Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Fernando Tapia, J.), entered April 8, 2015, which denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, modified, on the law, to grant the motion as to the claim of excessive force, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
According to plaintiff, Hector Mendez, on May 25, 2009, at approximately 10:40 p.m., he was walking down a public sidewalk in the Bronx on his way to meet a woman named Sandra at a Memorial Day barbecue. He inquired of a passerby walking toward him from the opposite direction, later identified as Jamal Joseph, whether he had seen “a white girl . . . with long hair.” Shortly thereafter, several police officers “rolled up” in an unmarked vehicle. Plaintiff was told to freeze, whereupon two officers exited the vehicle. They threw plaintiff and Joseph against the wall of a nearby apartment building. When plaintiff inquired why he was being stopped, he was told to “shut up.” Plaintiff was handcuffed, read his rights, and transported to the precinct.
On May 25, 2009, the day of plaintiff’s arrest, Officers Shea and Moreno and their supervisor, Lieutenant Davis, were on patrol in the vicinity. Shea observed plaintiff standing near Joseph on the sidewalk, admittedly doing nothing suspicious. After circling the block, the officers happened upon the men again, walking in opposite directions, Mendez toward Morris Avenue and Joseph east toward Grand Concourse. Shea, in the passenger seat of the police vehicle, observed Joseph dip behind a parked vehicle, whereupon he heard a “metallic clink” as an object hit the ground. Lieutenant Davis, who was in the rear [469]*469passenger seat, testified that he observed Joseph “duck[ ] down to the ground.” Shea told Officer Moreno, “I got this guy,” and exited the vehicle. Shea and Davis were focused on Joseph and did not have occasion to observe plaintiff. Shea testified that for the minute or two prior to exiting the vehicle, he had not observed an object in plaintiff’s hands. Neither observed plaintiff in possession of contraband.
Officer Moreno testified that he observed Joseph drinking from an open container. Joseph said, “We don’t have no problem here,” or words to that effect, as the officers slowly drove by. Moreno wanted to circle back and talk to them because Joseph appeared “over anxious” to prove he was not doing anything wrong. Before approaching plaintiff, Moreno heard “something hit the ground and slide.” Shea exited the vehicle and approached Joseph. Using a flashlight, Moreno observed the gun attributed to Joseph on the street underneath a parked van. He yelled “92” to his partner, their code word for “arrest.” Moreno testified that as he lifted his flashlight up, he observed plaintiff with his right hand extended, dropping an object onto a pile of garbage bags on the sidewalk. Moreno then observed a gun on top of the garbage bags. Shea apprehended Joseph, and Moreno apprehended plaintiff. Plaintiff did not resist arrest. The evidence collection unit recovered both weapons.
Shea, the arresting officer, prepared the relevant paperwork. Moreno indicated to Shea, either at the scene or back at the precinct, that a second gun had been recovered on garbage near plaintiff; however, no notation of Moreno’s observations regarding the gun are recorded in the police paperwork, i.e., the memo books,1 arrest report, criminal court affidavit and vouchers. Moreno conceded that his observations were not reflected anywhere in the relevant paperwork. The paperwork states only that plaintiff had in his custody and control a semiautomatic firearm. The paperwork does not reflect Moreno having observed plaintiff discard the firearm onto the pile of garbage.
At the precinct, plaintiff was informed that he was being charged with the possession of a loaded firearm. He was arraigned on charges of gun possession and remanded until a subsequent court proceeding, at which bail was set in the [470]*470amount of $10,000 bond or $5,000 cash. Unable to make bail, plaintiff remained incarcerated for 247 days.
While incarcerated, plaintiff underwent strip searches and cavity inspections. He became depressed and had difficulty sleeping. He had to appear in court 12 times. On January 28, 2010, eight months after his arrest, plaintiff was acquitted of all charges by a jury. DNA testing did not link plaintiff to the weapon recovered at the scene.
On or about November 4, 2011, plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging, inter alia, false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. On or about November 1, 2013, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that probable cause existed by virtue of Moreno’s testimony that he observed plaintiff drop an object onto a pile of garbage, and then discovered a firearm on top of the garbage.
The motion court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety, holding that “conflicting, specific factual references” in the papers raised triable issues of fact. We affirm in large part, modifying only to grant the motion to dismiss the claim for excessive force.
