Melvin Trotter v. State of Florida & Melvin Trotter v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: SC2026-0214 & SC2026-0217
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC2026-0214 ____________

MELVIN TROTTER, Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

____________

No. SC2026-0217 ____________

MELVIN TROTTER, Petitioner,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

February 17, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Melvin Trotter is a prisoner under sentence of death for whom

a death warrant has been signed and an execution date set for

February 24, 2026. He appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his successive motion for postconviction relief filed under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, petitions this Court for a

writ of habeas corpus, and requests a stay of execution. We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. As we explain

below, we affirm the summary denial of postconviction relief. We

also deny Trotter’s habeas petition and his request for a stay of

execution.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Trotter was convicted of the 1986 first-degree murder of 70-

year-old Virgie Langford. Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla.

1990). This Court explained:

On June 16, 1986, a truck driver went into Langford’s grocery in Palmetto, Florida, and found the seventy-year-old owner, Virgie Langford, bleeding on the floor in the back of the store. She had suffered a large abdominal wound which resulted in disembowelment; there were a total of seven stab wounds. She told the driver that she had been stabbed and robbed. Several hours after the surgery for her wounds, the victim went into cardiac arrest and died.

Id. at 692. The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial

court sentenced Trotter to death. On direct appeal, this Court

affirmed Trotter’s first-degree murder conviction but reversed

Trotter’s death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase.

-2- At the conclusion of the new penalty phase, the jury again

recommended that Trotter be sentenced to death. Upon finding

that multiple aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable

doubt and that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating

circumstances, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation

and sentenced Trotter to death. Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234,

1236 (Fla. 1996). In its sentencing order, the trial court found the

following aggravating factors: (1) Trotter was on community control

at the time of the murder; (2) Trotter had been convicted of a prior

violent felony; (3) the murder took place while Trotter was engaged

in a robbery (merged with pecuniary gain); and (4) the murder was

especially wicked, evil, atrocious, and cruel. Id. at 1236 n.5.

The trial court found as statutory mitigation that at the time of

the murder (1) Trotter was under the influence of extreme mental

and emotional disturbance, and (2) Trotter’s capacity to conform his

conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. As

nonstatutory mitigation, the court found that (1) Trotter had a

below average IQ, family and developmental problems, and a

disadvantaged background; (2) Trotter may have suffered from a

frontal lobe brain disorder (which the sentencing order indicated

-3- “slowed down [Trotter’s] reaction times”); (3) Trotter was remorseful

“to some degree”; and (4) other nonstatutory factors. Id. at 1236

nn.6-7.

Trotter’s convictions and sentences became final when the

United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on October 6,

1997. Trotter v. Florida, 522 U.S. 876 (1997).

Since that time, Trotter has unsuccessfully challenged his

death sentence in state and federal courts. See Trotter v. State, 932

So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2006) (affirming denial of initial motion for

postconviction relief, denying state habeas petition, and affirming

the rejection of Trotter’s claim of mental retardation under Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203); Trotter v. State, 10 So. 3d 633

(Fla. 2009) (unpublished table decision) (affirming denial of first

successive motion for postconviction relief); Trotter v. State, 235 So.

3d 284 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of second successive motion for

postconviction relief); Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:06-cv-

1872-T-17MSS, 2007 WL 3326672 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2007)

(denying federal habeas petition); Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 535

F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of federal habeas relief).

-4- Governor Ron DeSantis signed Trotter’s death warrant on

January 23, 2026. On February 2, 2026, Trotter filed in the circuit

court a motion for stay of execution and a successive motion for

postconviction relief under rule 3.851 raising two claims: (1) the

alleged failure of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) to

follow the published lethal injection procedures violates Trotter’s

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States

Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida

Constitution; and (2) executing Trotter constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment because of his advanced age and status as an

elderly person.

On February 6, 2026, the circuit court summarily denied both

of Trotter’s rule 3.851 claims and denied his motion to stay the

execution. Trotter now appeals to this Court the circuit court’s

denial of postconviction relief, petitions this Court for a writ of

habeas corpus, and requests a stay of execution.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief

The “[s]ummary denial of a successive postconviction motion

is appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case

-5- conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Owen

v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022 (Fla. 2023) (second alteration in

original) (quoting Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021)). We

review the circuit court’s decision de novo, “accepting the movant’s

factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the

record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows

that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Id. at 1022-23 (quoting

Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009)). The circuit court

did not err in summarily denying Trotter’s claims.

