Melody Wallace v. United States Postal Service

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 18, 2024
DocketDA-0752-19-0538-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Melody Wallace v. United States Postal Service (Melody Wallace v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melody Wallace v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MELODY A. WALLACE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-19-0538-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: July 18, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Steve Newman , Esquire, New York, New York, for the appellant.

Nadalynn Hamilton , Esquire, Plano, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed her removal for misconduct. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The appellant was an EAS-17 Supervisor of Customer Services for the agency’s Trinity River Station in Fort Worth, Texas. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 88. On November 27, 2018, the appellant’s supervisor reported some missing stamp stock to the agency’s Inspector General, and the ensuing investigation uncovered several irregularities with the most recent stamp and cash count that the appellant conducted on October 31, 2018. Id. at 77-78. After further investigation, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on one charge of unacceptable conduct with four specifications, and one charge of unacceptable performance with two specifications. Id. at 77-81. One specification of unacceptable performance pertained to the appellant’s failure to use the proper form when she last changed the Trinity River Station safe combination. All other specifications pertained to the appellant’s use of a subordinate’s computer credentials to conduct the stamp and cash count, and her untruthful indication that this same subordinate had witnessed the count. 2 The

2 The agency did not allege that the appellant stole any of the stamp stock or that she was otherwise directly responsible for its disappearance. 3

deciding official sustained both charges and all specifications, removing the appellant effective September 14, 2019. Id. at 82. The appellant filed a Board appeal, contesting the merits of the agency’s action and raising an affirmative defense of violation of due process or harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID) at 11-14. After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the appellant’s removal. ID. She sustained both charges and all the underlying specifications. ID at 3-11. She further found that the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defense and that the removal penalty was reasonable. ID at 11-17. The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the attorney who represented her below was ineffective. She also disputes the administrative judge’s findings on two specifications. 3 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS In an appeal of a removal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, the agency bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that its action was taken for such cause as would promote the efficiency of the service. MacDonald v. Department of the Navy, 4 M.S.P.R. 403, 404 (1980); 5 U.S.C. § 1201.56(a)(1)(ii). To meet this burden, the agency must prove its charge, establish a nexus between the charge and the efficiency of the service, and demonstrate that the penalty imposed was reasonable. Pope v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, even if the agency carries this burden, the removal may not be sustained if the appellant shows that it was the product of harmful procedural error or was taken without due process. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A); Stephen v.

3 It appeared that the appellant’s petition for review might have been missing some pages. The Office of the Clerk of the Board issued an order notifying the appellant of the issue and giving her an opportunity to supplement her petition with any pages that might be missing from the record. Petition for Review File, Tab 6. The appellant did not respond to the order. 4

Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681, 680-81 (1991); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C). As explained above, the administrative judge sustained both charges and all six supporting specifications underlying the appellant’s removal. ID at 5-11. On petition for review, the appellant challenges only charge 1, specifications 1 and 2. Because the appellant has not provided a basis to disturb the remaining specifications, we affirm the initial decision with respect to charge 2 and charge 1, specifications 3 and 4. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (“The Board normally will consider only issues raised in a timely filed petition or cross petition for review.”). Accordingly, both charges are sustained. See Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that, when more than one event or factual specification supports a single charge, proof of one or more, but not all, of the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge). Nor does the appellant challenge the administrative judge’s findings on her affirmative defense, and we see no basis to disturb those findings on review. ID at 11-14. Under, charge 1, specifications 1 and 2, the agency alleged as follows: Specification #1 : You failed to comply with postal policy regarding information security when you obtained the computer access credentials of another postal employee.

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Melody Wallace v. United States Postal Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melody-wallace-v-united-states-postal-service-mspb-2024.