M'Elroy's Case

6 Watts & Serg. 451
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 15, 1843
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 6 Watts & Serg. 451 (M'Elroy's Case) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M'Elroy's Case, 6 Watts & Serg. 451 (Pa. 1843).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Huston, J.

There are cases in which deliberate opinions of great lawyers, or even the dicta of such men, seem to impose a restraint to investigation on certain subjects; and if these have been often cited as authority down to near our own time, the difficulty to be surmounted appears greater. Lord Coke, from his situation in life, had probably little intercourse with what occurs often to those who mingle much in society, and possibly, I may say probably, had never seen or never examined an idiot lunatic, or one non compos mentis, in his life; and though no doubt treatises on those subjects existed, we do not know what they were. We know much has been written on mental insanity; that the subject has employed the most eminent physicians, jurists and philosophers ; that we have theories and the histories of those disorders of the mind by those who have had opportunities of observing the subjects of such disorders for many years ; yet we find no treatise of the age in which Sir Edward Coice lived, quoted or even noticed.

On all subjects relating to rights of property, I admit his authority; but the subject before us is not the rights of idiots, lunatics, or of persons of unsound mind: it is his definition of what disordered state of the faculties constituted a person designated by those words; a matter more of medical than judicial cognizance. He says, “ An idiot or fool natural, is one who from his nativity, by a perpetual infirmity, is non compos mentis." Certainly it was not intended to leave this as a definition of idiocy. Another ancient and great authority, Fitzherbert, defines an idiot to be “one who from his birth cannot count or number twenty pence, or tell who his father or mother is, or how old he is;” “ if he have sufficient understanding to know and understand his letters, or to read by teaching and information of another man, then he is not an idiot.” Of this Lord Tentekden has said, “ It is contrary to common sense; for as to knowing the letters of the alphabet, or reading what is set before him, a child of three years old may do that.” 2. A person who was of good and sound memory, and by sickness, grief or other accident, wholly loses his [461]*461memory and understanding. 3. A lunatic, lunaticus, who sometimes has understanding and sometimes not, qui gaudet lucidis iniervnllis, and therefore is called non. compos mentis so long as he has not understanding. The words “ wholly lost his memory and understanding,” and the expression attributed to Lord Hardwicke in 3 Atk. 173, being non compos mentis, of unsound mind, are certain terms in law, and import a total deprivation of sense; and these expressions, adopted by Judge Kennedy in delivering the opinion of this court in quashing the inquisition in Beaumont’s case (1 Wharton 55), were quoted and relied on by the counsel of the traverser in this case. Although Atkyns is an elegant and generally a correct reporter, yet it must be recollected that in his day the Chancellor did not write his own opinions and give them to the reporter, and that the expression may not have been used by the Chancellor. But if it was used, it proves little. The words “of unsound mind” had been used in the returns on inquests, and were omitted in that case; and for this cause the inquisition was quashed, and that weakness of understanding, as expressed, was not equivalent, was decided. The words non compos mentis, or unsound mind, were held necessary in point of form, and nothing, more: for in the same book (page 184) we find an inquisition on the same person, stated to have been found on the same evidence, but in form stating Barnsley to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing his estate, was affirmed. And more: the same Lord Hardwicke refused to allow it to be traversed, because two inquests had found the same way; for, said he, although the first was quashed for want of form, it was substantially the same finding.

It has happened that the argument of counsel adopted by the court, and carrying conviction in itself, is quoted as law. In the defence of Hatfield, Mr. Erskine, speaking of the total deprivation of memory and understanding, as put by Lord Coke, says: “ If this was intended to be taken in the literal sense of the words; if it was meant that to protect a man from punishment he must be in such a state of prostrated intellect as not to know his name, nor his relation towards others; that if a husband, he should not know he was married; if a father, that he should not know his children; nor know the road to his own house nor his property in it; then no such madness ever existed in the world. It is idiocy alone, which places a man in such a helpless condition.” He afterwards admits that in delirium a person may not be able to know any person or thing. “ In all the cases which have filled Westminster Hall with the most complicated considerations, the lunatics and other insane persons who have been the subject of them, have not only had memory in my sense of the expression— they have not only had the most perfect knowledge and recollection of all the relations they stood in towards others, and of the acts and circumstances of their lives, but have in general been [462]*462remarkable for subtlety and acuteness. Defects in their reasonings have seldom been traceable. The disease consisted in the delusive sources of thought; all their deductions within the scope of the malady being founded on the immovable assumption of matters as realities, either without any foundation whatever, or so distorted and. disfigured by fancy as to be nearly the same thing as their creation.” He then related a case tried in that very house before one of the judges then present, of an indictment by an insane person of his own brother and the keeper of an hospital, for false imprisonment. Mr. Erskine had not been informed as to the nature of the insanity; and after the witness had detailed his story, cross-examined him for more than an hour, and left no means untried which his knowledge or his experience could suggest; and when the jury and judge and audience were satisfied that it was a most flagrant case of oppression and injustice, Dr. Syms, who had attended the patient, came in and stated to the counsel the nature of the malady, on which Erskine, with great apparent humility, begged forgiveness for his rudeness, as he had not known the witness. Immediately the insane replied, with great gravity, I forgive you — I am the Christ;” and the trial ended.

Most of the judges on this bench knew a member of the bar of considerable legal acquirements, and those rather solid and substantial than showy or superficial. For some considerable time those near him saw a change, but it did not attract general attention ; he attended to his property and profession carefully and constantly, and no want of skill or knowledge was discovered. At length his abuse in words of his wife and friends raised doubts as to his sanity; his increasing violence and threats and attempts removed all doubt, and his friends took him to the Pennsylvania Hospital. When there he became quiet and apparently composed. He insisted on his sanity, had the managers and physicians called together, and after many examinations and consultations was discharged as of sound mind. It was soon discovered that he was still deranged. He however took great care of his property. At length he charged one and another with robbing him. His insanity became dangerous, and strict confinement absolutely necessary, and he continued in that state, or growing worse, till he died.

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Bluebook (online)
6 Watts & Serg. 451, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melroys-case-pa-1843.