Where there is conflicting evidence concerning the existence of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, from which reasonable persons might draw different inferences, the question is one for the jury (see Parkin v Cornell Univ., 78 NY2d 523, 529 [1991], citing Veras v Truth Verification Corp., 87 AD2d 381, 384 [1st Dept 1982], affd 57 NY2d 947 [1982]). The parties’ differing versions of the events leading to plaintiff’s arrest raise a triable issue of fact whether the officers had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was in possession of a gun, precluding summary dismissal of the false arrest and false imprisonment claims (see Musto v Arakel, 184 AD2d 243, 243 [1st Dept 1992]). “Presence in a public place does not itself prove dominion and control over contraband discovered there” (People v Pearson, 75 NY2d 1001, 1002 [1990]). It is well settled that to support a charge of constructive possession, “the People must show that the defendant exercised dominion or control over the property by a sufficient level of control over the area in which the contraband is found or over the person from whom the contraband is seized” (People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The dissent claims that plaintiff does nothing more than deny his guilt in conclusory terms. However, crucial facts preceding plaintiff’s arrest are in dispute, including whether he dropped an object onto the pile of garbage bags. Officer Shea did not observe [471]*471plaintiff drop a gun or any other object onto the garbage, even though at the time his partner was engaged with plaintiff he was in close proximity, less than 10 feet away. Shea testified at trial that at no time did he observe an object in plaintiff’s hand, even in the moments their unmarked vehicle approached the men, coming within 10 to 15 feet of them. Plaintiff denies discarding any object; Moreno maintains that he did, though his observations are recorded nowhere in the relevant paperwork, as defendants concede.
The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) actual malice (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 457 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]).
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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Fernando Tapia, J.), entered April 8, 2015, which denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, modified, on the law, to grant the motion as to the claim of excessive force, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
According to plaintiff, Hector Mendez, on May 25, 2009, at approximately 10:40 p.m., he was walking down a public sidewalk in the Bronx on his way to meet a woman named Sandra at a Memorial Day barbecue. He inquired of a passerby walking toward him from the opposite direction, later identified as Jamal Joseph, whether he had seen “a white girl . . . with long hair.” Shortly thereafter, several police officers “rolled up” in an unmarked vehicle. Plaintiff was told to freeze, whereupon two officers exited the vehicle. They threw plaintiff and Joseph against the wall of a nearby apartment building. When plaintiff inquired why he was being stopped, he was told to “shut up.” Plaintiff was handcuffed, read his rights, and transported to the precinct.
On May 25, 2009, the day of plaintiff’s arrest, Officers Shea and Moreno and their supervisor, Lieutenant Davis, were on patrol in the vicinity. Shea observed plaintiff standing near Joseph on the sidewalk, admittedly doing nothing suspicious. After circling the block, the officers happened upon the men again, walking in opposite directions, Mendez toward Morris Avenue and Joseph east toward Grand Concourse. Shea, in the passenger seat of the police vehicle, observed Joseph dip behind a parked vehicle, whereupon he heard a “metallic clink” as an object hit the ground. Lieutenant Davis, who was in the rear [469]*469passenger seat, testified that he observed Joseph “duck[ ] down to the ground.” Shea told Officer Moreno, “I got this guy,” and exited the vehicle. Shea and Davis were focused on Joseph and did not have occasion to observe plaintiff. Shea testified that for the minute or two prior to exiting the vehicle, he had not observed an object in plaintiff’s hands. Neither observed plaintiff in possession of contraband.
Officer Moreno testified that he observed Joseph drinking from an open container. Joseph said, “We don’t have no problem here,” or words to that effect, as the officers slowly drove by. Moreno wanted to circle back and talk to them because Joseph appeared “over anxious” to prove he was not doing anything wrong. Before approaching plaintiff, Moreno heard “something hit the ground and slide.” Shea exited the vehicle and approached Joseph. Using a flashlight, Moreno observed the gun attributed to Joseph on the street underneath a parked van. He yelled “92” to his partner, their code word for “arrest.” Moreno testified that as he lifted his flashlight up, he observed plaintiff with his right hand extended, dropping an object onto a pile of garbage bags on the sidewalk. Moreno then observed a gun on top of the garbage bags. Shea apprehended Joseph, and Moreno apprehended plaintiff. Plaintiff did not resist arrest. The evidence collection unit recovered both weapons.
Shea, the arresting officer, prepared the relevant paperwork. Moreno indicated to Shea, either at the scene or back at the precinct, that a second gun had been recovered on garbage near plaintiff; however, no notation of Moreno’s observations regarding the gun are recorded in the police paperwork, i.e., the memo books,1 arrest report, criminal court affidavit and vouchers. Moreno conceded that his observations were not reflected anywhere in the relevant paperwork. The paperwork states only that plaintiff had in his custody and control a semiautomatic firearm. The paperwork does not reflect Moreno having observed plaintiff discard the firearm onto the pile of garbage.
