Melody H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 4:25-cv-05070
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 1 Feb 05, 2026 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7 MELODY H., No. 4:25-CV-05070-ACE

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 MOTION 10 v.

11 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 12, 16 12 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 13

14 Defendant. 15 16 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and Defendant’s Brief 17 in response. ECF No. 12, 16. Attorney Chad Hatfield represents Plaintiff; Special 18 Assistant United States Attorney Sarah Moum represents Defendant. After 19 reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the Court 20 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 21 JURISDICTION 22 Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 23 Supplemental Security Income in December 2020, alleging a disability onset date 24 of February 17, 2016. Tr. 366, 368. The applications were denied initially and 25 upon reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jesse Shumway held a 26 hearing on April 18, 2024, Tr. 39-77, and issued an unfavorable decision on June 27 6, 2024, Tr. 17-32. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 28 April 17, 2025, Tr. 1-6, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 1 decision for purposes of judicial review, which is appealable to the district court 2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on 3 June 18, 2025. ECF No. 1. 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 The ALJ is tasked with “determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 6 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 7 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 8 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 9 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 10 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 11 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 12 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 13 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence “is such relevant evidence as a 14 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 15 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 16 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 17 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 18 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 19 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or 20 if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either disability or non-disability, the 21 ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 22 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be 23 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence 24 and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 25 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 27 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 28 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 1 416.920(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 (1987). In steps one through 2 four the claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability. 3 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-1099. This burden is met once a claimant establishes 4 that a physical or mental impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in past 5 relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot 6 perform past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to 7 the Commissioner to show: (1) that Plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 8 activity; and (2) that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy 9 which Plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497-1498 (9th Cir. 10 1984); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). If a claimant cannot 11 make an adjustment to other work in the national economy, the claimant will be 12 found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 13 ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS 14 On June 6, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled 15 as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 17-32. 16 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff, who met the insured status 17 requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2021, had not engaged in 18 substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, February 17, 2016. Tr. 20. 19 At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe 20 impairments: seizure disorder, supraventricular tachycardia, depressive disorder, 21 anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and alcohol use disorder. Id. 22 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 23 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of 24 the listed impairments. Tr. 21. 25 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and found 26 she could perform light work, with the following limitations:

27 [Plaintiff] can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and 28 c an frequently perform all other postural activities; she cannot have 1 concentrated exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights and 2 moving mechanical parts; she is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; she can have only occasional, superficial interaction with the 3 public, supervisors, and coworkers; and she requires a routine, 4 predictable work setting with clear, employer-set goals and no more 5 t han occasional changes. 6 Tr. 24. 7 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant 8 work. Tr. 31. 9 At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the vocational 10 expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 11 Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 12 economy, including the jobs of housekeeping, cleaner; small products assembler; 13 and office helper. Tr. 31-32. 14 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 15 meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date, 16 February 17, 2016, through the date of the decision, June 6, 2024. Tr. 32. 17 ISSUES 18 The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 19 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 20 standards. 21 Plaintiff raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the ALJ 22 properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence; (2) whether the ALJ properly 23 evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective limitations; and (3) whether the ALJ conducted a 24 proper step-five analysis. ECF No. 12 at 5. 25 DISCUSSION 26 A. Medical Opinion Evidence 27 Plaintiff first asserts the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating the medical 28 opinion evidence. ECF No. 12 at 6-17. Plaintiff specifically contends the ALJ 1 erred by rejecting the opinions of (1) examining psychologist Patrick Metoyer, 2 Ph.D., (2) examining psychologist Kenneth Cole, Psy.D., (3) examining 3 psychologist David Morgan, Ph.D., and (4) reviewing psychologist Renee 4 Eisenhauer, Ph.D. ECF No. 12 at 6-17. 5 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ must consider and 6 evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical 7 findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b), 416.920c(a) 8 and (b). The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and 9 prior administrative findings include supportability, consistency, the source’s 10 relationship with the claimant, any specialization of the source, and other factors 11 (such as the source’s familiarity with other evidence in the file or an understanding 12 of Social Security’s disability program). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 13 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). 14 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and the ALJ 15 must explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 16 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may explain how she considered the other factors, but is 17 not required to do so, except in cases where two or more opinions are equally well- 18 supported and consistent with the record. Id. Supportability and consistency are 19 explained in the regulations:

20 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence 21 and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 22 finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior 23 administrative medical finding(s) will be.

