Mendez De Navarro v. Bondi
This text of Mendez De Navarro v. Bondi (Mendez De Navarro v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REINA MARIA MENDEZ DE No. 21-24 NAVARRO,* Agency No. A070-916-080 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM**
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 12, 2025 ***
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Reina Maria Mendez de Navarro, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions
pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her
* The clerk will amend the caption to reflect petitioner’s name as Reina Maria Mendez de Navarro, consistent with the final removal order in the certified administrative record. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen.
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We review de novo
questions of law and constitutional claims. Id. at 791-92. We deny in part and
dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendez de Navarro’s third
motion to reopen as number-barred and untimely where Mendez de Navarro did
not show that any statutory or regulatory exception applies. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) (only one motion to reopen allowed), (c)(7)(C)(i) (motion to
reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final removal order); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3) (exceptions).
To the extent Mendez de Navarro contends the BIA should have reopened
proceedings sua sponte, we have jurisdiction to review this discretionary
determination only for legal or constitutional error. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d
1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2020). We find no legal or constitutional error underlying the
BIA’s decision. See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 602-03 (9th Cir.
2002) (differential treatment by country of origin under the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act does not violate equal protection).
We do not address Mendez de Navarro’s contentions as to her eligibility for
cancellation of removal and the immigration judge’s consideration of the evidence
2 21-24 because the BIA did not deny relief on these grounds. See Santiago-Rodriguez v.
Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA,
we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as unsupported by the record Mendez de Navarro’s contention that
the BIA did not provide a reasoned opinion.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
3 21-24
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