Melton v. State

993 S.W.2d 95, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 605, 1999 Tex. LEXIS 47, 1999 WL 257268
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedApril 29, 1999
Docket98-0784
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 993 S.W.2d 95 (Melton v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melton v. State, 993 S.W.2d 95, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 605, 1999 Tex. LEXIS 47, 1999 WL 257268 (Tex. 1999).

Opinion

Justice O’NEILL

delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

This case calls for us to apply provisions of the Local Government Code, the Property Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure to delineate the duties of county officials regarding unclaimed cash bail bonds. These proceedings began when the State of Texas sued to compel the Dallas County clerk, Earl Bullock, to comply with Chapter 74 of the Property Code by reporting and delivering to the comptroller unclaimed cash bail bonds deposited by defendants into the registry of the Dallas courts. 1 Both the State and the clerk moved for summary judgment. The trial court held that unclaimed cash bail bonds are not abandoned property subject to Chapter 74, and granted summary judgment for the clerk.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. We agree with the court of appeals’ holding that: (1) unclaimed cash bail bonds become abandoned property subject to Chapter 74 three years from the date of final judgment in the underlying criminal prosecutions; (2) the county clerk is a “holder” obligated to report and deliver the bonds to the comptroller; (3) a court order is necessary to trigger the clerk’s duty to deliver abandoned cash bad bonds to the comptroller, but not to trigger the clerk’s duty to report the abandoned bonds; and (4) material fact issues concerning the amount of unclaimed cash bail bonds in dispute preclude summary judgment. See 970 S.W.2d 146,150-152. Consequently, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment, albeit on somewhat different grounds.

I Statutory Overview

A bail bond is a written undertaking binding an accused to appear before the appropriate authorities to answer a criminal accusation. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.02. The bond is in a specific monetary amount and must be executed by sureties. Id. In lieu of having sureties, an accused may deposit cash with the court. Id. Funds deposited in this manner are “cash bail bonds.” These bonds are refunded when the accused complies with the conditions of the bond “and upon order of the court.” Id. The county or district clerk is responsible for cash bail bonds deposited into the court’s registry. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 117.052(c)(6).

Several interrelated provisions of the Property Code and Local Government Code govern district and county clerks’ duties regarding unclaimed court registry funds. Chapter 74 of the Property Code governs property that is presumed abandoned; it is designed to provide a means for absent owners to reclaim their property. See Tex. Prop.Code §§ 74.501-502, 74.504, 74.506-509. To further this purpose, Chapter 74 provides a procedure whereby persons holding property that is presumed abandoned under Chapters 72, 73, or 75, of the Property Code must annually report and deliver such property to *98 the comptroller. See Tex. Prop.Code § 74.301. Personal property is presumed abandoned if, after a three-year period (the “dormancy period”),

(1) the existence and location of the owner of the property is unknown to the holder of the property; and
(2) according to the knowledge and records of the holder of the property, a claim to the property has not been asserted or an act of ownership of the property has not been exercised.

Tex. Prop.Code § 72.101(a). Section 117.002 of the Local Government Code governs when the Property Code’s dormancy period begins to run for trust funds and court registry funds in the care of district and county clerks. 2 See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 117.002.

II Abandonment of Cash Bail Bonds

The clerk contends unclaimed cash bail bonds cannot be abandoned property subject to Chapter 74 of the Property Code for two reasons. First, the clerk argues that the bonds cannot be presumed abandoned under section 72.101(a) because the bond owners’ existence is not “unknown.” Second, the clerk argues that the dormancy provision governing court registry funds does not apply to cash bail bonds, and the Property Code’s three-year dormancy period does not begin to run until the court in which the bonds were deposited orders them released to the defendant. Because the cash bail bonds at issue have not been ordered released, the clerk argues that they cannot be abandoned property.

A Identity of Bonds’ Owners

The clerk contends unclaimed cash bail bonds cannot be presumed abandoned because their owners are identified defendants in criminal cases whose “existence and location” are not “unknown.” We disagree. Viewed within the statutory framework, it is clear that “unknown,” as used in section 72.101(a) of the Property Code, does not mean completely unidentified.

Chapter 74 of the Property Code governs the disposition of funds that are presumed abandoned under section 72.101(a). Among the comptroller’s responsibilities outlined in Chapter 74 is the duty to attempt to provide notice to each reported owner of abandoned property. See Tex. Prop.Code § 74.201. The notice must be provided in the county of the property owner’s last known address and must contain, inter alia, the reported owner’s name and city of last known address. See id. The notice statute would be nonsensical if knowledge of the owner’s name and last known address meant the property could never be presumed abandoned.

In addition, we note that section 72.101(a) is phrased in the present tense; personal property is presumed abandoned if, after three years, “the [owner’s] existence and location ... is unknown.” See Tex. Prop.Code § 72.101(a)(1) (emphasis added). The fact that the defendant’s “existence and location” may have been “known” when the bond was filed does not mean that it is “known” after the passage of more than three years with no request from the defendant for the bond’s release. We conclude that knowledge of the defendant’s name and last known address at the time the bond was filed does not preclude *99 the application of section 72.101(a). See Eason v. Calvert, 902 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding that funds were presumed abandoned under section 72.101, even though they were deposited by an identifiable person).

B Commencement of the Dormancy Period

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
993 S.W.2d 95, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 605, 1999 Tex. LEXIS 47, 1999 WL 257268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melton-v-state-tex-1999.