24 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior 25 administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more 26 persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 27 finding(s) will be. 28 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). 1 The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the 2017 regulatory 2 framework displaced the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide 3 specific and legitimate reasons to reject an examining provider’s opinion. Woods 4 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court held that the new 5 regulations eliminate any hierarchy of medical opinions, and the specific and 6 legitimate standard no longer applies. Id. at 788-789, 792. The Court reasoned the 7 “relationship factors” remain relevant under the new regulations, and thus the ALJ 8 can still consider the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the 9 frequency of examinations, the kinds and extent of examinations that the medical 10 source has performed or ordered from specialists, and whether the medical source 11 has examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant’s records. Id. at 790, 12 792. An ALJ must provide an explanation, supported by substantial evidence, 13 when rejecting a medical provider’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent. Id. at 14 792. 15 1. Dr. Metoyer 16 On May 1, 2022, Dr. Metoyer completed a mental evaluation of Plaintiff. 17 Tr. 1085-1089. Dr. Metoyer opined that Plaintiff’s ability to interact with 18 coworkers and the public is likely “moderately to markedly impaired” due to 19 anxiety, PTSD, mood symptoms, and a tendency to isolate herself from others; her 20 ability to maintain regular attendance in the workplace is “moderately to markedly 21 impaired;” her ability to complete a normal workday or work week without 22 interruption from anxiety, PTSD, and mood symptoms is likely “moderately to 23 markedly impaired;” and her ability to deal with the usual stress encountered in the 24 workplace is “moderately to markedly impaired” if it involves persistent activity 25 interacting with other individuals. Tr. 1089. 26 The ALJ found Dr. Metoyer’s opinion “somewhat persuasive,” but indicated 27 that because it was vague, it provided little assistance in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. 28 Tr. 29. With respect to the vagueness determination, the ALJ specified that Dr. 1 Metoyer opined a range of severity spanning moderate, which would typically not 2 be disabling, to marked, which would typically be disabling, but provided no 3 further quantification or elaboration to help the ALJ choose between these two 4 levels of impairment. Tr. 29. The ALJ found the opinion persuasive only to the 5 extent that it assessed moderate limitations because the mental status examination 6 revealed few, modest deficits, nothing in the evaluation supported marked 7 limitations, and a finding of moderate limitations was consistent with similar 8 observations in the longitudinal record. Tr. 29. 9 The Court agrees with the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Metoyer’s assessment 10 is vague because it failed to identify specific degrees of impairment or elaborate 11 regarding the range of severity. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) 12 (finding a lack of specificity regarding functional limits is a proper reason to 13 discount an opinion); Christopher L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 3168615 at 14 *3 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (holding an ALJ’s findings with respect to vagueness of a 15 medical provider’s conclusions pertain to the supportability of the opinion because 16 they address the relevance of the medical provider’s explanation). 17 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, a finding of “marked” limitations based on 18 Dr. Metoyer’s examination is not supported by the examination findings or the 19 weight of the record evidence. Although mood abnormalities were identified,1 the 20 mental status examination was essentially normal, and Plaintiff displayed no 21 difficulty in interacting with the medical provider. Tr. 1087-1088. Moreover, as 22 indicated by the ALJ, moderate limitations, not marked limitations, would align 23 with similar observations throughout the longitudinal record. Tr. 29 citing Tr. 852- 24 918; 965-1069; 1104-1121. While Plaintiff requests a different interpretation of 25 Dr. Metoyer’s report, it is not the role of this Court to second-guess the 26