Trotter’s postconviction appeal raises two issues, the first of

which involves his claim that FDOC maladministered certain lethal

injection procedures in recent executions. According to Trotter,

FDOC’s alleged failure to comply with the published procedures

creates a sure or very likely risk of sufficiently imminent danger and

thus violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. Second, Trotter, who recently turned 65 years old,

argues that executing him at the age of 65 violates the protection

against cruel and unusual punishment because of his status as an

elderly person. We address each issue in turn and explain why

Trotter is not entitled to relief.

-6- 1. Lethal Injection Procedures

Trotter challenges the summary denial of his claim that

FDOC’s alleged maladministration of the published procedures for

execution by lethal injection violates his rights under the Eighth

Amendment and corresponding provisions of the Florida

Constitution. In support of this claim, Trotter alleges several

examples of FDOC’s maladministration of its procedures: ad hoc

recordkeeping regarding the removal of lethal injection drugs from

inventory; the administration of incorrect drug doses during certain

executions; the use of a fourth drug, lidocaine, during certain

executions; the use of expired drugs during certain executions; and

the failure to contemporaneously document and accurately record

the drugs used in executions. Trotter maintains that these

instances—based on evidence submitted in a federal lawsuit

brought by since-executed inmate Frank Walls—constitute “a per se

violation of [his] constitutional rights under the [Eighth]

Amendment” due to “sure or very likely risks of sufficiently

imminent danger.”

While Trotter contends that his lethal injection claim is not a

traditional “method-of-execution claim,” the gist of his argument

-7- remains that executing him by lethal injection—given the

allegations he raises—constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Thus, to obtain relief, Trotter must: “(1) establish that the method of

execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or

very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering and

(2) identify a known and available alternative method of execution

that entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay v. State,

224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Glossip v.

Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 877 (2015)). The circuit court did not err in

denying an evidentiary hearing on nor in summarily denying this

claim. See Heath v. State, 2026 WL 320522, at *3 (Fla. Feb. 3)

(stating that “speculative and conclusory allegations that lethal

injection protocols present a substantial risk of serious harm are

insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing” (citing Cole v. State,

392 So. 3d 1054, 1065 n.18 (Fla. 2024))), cert. denied, 2026 WL

363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026).

Trotter acknowledges that his allegations are substantively

similar to those we recently addressed in the postconviction appeal

of recently executed inmate Ronald Heath. In Heath, we explained:

-8- The question is not whether protocol deviations occurred but whether the defendant’s allegations would demonstrate a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering. Heath’s allegations would not demonstrate such a risk. The alleged failure to document the removal of drugs from inventory until one or two days after an execution would not, without more, show a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering during an execution. Nor would the alleged failure to log the removal of etomidate from inventory establish such a risk where the autopsy indicates the drug was, in fact, administered. The allegation that lidocaine was administered on two occasions certainly would not establish a risk of needless suffering. Heath’s suggestion that inventory removals on dates that “seemingly correspond[]” to executions and reflect amounts less than required by the protocol show that incorrect doses were used is speculative and Heath does not allege that such incorrect doses would create a demonstrated risk of severe pain. The same is true of the alleged use of expired drugs and the execution that took twenty minutes and allegedly involved movement. None of Heath’s allegations would establish that the method of execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very likely—in other words, a virtual certainty—to cause serious illness and needless suffering.

Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).

However, Trotter argues that his lethal injection claim

sufficiently pleads “a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or

very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering during an

execution” and that Heath is distinguishable on this basis. We

-9- disagree.

In addition to the Walls documents, Trotter also relies on an

affidavit submitted by Dr. Daniel Buffington, a clinical

pharmacologist. However, similar to Heath, the outcomes

suggested in the affidavit are speculative and thus do not

demonstrate “a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very

likely—in other words, a virtual certainty—to cause serious illness

and needless suffering.” Id.

Moreover, because Trotter incorrectly maintains that the

Glossip requirements do not apply to his claim, he fails to identify

an alternative method of execution.

Trotter is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the circuit court’s

denial of this claim.

2. Execution of the Elderly

Trotter also urges this Court to hold that his advanced age

and status as an elderly person exempt him from execution on

Eighth Amendment grounds because carrying out his death

sentence by execution at 65 years of age runs afoul of evolving

standards of decency and would constitute cruel and unusual

punishment. The circuit court did not err in denying this claim.

