Melvin Weatherholt v. Crockett Cnty. Sch. Bd.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 25-5800
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0102n.06

Case No. 25-5800

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 04, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

MELVIN WEATHERHOLT and JOY ) WEATHERHOLT, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN v. ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE ) CROCKETT COUNTY, TN SCHOOL BOARD, ) APRIL HILLIARD, KYLIE DOYLE, and ) OPINION PATRICK DWYER, ) Defendants-Appellees. )

Before: McKEAGUE, LARSEN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Melvin and Joy Weatherholt claim they were subjected to

excessive force while being escorted out of an event at their grandchild’s elementary school.

Because they have not plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation, we AFFIRM.

I.

At this stage, we accept the facts as alleged in the complaint. Martinez v. Wayne County,

142 F.4th 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2025). Melvin and Joy Weatherholt planned to see their grandchild

perform in a sing-along event at Maury City Elementary School. But when the Weatherholts

entered the school gymnasium for the event, they were approached by school secretary April

Hilliard and Patrick Dwyer (who is apparently a Tennessee State Trooper). According to the

Weatherholts, Hilliard and Dwyer “unreasonably seized” and “unlawfully arrested them” by No. 25-5800, Weatherholt, et al. v. Crockett County, TN School Bd, et al.

“forcing them to leave the event under the pretext that a court order had been issued preventing

them from attending.” Complaint, R. 1, PageID 3, ¶ 9. As the Weatherholts see it, Hilliard and

Dwyer ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment by “physically accousting [sic] them,” “threating [sic]

. . . physical application of force,” and making “very load [sic] verbal demands that they leave the

premises.” Id., PageID 3, ¶¶ 9-10. Beyond that, the complaint is short on detail.

The Weatherholts allege that Hilliard and Dwyer violated the Fourth Amendment, deprived

them of due process, and ran afoul of state law when removing them from the event.1 The

Weatherholts also asserted a supervisory liability claim against school vice principal Kylie Doyle

and Monell2 claims against the Crockett County Board of Education. All told, the Weatherholts

seek $6 million in compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the restraint of liberty, alleged

emotional distress, loss of income, and embarrassment.

Across two orders, the district court dismissed all of the Weatherholts’ claims. Relevant

here, it concluded the Weatherholts failed to plead sufficient facts supporting their Fourth

Amendment claims. And, although it acknowledged that not all of the events in question were

captured on video, the district court concluded that the Weatherholts’ allegations were implausible

based on available footage. This appeal followed.

1 The Weatherholts’ state law allegations fall under a heading naming Hilliard and Dwyer, but the complaint confusingly names a “Defendant Hunter” in articulating those claims. Complaint, R. 1, PageID 6, ¶ 24. 2 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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II.

A.

Although the district court dismissed all of the claims below, the Weatherholts have

narrowed the issues on appeal. They have explicitly waived review of their state law claims against

Hilliard and Dwyer, their supervisory liability claims against Doyle, and their municipal liability

claims against the School Board. See Appellants’ Br. at 6 n.1. And by failing to offer any argument

in support of their due process claims against Hilliard and Dwyer, they have waived appeal on that

front as well. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2013).

B.

All that remains, then, are the Weatherholts’ Fourth Amendment claims. They argue that

the district court erred in relying on video evidence in dismissing those claims. And, setting that

footage aside, they contend the complaint plausibly alleges excessive force claims against Hilliard

and Dwyer. We review the district’s court dismissal of the Weatherholts’ claims de novo. Long v.

Insight Commc’ns of Cent. Ohio, LLC, 804 F.3d 791, 794 (6th Cir. 2015). In doing so, we can

affirm the district court’s dismissal on any ground supported by the record. Id.

With that in mind, we start and end with the sufficiency of the Weatherholts’ complaint.

To survive a Rule 12 motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a Rule 12(c) motion is

reviewed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). That standard does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” but a complaint must offer more than “naked assertions devoid of

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further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). So, “an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” will not do. Id. (citation modified).

Measured by those standards, the Weatherholts’ complaint falls short. To state a claim for

excessive force, they must plausibly allege that the use of force was unreasonable in light of on-

the-ground facts and circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). Here, the

Weatherholts point solely to their allegation that they were physically accosted. See Appellants’

Br. at 9 (citing Complaint, R. 1, PageID 3). But that vague assertion leaves even the most basic

questions unanswered: what type of force was applied, what type of injuries did the Weatherholts

suffer, and when did each defendant use force? See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (recognizing that

analyzing the reasonableness of a particular use of force “requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case”); see also Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue

Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal when plaintiff offered

only “bare allegations without any reference to the ‘who, what, where, when, how or why’”).

