Melody Helmbrecht v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 5, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-1965
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Dec 05 2018, 10:16 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK Indiana Supreme Court purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals and Tax Court collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Yvette M. LaPlante Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana Evansville, Indiana Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Melody Helmbrecht, December 5, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1965 v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82D03-1708-F5-4645

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1965 | December 5, 2018 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] In 2017, Melody Helmbrecht was tasked with the care of the severely-disabled

B.M. B.M.’s father (“Father”) eventually became concerned about B.M.’s care

and installed surveillance cameras, which recorded Helmbrecht abusing B.M.

Helmbrecht was eventually convicted of Level 6 felony battery of a disabled

person, and the trial court sentenced her to two years of incarceration with one

year suspended to therapeutic work release. Helmbrecht contends that the trial

court abused its discretion in sentencing her. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Helmbrecht is a licensed practical nurse who, in the summer of 2017, was

assigned to care for nine-year-old B.M. at her Evansville home while Father

was at work. B.M. suffers from cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder, is

developmentally delayed, is non-verbal with no way of communicating,

requires constant supervision, and is entirely dependent upon others to fulfill

her needs. At some point, Father became concerned about B.M.’s care and

installed cameras in the house in plain view, informing Helmbrecht’s employer

that he was doing so. When Father reviewed the video recorded by the

cameras, he observed B.M. on the couch “swaying back and forth” while

Helmbrecht ignored her from the other side of the couch. Tr. p. 24. Additional

video showed Helmbrecht dragging B.M. by a wrist, pinning B.M. behind

herself on the couch while B.M. was kicking and apparently trying to escape,

ignoring B.M., and dropping B.M. onto the couch.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1965 | December 5, 2018 Page 2 of 6 [3] On August 3, 2017, the State charged Helmbrecht with Level 5 felony battery

resulting in bodily injury to a disabled person and Level 6 felony neglect of a

dependent. On May 4, 2018, the trial court found Helmbrecht guilty of battery

of a disabled person as a Level 6 felony. On June 12, 2018, the trial court

sentenced Helmbrecht to two years of incarceration with one year suspended to

therapeutic work release.

Discussion and Decision [4] Under our current sentencing scheme, “the trial court must enter a statement

including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a

particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),

modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2008). We review the

sentence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if “the decision is clearly

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. A trial court

abuses its discretion if it (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2)

enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence–

including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any–but the record

does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits

reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for

consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. at 490–91.

[5] Helmbrecht contends that the trial court impermissibly used elements of her

crime as aggravating circumstances. It is true that the Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1965 | December 5, 2018 Page 3 of 6 has concluded “that in some circumstances it is improper” to rely on a

“material element of an offense” when identifying a sentencing aggravator.

Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2014). That said, while “a material

element of a crime may not be used as an aggravating factor to support an

enhanced sentence[,] the trial court may properly consider the particularized

circumstances of the factual elements as aggravating factors” and “this

aggravator is thought to be associated with particularly heinous facts or

situations.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589–90 (Ind. 2007).

[6] Turning to the case before us, Helmbrecht was convicted of Level 6 felony

battery of a disabled person, which required proof that she knowingly or

intentionally touched B.M. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner where “[t]he

offense [was] committed against a person of any age who has a mental or

physical disability and [was] committed by a person having the care of the

person with the mental or physical disability[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(4). In

sentencing Helmbrecht, the trial court stated the following:

[Y]ou have no prior criminal record but the nature and circumstances of the events that you are in a position of care, custody and control over the victim, that the victim, obviously, is a young child and not only is it a young child, is a disabled child, these are the folks who deserve our best and you fell way short of that in this case. Tr. Vol. II p. 52. In addition, the sentencing order indicates the following:

Court finds mitigating circumstances to be [Helmbrecht’s] lack of criminal record. Court finds aggravating circumstances to be the nature and circumstances of the crime, [Helmbrecht’s] position of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1965 | December 5, 2018 Page 4 of 6 care and control of the victim, the fact that the victim was a child and that the victim was disabled. Court finds aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances calling for an enhanced sentence. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 50.

[7] We conclude that the trial court’s findings reflect a consideration of the

particularized circumstances of Helmbrecht’s offense and not a mere

restatement of the elements. First, the trial court properly found it aggravating

that B.M. was a young child, being nine at the time. While the offense was

aggravated to a Level 6 felony based on Helmbrecht’s status as a caregiver to a

disabled victim, the offense for which Helmbrecht was convicted does not

account for B.M.’s youth.1 Second, while B.M.’s mental or physical disability is

an element of the offense, B.M. is not merely disabled but profoundly disabled,

being entirely dependent on others and suffering from cerebral palsy, a seizure

disorder, a developmental delay, and a complete inability to communicate.

Third, even though assumption of care is an element of the offense, the trial

court went beyond that element by recognizing that Helmbrecht was entrusted

with providing a high degree of care, finding that Helmbrecht was in “a

position of care, custody and control over the victim[.]” Tr. 52. Helmbrecht

was charged with the care of a severely disabled child who is entirely dependent

1 Indeed, B.M.’s youth would have independently justified elevating the offense to a Level 6 felony charge because the battery was “committed against a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and [was] committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.” See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1965 | December 5, 2018 Page 5 of 6 on others, which goes beyond the mere assumption of care. Helmbrecht has

failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her.

[8] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1965 | December 5, 2018 Page 6 of 6