M.E.M., Jr. v. K.J.

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: CL-2025-0468
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel December 5, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________

CL-2025-0468 _________________________

M.E.M., Jr.

v.

K.J.

Appeal from Jefferson Juvenile Court (JU-15-1609.02)

EDWARDS, Judge.

M.E.M., Jr. ("the alleged father"), appeals from a judgment entered

by the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating his

parental rights to M.M. ("the child") and awarding permanent custody of CL-2025-0468

the child to K.E. ("the maternal aunt"). For the reasons discussed below,

we dismiss the appeal with instructions to the juvenile court.

Procedural History

On April 29, 2024, the maternal aunt filed a petition in the juvenile

court seeking to terminate the parental rights of S.N.J. ("the mother") to

the child. According to the maternal grandmother's petition, on October

26, 2015, the juvenile court had adjudicated the child dependent and had

awarded her custody of the child.1 Also, in her petition, the maternal

aunt asserted that "[t]here ha[d] never been a [f]ather adjudicated to the

… child, nor has there been a presumed father that has been active in

the life of the child." A hearing on the maternal aunt's petition was

scheduled to occur on July 23, 2024.

On July 8, 2024, the maternal aunt amended her petition to allege

that the alleged father "was listed on the … child's birth certificate."

Moreover, the maternal aunt asserted that, "should [the juvenile court]

determine that the [alleged] father ha[d] any parental rights under the

1The October 26, 2015, judgment is not contained in the record on

appeal. 2 CL-2025-0468

laws of this state[,] … the [alleged] father ha[d] effectively abandoned the

minor child."

On July 22, 2024, the alleged father filed an answer to the maternal

aunt's termination-of-parental-rights petition, as amended. In his

answer, the alleged father admitted that he was the child's father but

denied that he had abandoned the child. He asserted that the mother

had prohibited him from maintaining a relationship with the child.

Following a hearing, the juvenile court, on July 24, 2024, entered

an order that noted that the alleged father had attended the hearing via

Zoom, a videoconferencing service. That order also directed the Alabama

Department of Human Resources ("DHR") to conduct an evaluation of the

maternal aunt's residence in Pinson and scheduled a "pretrial" hearing

to occur on August 20, 2024.

On August 20, 2024, the alleged father's counsel filed a motion

requesting that the juvenile court allow the alleged father, who is a

resident of California, to appear virtually for the pretrial hearing. While

there is no order in the record on appeal granting the alleged father's

request, an order entered by the juvenile court on August 20, 2024,

indicates that, on that day, the alleged father had appeared virtually for

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the pretrial hearing. The order further stated that DHR had provided a

favorable oral report regarding the maternal aunt's home evaluation, and

the juvenile court awarded the alleged father visitation with the child to

be exercised via "telephone, zoom or other electronic means." The

juvenile court also scheduled a second "pretrial" hearing to occur on

October 22, 2024.

Following the October 22, 2024, pretrial hearing, the juvenile court,

on October 23, 2024, entered an order that, in pertinent part, noted that

the alleged father had again appeared virtually for the hearing. The

order also scheduled a trial on the maternal aunt's termination-of-

parental-rights petition, as amended, to occur on February 25, 2025; the

trial setting was subsequently continued to May 27, 2025.

Following the trial, the juvenile court, on June 2, 2025, entered a

judgment terminating the mother's and the alleged father's parental

rights to the child and awarding the permanent legal custody of the child

to the maternal aunt. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-102(16). The judgment

also noted that the alleged father had not been present for the trial but

that his counsel had appeared on his behalf.

4 CL-2025-0468

On June 16, 2025, the alleged father filed a postjudgment motion

seeking to vacate that part of the judgment that terminated his parental

rights. In his motion, the alleged father argued that, because he had been

allowed to virtually appear at the pretrial hearings, he had been

operating under the assumption that he did not need to personally

appear for the termination trial. The alleged father posited that the

juvenile court had violated his due-process rights by conducting the

termination trial despite his failure to appear. The alleged father

requested that the juvenile court vacate its June 2, 2025, judgment

insofar as it terminated his parental rights and reinstate the matter to

the trial docket.