The Weatherholts have not identified, nor have we located, any on-point Sixth Circuit cases

with sufficiently similar facts. But courts routinely find allegations similar to the Weatherholts’

insufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force. See, e.g., Sampson v. Bergen

Cnty. Prosecutors Off., No. 23-2425, 2024 WL 3177776, at *2 (3d Cir. June 26, 2024)

(“[Plaintiff’s] bare allegation that he was ‘assaulted’ is insufficient to state an excessive force

claim.”); Allen v. Forren, No. 2:25-cv-1012, 2025 WL 2814703, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2025)

(recommending dismissal of excessive force claim as “entirely conclusory” when plaintiff alleged

only that a police officer “manhandled” him during an arrest without additional specific facts),

report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 120203 (Jan. 16, 2026); Adams v. Jones, No. 3:16-

cv-P90-CRS, 2016 WL 4257368, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 11, 2016) (dismissing excessive force

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claim as “conclusory” when plaintiff alleged only that he was “assaulted” but failed to “describe

with reasonable particularity the specific incident of alleged force or his resulting injuries”); Engle

v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, No. 5:14-cv-1161, 2015 WL 3852143, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2015)

(dismissing excessive force claim when plaintiff alleged he was “physically prevented” from

taking an action but did not allege any facts describing “the type of force used or what actions any

of the officers took” (emphasis omitted)). And cases in the Eighth Amendment context lend further

support. Kirkendall v. Jaramillo, No. 16-1500, 2016 WL 11005056, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2016)

(finding Eighth Amendment excessive force claim insufficiently pled where plaintiff did not

“allege any specific instances of . . . conduct”); Riddle v. Rivard, No. 14-11092, 2015 WL 74822,

at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2015) (dismissing complaint asserting Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim when plaintiff alleged only that he was “physically assaulted” and did not allege “what

conduct constituted the assault, or any other details of the incident”).

All in all, the Weatherholts’ allegations add up to nothing more than “naked assertions.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). Without “further factual enhancement,” the complaint

“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (citation

modified). Although the district court did not focus on the sufficiency of the complaint, the

complaint’s shortcomings are sufficient to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Weatherholts’

Fourth Amendment claims.

In any event, given the Weatherholts’ bare-bones allegations, it is not clear that the district

court erred in relying on the available video evidence either. At the pleadings stage, a district court

“can only rely on . . . videos over the complaint to the degree the videos are clear and blatantly

contradict or utterly discredit the plaintiff’s version of events.” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th

362, 364 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)) (citation modified).

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And “any gaps or uncertainties” must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Eastep v. City of

Nashville, 156 F.4th 819, 826 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

Consider how those principles apply here. Available footage leaves no question that the

Weatherholts were not subjected to the use of force in the gymnasium or school office. In the

gymnasium, Hilliard and Dwyer approach the Weatherholts (who are seated in the bleachers), have

a brief conversation, and then walk toward an exit. And in the office, the Weatherholts stand calmly

and appear to speak with two individuals behind the desk before Hilliard presents them with a

document and they depart. So, on that score, the district court was correct to rely on the video

exhibits to conclude the Weatherholts’ allegations were implausible. Id. As the Weatherholts point

out, there is a 22-second break in the footage from the time the parties leave the gymnasium to

when they enter the school office, but nothing about their demeanor once they arrive in the office

suggests they had been accosted in the hallway. True, any inference about events occurring during

that gap must be resolved in the Weatherholts’ favor at this stage. Id. Invoking that rule, both in

the district court and on appeal, the Weatherholts argue that they “plausibly plead that defendants

physically accosted them while escorting them from the gym to the office.” Appellants’ Br. at 9;

R. 26, PageID 91. But a review of the complaint reveals no such allegations. Quite the opposite,

their complaint alleges only an impermissible use of force “in the public event with a large number

of the members of the community present.” Complaint, R. 1, PageID 3, ¶ 10. With that in mind,

the video exhibits undercut the plausibility of the Weatherholts’ allegations as well.

III.

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Weatherholts’ complaint.

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