27 1Plaintiff’s mood was described as “anxious, sad, down, depressed,” with 28 congruent affect. Tr. 1087. 1 Commissioner. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f 2 evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the decision of the 3 ALJ must be upheld.”); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 4 Plaintiff also asserts Dr. Metoyer’s opinion is confirmed by Plaintiff’s 5 testimony. ECF No. 12 at 10. However, as determined in Section B below, the 6 ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is supported by substantial 7 evidence and free of legal error. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 8 (9th Cir. 2001) (a physician’s opinion may be disregarded when it is premised on 9 the properly rejected subjective complaints of Plaintiff). 10 The Court finds the ALJ correctly determined that Dr. Metoyer’s opinion 11 suggesting marked limitations lacked persuasive value. 12 2. Dr. Cole 13 On December 7, 2020, Dr. Cole completed a Psychological/Psychiatric 14 Evaluation of Plaintiff. Tr. 835-839. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Cole that she quit 15 her job three years prior because she got sick, COVID had made it difficult to find 16 a job, her anxiety was a barrier to finding work, and not having a cell phone made 17 it difficult to find work. Tr. 835. Dr. Cole opined Plaintiff would have marked 18 limitations in the following basic work activities: (1) performing activities within 19 a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary 20 tolerances without special supervision; (2) completing a normal work day and 21 work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and (3) 22 setting realistic goals and planning independently. Tr. 838. 23 The ALJ found the report of Dr. Cole “not persuasive.” Tr. 30. The ALJ 24 noted the check-box form provided no explanation for each rating,2 and the 25

26 2Although the Ninth Circuit stated in a footnote that there is no authority that 27 a “check-the-box” form is any less reliable than any other medical form, Trevizo v. 28 Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 677 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit has consistently 1 assessed marked limitations were not well supported by the examination findings 2 which were almost entirely normal. Tr. 30. The ALJ additionally indicated that 3 because the Personality Assessment Inventory (“PAI”) administered by Dr. Cole 4 suggested Plaintiff “may not have answered in a completely forthright manner,” 5 the test results were unlikely to be an accurate reflection of Plaintiff’s objective 6 clinical status. Tr. 30, 840. The ALJ concluded the opinion was inconsistent with 7 the longitudinal record, which shows normal mental status examinations, and was 8 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ability to follow through and complete her anger 9 management course. Tr. 30. 10 Given the PAI administered by Dr. Cole suggested Plaintiff was not 11 forthright on exam, Tr. 840, the Court agrees with the ALJ’s determination that 12 Plaintiff’s subjective reports in the evaluation could not be relied upon. Tr. 30. 13 Other than the unreliable subjective complaints of Plaintiff, there is no other basis 14 for marked limitations because Dr. Cole’s examination findings were almost all 15 entirely normal. Tr. 30 citing Tr. 841-842 (abstract thought is the only area 16 marked as not within normal limits). Furthermore, the ALJ again correctly notes 17 that an assessment of marked limitations was not consistent with the longitudinal 18 record, which shows normal mental status examinations, as well as Plaintiff’s 19 ability to complete an anger management course. Tr. 30 citing Tr. 852-918; 965- 20 1069; 1104-1121. The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Cole’s report is supported by 21 substantial evidence and free of legal error. 22