At the precinct, plaintiff was informed that he was being charged with the possession of a loaded firearm. He was arraigned on charges of gun possession and remanded until a subsequent court proceeding, at which bail was set in the [470]*470amount of $10,000 bond or $5,000 cash. Unable to make bail, plaintiff remained incarcerated for 247 days.
While incarcerated, plaintiff underwent strip searches and cavity inspections. He became depressed and had difficulty sleeping. He had to appear in court 12 times. On January 28, 2010, eight months after his arrest, plaintiff was acquitted of all charges by a jury. DNA testing did not link plaintiff to the weapon recovered at the scene.
On or about November 4, 2011, plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging, inter alia, false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. On or about November 1, 2013, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that probable cause existed by virtue of Moreno’s testimony that he observed plaintiff drop an object onto a pile of garbage, and then discovered a firearm on top of the garbage.
The motion court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety, holding that “conflicting, specific factual references” in the papers raised triable issues of fact. We affirm in large part, modifying only to grant the motion to dismiss the claim for excessive force.
Where there is conflicting evidence concerning the existence of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, from which reasonable persons might draw different inferences, the question is one for the jury (see Parkin v Cornell Univ., 78 NY2d 523, 529 [1991], citing Veras v Truth Verification Corp., 87 AD2d 381, 384 [1st Dept 1982], affd 57 NY2d 947 [1982]). The parties’ differing versions of the events leading to plaintiff’s arrest raise a triable issue of fact whether the officers had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was in possession of a gun, precluding summary dismissal of the false arrest and false imprisonment claims (see Musto v Arakel, 184 AD2d 243, 243 [1st Dept 1992]). “Presence in a public place does not itself prove dominion and control over contraband discovered there” (People v Pearson, 75 NY2d 1001, 1002 [1990]). It is well settled that to support a charge of constructive possession, “the People must show that the defendant exercised dominion or control over the property by a sufficient level of control over the area in which the contraband is found or over the person from whom the contraband is seized” (People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The dissent claims that plaintiff does nothing more than deny his guilt in conclusory terms. However, crucial facts preceding plaintiff’s arrest are in dispute, including whether he dropped an object onto the pile of garbage bags. Officer Shea did not observe [471]*471plaintiff drop a gun or any other object onto the garbage, even though at the time his partner was engaged with plaintiff he was in close proximity, less than 10 feet away. Shea testified at trial that at no time did he observe an object in plaintiff’s hand, even in the moments their unmarked vehicle approached the men, coming within 10 to 15 feet of them. Plaintiff denies discarding any object; Moreno maintains that he did, though his observations are recorded nowhere in the relevant paperwork, as defendants concede.
The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) actual malice (see Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 457 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). A jury may infer that a defendant acted with actual malice from the fact that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff (see Martin v City of Albany, 42 NY2d 13, 17 [1977]; Lundgren v Margini, 30 AD3d 476, 477 [2d Dept 2006] [error to grant motion for summary judgment dismissing malicious prosecution claim where triable issue of fact existed as to whether there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, noting that the lack of probable cause could support an inference of actual malice]). As noted, there are numerous factual questions concerning whether the police had the requisite probable cause to arrest plaintiff and initiate criminal proceedings. The omissions in the police paperwork and the various versions of events raise questions as to the credibility of the police account of what transpired. Further, the presumption of probable cause attaching upon an accused’s arraignment or indictment may be overcome by evidence that “the police witnesses have not made a complete and full statement of facts either to the Grand Jury or to the District Attorney, that they have misrepresented or falsified evidence, that they have withheld evidence or [that they have] otherwise acted in bad faith” (Maxwell v City of New York, 156 AD2d 28, 34 [1st Dept 1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Since the police paperwork admittedly omitted mention of Detective Moreno’s observations, there is a question as to whether Shea’s testimony before the grand jury was a full and complete statement of the facts.
The issue of fact as to probable cause for the arrest precludes summary dismissal of the assault and battery claim (see Johnson v Suffolk County Police Dept., 245 AD2d 340, 341 [2d Dept 1997]), as well as the claim of a violation of 42 USC § 1983 [472]*472against the individual officers (see Narvaez v City of New York, 83 AD3d 516, 517 [1st Dept 2011]).2
The claim of excessive force should be dismissed. “ ‘[AJnalyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness’ ” (Rivera v City of New York, 40 AD3d 334, 341 [1st Dept 2007], lv dismissed 16 NY3d 782 [2011], quoting Ostrander v State of New York, 289 AD2d 463, 464 [2d Dept 2001]), even assuming probable cause for the arrest, the officers’ use of tight handcuffing on plaintiff was not unreasonable (see Ostrander, 289 AD2d at 464).
Concur—Acosta, J.P., Manzanet-Daniels and Kapnick, JJ.