garland, 120 F.4th

570, 578-79 (9th Cir. 2024) (threats made by gang members who previously killed

petitioner’s father and repeatedly stalked petitioner for reporting the murder,

including by breaking into the family’s home, were sufficiently “specific,

menacing, and credible” to compel a finding of past persecution).

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Mendoza

Dimas did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because

Mendoza Dimas did not establish past persecution, she bore the burden of

establishing that “it would not be reasonable for . . . her to relocate” to avoid future

persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i). The BIA reasonably concluded that

Mendoza Dimas did not meet that burden because she offered only “speculative

assertion[s] that members of the Jalisco Cartel remain interested in harming her

3 24-5554 and would track her throughout Mexico.” These “statements, on their own, are

insufficient to meet [her] burden of proof” that relocation would be unreasonable.

See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011). Additionally,

country conditions evidence indicates that the cartel she fears, the Jalisco Cartel,

does not operate country-wide, and the Mexican government has taken steps to

combat the cartel. Mendoza Dimas’s subjective belief that the cartel would track

her throughout Mexico does not compel a contrary conclusion.

3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that

Mendoza Dimas failed to establish she would more likely than not be tortured with

government “consent or acquiescence” if removed, as required for CAT relief.

Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). To show

acquiescence, government officials must “be aware of the alleged torture but either

willfully blind to it . . . or unwilling[] to oppose it.” Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823,

837 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence that

any government official was involved in or aware of the threats against Mendoza

Dimas. Generalized evidence of government corruption is insufficient to show

future government acquiescence. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th

696, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the record does not compel the

conclusion that Mendoza Dimas is eligible for CAT relief.

4 24-5554 PETITION DENIED.1

1 The stay of removal will dissolve upon the issuance of the mandate.

5 24-5554