23 held that individual medical opinions are preferred over check-box reports, Crane 24 v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 25 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding “the regulations give more weight to opinions 26 that are explained than to those that are not”). An ALJ’s rejection of a check-box 27 report that does not contain an explanation of the bases for the conclusions made is 28 permissible, Crane, 76 F.3d at 253. 1 3. Dr. Morgan 2 On January 23, 2020, Dr. Morgan completed a Psychological/Psychiatric 3 Evaluation of Plaintiff. Tr. 829-833. Dr. Morgan assessed mild to moderate 4 limitations in 12 of 13 categories of basic work activities. Tr. 831. He opined that 5 Plaintiff had a marked limitation in her ability to complete a normal workday and 6 workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms but noted 7 the length of time Plaintiff would be impaired with available treatment as only nine 8 months. Id. Dr. Morgan also noted in a disclaimer that the sole purpose of the 9 evaluation was to assess Plaintiff’s ability to engage in gainful employment based 10 on DSHS criteria only and the use of the exam for any other purpose would be 11 inappropriate as contrary to the intent of the evaluation. Tr. 832. 12 The ALJ found Dr. Morgan’s report “not persuasive.” Tr. 29. The ALJ 13 noted the report expressly disclaimed usefulness for any purpose other than DSHS 14 disability evaluation and stated the use of the evaluation for any other purpose was 15 “inappropriate.” Tr. 29, 832. The ALJ also found the opinion poorly supported 16 and inconsistent with the evidence of record: with respect to the marked limitation 17 in Plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday, the objective findings were 18 entirely normal and there was no examination finding related to the ability to 19 complete a workday or workweek. Tr. 30. The ALJ determined the assessed 20 marked limitation was unsupported because there was no evidence Plaintiff would 21 be unable to complete a workday/workweek and inconsistent given Plaintiff’s 22 ability to be present for her mother post-surgery, complete her anger management 23 course, and actively seek employment. Tr. 30. 24 The Court finds the ALJ reasonably adopted Dr. Morgan’s own disclaimer 25 that his report was not intended to be used for any purpose other than DSHS 26 disability “pertaining to eligibility for ABD/HEN or IANF/Workfirst programs 27 ONLY.” Tr. 29-30 citing Tr. 832. As stated by the ALJ, “reliance on this report in 28 Social Security Administrative proceedings [is] inappropriate. Tr. 29-30. 1 Moreover, Dr. Morgan found that Plaintiff’s mental limitations would not meet the 2 duration requirements of the Act (one year), instead finding that they were only 3 expected to last nine months, Tr. 831. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). 4 Nevertheless, the marked limitation finding of Dr. Morgan was not supported by 5 the examination as the objective findings were normal (other than a notation of an 6 anxious mood) and there were no findings related to the ability to complete a 7 normal workday or workweek, Tr. 832-833. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (an 8 ALJ may discredit a physician’s opinion that is unsupported by rationale or 9 treatment notes and offers no objective medical findings to support the existence of 10 alleged conditions). In addition, the ALJ again correctly noted that a marked 11 limitation was not consistent with the longitudinal record, which shows normal 12 mental status examinations, as well as Plaintiff’s ability to care for her mother 13 post-surgery, complete an anger management course, and seek employment. Tr. 14 30 citing Tr. 852-918; 965-1069; 1104-1121. Because Dr. Morgan’s assessment 15 was inconsistent with the normal objective findings on exam, unsupported by an 16 explanation, and inconsistent with the weight of the record evidence, the Court 17 finds the ALJ correctly determined that Dr. Morgan’s opinion lacked persuasive 18 value. 19 4. Dr. Eisenhauer 20 On December 9, 2020, Dr. Eisenhauer completed a “Review of Medical 21 Evidence” form. Tr. 825-827. Based solely on a review of the reports of Drs. Cole 22 and Morgan, Dr. Eisenhauer opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations in the 23 following work abilities: (1) performing activities within a schedule, maintaining 24 regular attendance and being punctual within customary tolerances; (2) completing 25 a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based 26 symptoms; and (3) setting realistic goals and planning independently. Tr. 826. 27 /// 28 /// 1 The ALJ found the reviewer’s opinion “not persuasive” for the same reasons 2 provided for the evaluations upon which it is based. Tr. 30. Dr. Eisenhauer only 3 viewed the two reports, did not examine Plaintiff, and did not have full access to 4 the record evidence. The ALJ determined the assessed limitations were 5 inconsistent with the normal mental status examinations, as stated above, and 6 Plaintiff’s ability to assist others with caretaking and household tasks. Tr. 30. 7 Because Dr. Eisenhauer’s report is based only on the reports of Drs. Cole 8 and Morgan, and the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that the reports 9 of Drs. Cole and Morgan lack persuasiveness is supported by substantial evidence, 10 see supra, the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Eisenhauer’s report is unsupported and 11 inconsistent is also fully supported. See Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 12 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court finds the ALJ correctly found that Dr. Eisenhauer’s 13 opinion is not persuasive. 14 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 15 that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence of record. 16 Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this issue. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Claims 18 Plaintiff contends the ALJ also erred by improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s 19 subjective complaints. ECF No. 12 at 17-19. 20 It is the province of the ALJ to make determinations regarding a claimant’s 21 subjective statements. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. However, the ALJ’s findings 22 must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 23 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an 24 underlying medical impairment, the ALJ may not discredit testimony as to the 25 severity of an impairment merely because it is unsupported by medical evidence. 26 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Absent affirmative evidence 27 of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be 28 “specific, clear and convincing.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1 1995). “General findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify what 2 testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 3 complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 4 1993); see also Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Ultimately, 5 the ‘clear and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to show [their] work[.]”). 6 Thus, to satisfy the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ must provide specific, 7 clear, and convincing reasons which explain why the medical evidence is 8 inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. Ferguson v. 9 O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original). 10 Here, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 11 could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, 12 Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 13 those symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 14 evidence in the record. Tr. 25. 15 1. Objective Medical Evidence 16 The ALJ first found that the objective medical evidence of record did not 17 support the degree of limitation alleged by Plaintiff. Tr. 25-26. 18 An ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s symptom testimony and deny 19 benefits solely because the degree of the symptoms alleged is not supported by 20 objective medical evidence. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 21 2001); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-347 (9th Cir. 1991); Fair v. Bowen, 22 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989); Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. However, the objective 23 medical evidence is a relevant factor, along with the medical source’s information 24 about the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, in determining the severity of a 25 claimant’s symptoms and their disabling effects. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857; 20 26 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). 27 /// 28 /// 1 Here, the ALJ noted physical examinations were entirely normal, did not 2 observe the claimant in distress, and reported normal gait, strength, and 3 neurological function. Tr. 25. Although Plaintiff has a significant history with 4 alcohol use disorder and has sought care for complications related to withdrawal 5 on multiple occasions, the record reflects greatly reduced alcohol intake since her 6 2016 and 2017 withdrawal episodes. Tr. 25. The ALJ determined the mental 7 status examinations were also largely normal, with no more than modest deficits 8 observed. Tr. 26. While there are some observations of unstable, depressed and 9 anxious mood, on most occasions Plaintiff attributes her mood to situational 10 factors and, outside of these situations, Plaintiff’s mood is described as euthymic, 11 normal, positive, and forward-looking. Tr. 26. 12 Plaintiff did not specifically challenge the ALJ’s reference to unremarkable 13 objective medical evidence that contradicted Plaintiff’s claims of debilitating 14 limitations with respect to her credibility assertion. See ECF No. 12 at 17-19. 15 Nevertheless, the Court finds the objective medical evidence of record, as 16 discussed above, does not support the degree of limitation alleged by Plaintiff in 17 this case, and, therefore, this was a valid, clear and convincing reason to discount 18 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 19 2. Inconsistencies 20 The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s symptom claims based on inconsistent 21 statements. Tr. 26-27. 22 An ALJ may consider inconsistencies in a claimant’s testimony or 23 inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and conduct when assessing 24 subjective complaints. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007); Thomas 25 v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-959 (9th Cir. 2002) (inconsistencies in a claimant’s 26 testimony may be used to discredit subjective complaints); Fair, 885 F.2d at 604 27 n.5 (an ALJ can reject pain testimony based on contradictions in a plaintiff’s 28 testimony). 1 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ did not specify any inconsistencies. ECF No. 12 at 2 18. The undersigned disagrees. The ALJ indicated that, inconsistent with 3 Plaintiff’s claim of debilitating limitations, Plaintiff stated on March 15, 2022, that 4 she had obtained a job3 and described it as a positive thing because she was able to 5 socialize and support herself. Tr. 26, 964. The ALJ also noted, inconsistent with 6 disability assertions, Plaintiff reported she was stable on her medications, Tr. 800, 7 880, 1045, was able to manage her anxiety with medication, Tr. 998 (“anxiety and 8 depression are fairly low”), and was doing “fairly well,” Tr. 1052. Tr. 26. 9 Plaintiff’s briefing asserts the fact that Plaintiff sought work out of a 10 financial necessity is not inconsistent with a claim for disability. ECF No. 12 at 11 19; ECF No. 20 at 9. However, employment performed “during any period” of 12 claimed disability may be probative of a claimant’s ability to work at the 13 substantial gainful activity level. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 416.971. The Ninth 14 Circuit has determined that seeking employment after the alleged disability onset 15 date may be a factor in an ALJ’s credibility determination. See Bray v. Comm’r of 16 Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the ALJ properly 17 discounted a claimant’s testimony because she recently worked as a personal 18 caregiver and had since sought out other employment). 19 The ALJ’s reference to inconsistencies is supported by substantial evidence, 20 and this was an additional clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s 21 symptom claims. 22 3. Possible Malingering or Exaggeration 23 The ALJ also noted the record contains evidence of possible malingering or 24 exaggeration. Tr. 27 25