Also, on June 16, 2025, the alleged father filed a timely notice of

appeal to this court. The alleged father's appeal was held in abeyance

pending the disposition of his postjudgment motion. See Rule 4(a)(5),

Ala. R. App. P. On June 30, 2025, the alleged father's postjudgment

motion was denied by operation of law, see Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.; Rule

59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., and the alleged father's notice of appeal became

effective on that date. See Rule 4(a)(5); and K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't

of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 910, 912 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

5 CL-2025-0468

The Evidence

Before taking testimony, the juvenile court addressed a motion that

had been filed by the alleged father's attorney seeking either to continue

the trial or to allow the alleged father to appear virtually. 2 After hearing

arguments from counsel regarding the motion, the juvenile court denied

that request.

The maternal aunt testified that she had received custody of the

child in October 2015. Since that time, she said, the alleged father had

spoken to the child, via cellular telephone, in December 2015 and on the

child's birthday in 2022. She also testified that the alleged father had

sent the child $100 in November 2022. According to the maternal aunt,

the alleged father was aware of her contact information because, she said,

she had maintained the same cellular-telephone number since before the

2015 dependency action was commenced. According to the maternal

aunt, neither she nor the child had heard from the alleged father from

November 2022 until she filed her termination-of-parental-rights

2The alleged father's motion to continue or, alternatively, to appear

virtually at the trial is not included in the record on appeal. 6 CL-2025-0468

petition in April 2024. She denied that she had ever kept the child from

the alleged father.

After the alleged father was served with the termination-of-

parental-rights petition, he reestablished contact with the maternal aunt

and with the child. According to the maternal aunt, during the pendency

of the matter, the alleged father, by agreement of the parties, would call

her cellular telephone to speak with the child on either Sunday or

Monday of each week. She testified, however, that the telephone contact

between the alleged father and the child had been problematic. The first

time the alleged father contacted the child, the child did not recognize the

alleged father's voice, and he was unable to identify who the alleged

father was, so he hung up on the alleged father. The alleged father called

back and raised his voice at the child, which, the maternal aunt said, had

prompted the child to again end the call with the alleged father.

Subsequent attempts at telephonic communication between the

child and the alleged father did not fare better. On two additional

occasions the alleged father contacted the child by telephone, and, on

both of those occasions, the child had indicated that he did not want to

speak with the alleged father and had ended the call. At the time of the

7 CL-2025-0468

termination-of-parental-rights trial, the alleged father had last spoken to

the child in October 2024. The maternal aunt said that she had

encouraged the child to speak with the alleged father but that her efforts

had failed. She testified that the child had received counseling and that

that the child's unwillingness to speak with the alleged father had been

addressed during the counseling sessions.

The maternal aunt has four children, including the child, that

reside in her home. According to her, all four children enjoy a close

relationship, and the children all consider each other siblings. The

maternal aunt testified that it was her intention to adopt the child if the

juvenile court granted her petition to terminate the mother's and the

alleged father's parental rights.

A.F., the maternal aunt's sister, testified that she had adopted a

half sibling of the child in March 2024. According to A.F., she regularly

interacted with the maternal aunt and the child, and she opined that the

child was very well adjusted to the maternal aunt's home. She testified

that she was aware of the identity of the alleged father but said that she

had never spoken to him or met him in person.

8 CL-2025-0468

Discussion

The alleged father raises several issues on appeal. He argues that

the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate his

parental rights because, he says, the record does not contain evidence

establishing that he is the legal father of the child; that the juvenile court

violated his due-process rights when it denied his oral motion to continue

or, alternatively, to allow him to appear virtually for the trial; that the

judgment terminating his parental rights is not supported by clear and

convincing evidence; and that the juvenile court erred when it

determined that there were no viable alternatives to the termination of

his parental rights. Because we find the alleged father's first argument

dispositive of this appeal, we pretermit discussion of the other issues he

raises.

In J.R.C. v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 342

So. 3d 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court stated:

"The termination of parental rights is governed by the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ('the AJJA'), § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. The statute authorizing a juvenile court to terminate parental rights provides that, if the juvenile court determines that 'the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care for the child ..., it may terminate

9 CL-2025-0468

the parental rights of the parents.' § 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The AJJA defines 'parent' as '[t]he legal mother or the legal father of a child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court' pursuant to the AJJA. § 12- 15-102(19), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The AJJA does not further define the term 'legal father,' but that term has a commonly understood legal meaning:

" 'The man recognized by the law as the male parent of a child. A man is the legal father of a child if he was married to the child's natural mother when the child was born, if he has recognized or acknowledged the child, or if he has been declared the child's natural father in a paternity action. ...'