- 10 - Trotter’s Eighth Amendment argument in favor of a categorical

ban on the execution of the elderly is similar to that raised in

Smithers v. State, 420 So. 3d 460 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 323

(2025). Smithers, who was also under an active death warrant,

argued that executing him at age 72 would constitute cruel and

unusual punishment. There, we observed that “[p]resently, the

United States Supreme Court—and this Court—recognize only one

age-based death penalty exemption, which prohibits the imposition

of the death penalty on individuals who were under the

chronological age of 18 at the time that their capital crimes were

committed.” Id. at 465 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578

(2005)). Trotter asks this Court to revisit our holding in Smithers.

We decline to do so.

In rejecting Smithers’ claim that executing him at age 72

would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, we observed:

Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to limit the exemption from execution . . . based on age to those whose chronological age was less than eighteen years at the time of their capital crime(s), this Court is bound by those interpretations and is precluded from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to exempt . . . those whose chronological age was over eighteen years at the time of their capital crime(s).

- 11 - Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701,

713 (Fla. 2025)). We concluded that “to the extent we view

Smithers’ argument as precluded by United States Supreme Court

precedent, we are bound by the conformity clause [of the Florida

Constitution],” id. at 466, meaning that

the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to provide protection that the Supreme Court has decided is not afforded by the Eighth Amendment.

Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 979 (Fla.) (quoting Barwick v. State,

361 So. 3d 785, 794 (Fla. 2023)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161

(2025).

Trotter argues that because the United States Supreme Court

has not expressly addressed whether the elderly are categorically

exempt from execution, this Court is not bound by the conformity

clause and may expand Eighth Amendment protections to the

execution of the elderly. However, as we stated in Gudinas:

While the states are required to adhere to the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, neither the Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendments require states to expand the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment

- 12 - or to interpret their own corresponding state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment in a more expansive manner than the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal prohibition.

412 So. 3d at 714 (emphasis added). Consistent with our analyses

in Smithers and Gudinas, we again decline to expand the

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to include

individuals 65 years of age and older. As such, we affirm the circuit

court’s summary denial of relief on this issue.

B. Habeas Petition

In his habeas petition, Trotter requests a stay of execution and

an independent investigation of FDOC’s compliance with Florida’s

published lethal injection procedures. According to Trotter, new

evidence suggests that FDOC is not following its published

procedures and is thereby creating a substantial likelihood of

serious injury and needless suffering. Trotter is not entitled to the

relief he seeks.

Even if we were to assume that Trotter’s habeas claim is

properly before this Court, this claim is based on the same

allegations raised in his post-warrant successive motion for

postconviction relief—a motion that the circuit court denied, and

- 13 - the denial of which we affirm in this opinion. In fact, Trotter

concedes that he presents “similar” issues in his postconviction

appeal and in his habeas petition. He contends, however, that his

habeas petition is sufficiently distinguishable from his successive

postconviction appeal because the types of relief he seeks are

different. Trotter notes that instead of seeking to have his death

sentence vacated as in his successive postconviction appeal, here,

he seeks a stay of execution and an investigation into FDOC’s

compliance with its lethal injection procedures. Trotter’s attempt to

circumvent a procedural bar is unavailing. Indeed, Trotter has

“repackaged one of his postconviction claims as a habeas claim,”

and for this reason, his habeas claim is procedurally barred. Davis

v. State, 383 So. 3d 717, 742 (Fla. 2024). “[C]laims [that] were

raised in [a] postconviction motion . . . cannot be relitigated in a

habeas petition.” Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 395 (Fla. 2005).

Trotter’s habeas claim also fails on the merits for the same

reason that his postconviction claim fails: he has not

“(1) establish[ed] that the method of execution presents a

substantial and imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause

serious illness and needless suffering,” nor has he “(2) identif[ied] a

- 14 - known and available alternative method of execution that entails a

significantly less severe risk of pain.” Asay, 224 So. 3d at 701

(emphasis added) (citing Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877).

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Trotter’s successive

motion for postconviction relief and deny his habeas petition. As

such, we decline to order a stay of execution.

No oral argument is required, no motion for rehearing will be

considered, and the mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Manatee County, Frederick P. Mercurio, Judge Case No. 411986CF001225CFAXMA And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mahham Syed, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Melody Jacquay- Acosta, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Ann Marie Mirialakis, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Stephen D. Ake, Attorney Manager, Capital Appeals, and Michael W.

- 15 - Mervine, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent

- 16 -