Mendez Jimenez v. County of Sacramento

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 8, 2019
• Docket: 2:18-cv-00044
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 LUIS ALBERTO MENDEZ JIMENEZ, No. 2:18-cv-00044-JAM-KJN 6 Plaintiff, 7 v. ORDER GRANTING THE REGENTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 8 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; et al., PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST JAVIST AND SOKOLOV 9 Defendants. 10 11 Plaintiff filed his complaint for damages against The 12 Regents of the University of California, Danielle Dass, Charlene 13 Williams, Gregory Sokolov, and Andrea Javist (together, the “JPS 14 Defendants”) as well as the County of Sacramento and three county 15 deputies (“County”). Id. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered 16 injuries caused by Defendants’ medical negligence and deliberate 17 indifference toward his constitutional rights while he was 18 detained in the county jail. Id. 19 The County, and the JPS Defendants filed separate motions 20 for summary judgment. JPS Defendants Mot. for Summ. J. (“JPS 21 Defendants Mot.”), ECF No. 32; County Mot. for Summ. J. (“County 22 Mot.”), ECF No. 33. On November 5, 2019, the Court held a 23 hearing on both motions. Minutes for November 5, 2019 Hearing, 24 ECF No. 44. 25 At the hearing, the Court granted the County’s motion in 26 its entirety. The Court denied the JPS Defendants’ motion for 27 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim and 28 Section 1983 claims against Dass and Williams. The Court also 1 took the JPS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 2 Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Sokolov and Javist under 3 submission. For the reasons stated below, the Court now GRANTS 4 summary judgment on this claim against Javist and Sokolov. 5 6 I. OPINION 7 Plaintiff pled a section 1983 claim against Sokolov and 8 Javist, arguing their failure to provide adequate mental health 9 treatment to inmates constituted a violation of the Fourteenth 10 Amendment. Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff’s opposition to the JPS 11 Defendants’ summary judgment motion appears to conflate a section 12 1983 municipal liability with a section 1983 claim against public 13 officials acting in their individual capacity. JPS Defendants 14 Opp’n at 16. To the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to 15 recognize a respondeat superior theory of municipal liability, 16 that request is denied. Neither municipalities nor public 17 officials acting in their official capacity can be held 18 vicariously liable under section 1983. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 19 1228, 1242 (9th Cir. 2018). Because Plaintiff’s complaint names 20 Sokolov and Javist as defendants in their individual capacity, 21 the Court treats his section 1983 claims against them as resting 22 on a theory of individual, supervisor liability. Id. 23 Supervisory officials violate section 1983 when they are 24 (1) personally involved in a constitutional deprivation, or 25 (2) if there is a “sufficient casual connection between the 26 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. 27 Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 28 2018). 1 1. Personally Involved 2 The JPS Defendants argue “there is no evidence [Javist and 3 Sokolov] had any personal involvement in the alleged deprivation 4 of [Plaintiff’s] mental health care,” because they never saw 5 Plaintiff. JPS Defendants Reply at 7. Plaintiff does not 6 dispute this. See generally JPS Defendants Opp’n at 15-19. 7 Thus, neither Dr. Javist nor Ms. Sokolov can be “liable for any 8 personal involvement in the deprivation of [Plaintiff’s] 9 constitutional [violation]....” Redman v. San Diego, 942 F.2d 10 1435 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding the defendant could not be liable 11 for any personal involvement when he was not “personally 12 appraised” of the harm plaintiff was suffering). 13 2. Casual Connection 14 Even if not personally involved, a supervisor “may be 15 liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or 16 inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 17 subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional 18 deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 19 indifference to the rights of others.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 20 798. “[A] plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to 21 plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury.” Starr 22 v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can 23 satisfy the causation element by showing a supervising defendant 24 “set[] in motion a series of acts by others or by knowingly 25 refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the 26 supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause 27 others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 28 1207-08. 1 Plaintiff alleges the “absence of any real mental health 2 treatment options [under the supervision of Sokolov and Javist] 3 caused him to decompensate during his incarceration, and 4 ultimately led him to attempt suicide.” JPS Defendants Opp’n at 5 18. Defendant argues Javist and Sokolov could not have caused 6 Plaintiff’s injuries because “they did not breach a duty to 7 Plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. 8 …[Plaintiff]was not their patient and they owed him no duty.” 9 JPS Defendants Reply at 7. The Court agrees. 10 Plaintiff never established that Dr. Sokolov and Ms. Javist 11 owed him a duty. Further, Plaintiff did not present any expert 12 evidence concluding that Dr. Sokolov and Ms. Javist caused his 13 suicide attempt or prevented him from receiving mental health 14 care during his detention. Plaintiff relies on the testimony of 15 witness Dr. Bruce Gage to support his causation conclusion. JPS 16 Opp’n 18-19. But as Defendants correctly point out, Dr. Gage 17 never reaches a causation conclusion. JPS Defendants Reply at 7. 18 Proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury, only if 19 it is possible “to raise a reasonable inference that the act 20 complained of was the proximate cause of the injury.” Rexall 21 Drug Co. v. Nihill, 276 F.2d 637, 645 (9th Cir. 1960). Without 22 evidence supporting Plaintiff’s conclusion of causation, a jury 23 cannot raise a reasonable inference as to that issue. Rather, a 24 jury would be left to speculate. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 25 failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material 26 fact as to the element of causal connection with respect to 27 Sokolov and Javist’s alleged individual liability under Section 28 1983. Summary judgment is granted in favor of these defendants. 1 Il. ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS summary 3 judgment as to the Section 1983 claim against Defendants Sokolov 4 and Javist. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: November 8, 2019 Lh Ion teiren staves odermacr 7008 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28