Melrose v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJune 8, 2021
Docket5:20-cv-00125
StatusUnknown

This text of Melrose v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Melrose v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melrose v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (W.D. Okla. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

N.M., A MINOR BY AND ) THROUGH HER MOTHER AND ) NEXT FRIEND, NATALIE ) MELROSE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-20-125-P ) ANDREW M. SAUL, ) Commissioner of the ) Social Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382. Defendant has answered the Complaint and filed the administrative record (hereinafter AR___), and the parties have briefed the issues. For the following reasons, Defendant’s decision is affirmed. I. Administrative History and Final Agency Decision Plaintiff protectively filed her application for SSI benefits on November 18, 2013. AR 142-43, 144-52. Plaintiff alleged she became disabled on October 21, 2013. AR 144. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application on February 4, 2014, see id. at 62, 63-69, and on reconsideration on April 26, 2014. AR 70, 71-78.

Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at an administrative hearing conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 4, 2015. AR 37-61. Plaintiff’s mother also testified at the administrative hearing. Id. The ALJ issued a

decision in which he found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 8-25. Following the Appeals Council’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for review, Plaintiff filed an appeal with this Court, which reversed Defendant’s decision and remanded the matter for further administrative

proceedings. N.M. by and through Melrose v. Berryhill, No. CIV-17-1073-BMJ, 2018 WL 3579481 (W.D. Okla. July 24, 2018). Following remand, a second administrative hearing was held on April 15,

2019, in which Plaintiff and her mother testified. AR 437-57. On July 24, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 393-420. The ALJ followed the three-step sequential evaluation process required by agency regulations for evaluating the

disability of a child. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. The ALJ first determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 18, 2013, the application date. AR 399. At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff suffered from the severe

impairments of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and generalized anxiety disorder. Id.1 At step three, the ALJ first found Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 400. The ALJ next found Plaintiff’s impairments do not functionally equal the severity of the Listings. AR 404. Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Social

Security Act, from November 18, 2013 through the date of the decision. AR 420. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, and therefore the ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009).

II. Issue Raised Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider whether she met the requirements for Listing 112.11. Doc. No. 25 at 19-23. Second, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by failing to properly

analyze her limitations with respect to functional equivalence. Id. at 23-28. III. General Legal Standards Guiding Judicial Review Judicial review of Defendant’s final decision is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Poppa v. Astrue, 569

1 The ALJ also noted Plaintiff had received medical treatment for diagnoses of nocturnal enuresis and asthma. AR 399-400. F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence “means-and means only- ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The “determination of whether the ALJ’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence must be based upon

the record taken as a whole. Consequently, [the Court must] remain mindful that evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). The court “meticulously examine[s] the record as a whole, including anything that may

undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Id. (citations omitted). While a court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in

disability cases, a court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of Defendant. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). IV. Listing 112.11 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his analysis at step three. At step three, the

ALJ must determine whether the child claimant has an impairment that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). If the child’s impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a Listing and meets the durational requirement, the ALJ will find the child disabled at step three. Id. If those criteria are not met, the ALJ will find the child is not disabled. Id.

Plaintiff contends that in considering whether she met or medically equaled Listing 112.11, the ALJ ignored evidence that contradicted his conclusion. Doc. No. 25 at 19-23. Listing 112.11, for ADHD, requires the following:

112.11 Neurodevelopmental disorders (see 112.00B9), for children age 3 to attainment of age 18, satisfied by A and B:

A. Medical documentation of the requirements of paragraph 1, 2, or 3:

1. One or both of the following:

a. Frequent distractibility, difficulty sustaining attention, and difficulty organizing tasks; or

b. Hyperactive and impulsive behavior (for example, difficulty remaining seated, talking excessively, difficulty waiting, appearing restless, or behaving as if being “driven by a motor”).

2. Significant difficulties learning and using academic skills; or

3. Recurrent motor movement or vocalization.

AND

B. Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning (see 112.00F):

1. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 112.00E1).
2. Interact with others (see 112.00E2).
3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 112.00E3).

4.

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Related

Boss v. Barnhart
67 F. App'x 539 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)
Oldham v. Astrue
509 F.3d 1254 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Bowman v. Astrue
511 F.3d 1270 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Taylor v. Astrue
266 F. App'x 771 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Carpenter v. Astrue
537 F.3d 1264 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Wall v. Astrue
561 F.3d 1048 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Alarid v. Colvin
590 F. App'x 789 (Tenth Circuit, 2014)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)

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Melrose v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melrose-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-okwd-2021.