"Black's Law Dictionary 640 (8th ed. 2004). Consistent with that definition, Alabama law recognizes a man as a legal father of a child when he is the 'presumed father' of the child, see § 26-17-204, Ala. Code 1975, or has been adjudicated as the father of the child, see § 26-17-201(b), Ala. Code 1975. Under [DHR's] regulations, an 'alleged father' does not meet the criteria to be considered a 'legal father' and, therefore, is not a 'parent' whose parental rights are subject to termination by a juvenile court under the AJJA."

342 So. 3d at 582 (footnote omitted). In pertinent part, § 26-17-204(a),

Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:

"…. "(5) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child or otherwise openly holds out the child as his natural child and establishes a significant parental

10 CL-2025-0468

relationship with the child by providing emotional and financial support for the child."

In its judgment, the juvenile court found, in pertinent part:

"The [alleged f]ather has not maintained contact with the child. The [alleged f]ather was aware of the dependency case involving this child in 2015 and that the [maternal aunt] was given custody of the child. The [alleged f]ather had no in- person contact with the child from December 2015 to July 2022. The [alleged f]ather had no contact of any kind with the child between November 2022 and April 2024. Subsequent to this case being filed, the [alleged f]ather has spoken on the phone with the child, but caused emotional distress to the child, requiring that the child submit to counseling to address his emotional concerns. [The alleged f]ather has failed to provide any monetary support to the [maternal aunt] for the benefit of the child, and has failed to maintain anything resembling a relationship with the child. The [alleged f]ather's conduct constitutes an abandonment of the child and shows that he is unwilling to or unable to discharge his responsibilities to and for the child."

On appeal, the alleged father does not contest the juvenile court's

findings of fact.

The alleged father's admission of paternity contained in his

unverified July 22, 2024, answer is not sufficient factual support for an

adjudication of the alleged father's paternity. Section 26-17-623, Ala.

Code 1975, authorizes a court adjudicating parentage to accept a verified

admission of paternity. Specifically, § 26-17-623(a) provides:

11 CL-2025-0468

"A defendant in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may admit to the paternity of a child by filing a verified pleading to that effect or by admitting paternity under penalty of perjury when making an appearance or during a hearing."

The alleged father did not admit paternity in a verified pleading or testify

to his paternity during a hearing; thus, the alleged father did not meet

the statutory requirements for his admission of paternity to be effective.

The evidence in the record on appeal does not establish that the paternity

of the child was determined in the October 26, 2015, dependency

judgment that awarded custody of the child to the maternal aunt. See §

26-17-201(b), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, considering the juvenile court's

uncontested findings regarding the alleged father and the statutory

requirements of § 26-17-204(a), we cannot conclude that the maternal

aunt has established that the alleged father is the child's presumed

father. Based on the foregoing, we are compelled to determine that the

maternal aunt has failed to establish that the alleged father is the child's

legal father. 3 See, J.R.C., supra.

3In his brief to this court, the child's guardian ad litem argues that

the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate the alleged father's parental rights because, he says, North Carolina has recognized that paternity can be judicially established by the child's birth certificate and because the alleged father was listed as the child's biological father on his North Carolina birth certificate. We disagree. 12 CL-2025-0468

Because the evidence does not indicate that the alleged father is the

legal father of the child and because the juvenile court had no evidence

before it to support an implicit adjudication of paternity in the alleged

father, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate

the alleged father's parental rights to the child; therefore, that portion of

the judgment terminating the parental rights of the alleged father is void.

See J.R.C., 342 So. 2d at 583. Consequently, because a void judgment will

not support an appeal, id., we dismiss the alleged father's appeal, albeit

with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate that part of the judgment

purporting to terminate the alleged father's parental rights to the child.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

Although the child was born in North Carolina, her paternity is determined under Alabama law. See § 26-17-103(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975. 13