26 3Plaintiff reported on May 26, 2020, that getting a job is what would reduce 27 her symptoms the most and that she was applying for jobs, actively seeking work, 28 and “forward looking.” Tr. 26, 1052-1054. 1 An ALJ’s finding of malingering is sufficient to support an adverse 2 credibility determination under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. Benton v. Barnhart, 3 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003); see e.g. LaGrand v. Commissioner Social 4 Sec. Admin., 379 Fed. Appx. 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Benton for the 5 proposition that “[t]he ALJ was entitled to reject LaGrand’s testimony because 6 there was evidence of malingering”); Flores v. Commissioner of Social Security, 7 237 Fed. Appx. 251, 252-253 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Benson for the proposition 8 that “an ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective pain testimony if the record 9 contains affirmative evidence of malingering”). A claimant’s tendency to 10 exaggerate may also support an ALJ’s decision to discredit a claimant’s 11 statements. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148. 12 Although the ALJ did not specifically conclude that Plaintiff was 13 malingering in this case, the ALJ noted the PAI administered by Dr. Cole on 14 December 7, 2020, suggested Plaintiff “may not have answered in a completely 15 forthright manner” leading to a somewhat inaccurate impression. Tr. 840. There 16 were indications suggesting Plaintiff tended to portray herself in an especially 17 negative or pathological manner, and Dr. Cole noted some deliberate distortion of 18 the clinical picture may be present. Tr. 840. Dr. Cole concluded the test results 19 potentially involve considerable distortion and are unlikely to be an accurate 20 reflection of Plaintiff’s objective clinical status. Id. 21 The undersigned finds the ALJ appropriately noted this evidence of possible 22 malingering or exaggeration when considering Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Tr. 23 27. 24 4. Course of Treatment 25 The ALJ additionally noted Plaintiff’s course of treatment had been routine 26 and conservative and was not consistent with disability-level severity. Tr. 27. 27 /// 28 /// 1 Evidence of “conservative treatment” is sufficient to discount a claimant’s 2 testimony regarding severity of an impairment. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 3 (9th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) 4 (conservative treatment suggests a lower level of both pain and functional 5 limitation). 6 Plaintiff, citing a Fourth Circuit case, asserts the fact that Plaintiff received 7 medication management and mental health counseling is “anything but 8 conservative.” ECF No. 12 at 18; ECF No. 20 at 8 citing Shelley C. v. 9 Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 363-364 (4th Cir. 2023). 10 However, unlike the claimant in Shelley C., Plaintiff’s mental health counseling 11 was infrequent and sporadic4 and Plaintiff’s medication management5 appears to 12 have stabilized her symptoms. Although Plaintiff claims she only missed mental 13 health appointments because of her symptoms, ECF No. 12 at 18; ECF No. 20 at 9- 14 9, there is nothing in the record that shows she missed appointments because of 15 anxiety or other symptoms and, in any event, her therapist had offered Plaintiff 16 telephonic sessions. 17 Plaintiff’s conservative treatment is another clear and convincing reason, 18 supported by substantial evidence, to discount her symptom claims. 19 /// 20 /// 21

22 4As indicated by the ALJ, Plaintiff engaged in minimal mental health 23 counseling, with only one session documented in the two years prior to the ALJ’s 24 decision, and, before that, it was infrequent and sporadic, often going months 25 between sessions. Tr. 27. The ALJ specifically noted a gap in psychiatry 26 treatment from March 2022 to October 2023. Tr. 27. 27 5The medication management was not sufficient to abate Shelley C.’s 28 symptoms, which appeared to be worsening. Shelley C., 61 F.4th at 364. 1 5. Activities of Daily Living 2 Finally, the ALJ indicated Plaintiff’s disability allegations were inconsistent 3 with her high-functioning activities of daily living. Tr. 27. 4 An ALJ may consider a claimant’s activities that undermine reported 5 symptoms. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. If a claimant can spend a substantial part of 6 the day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of exertional or non- 7 exertional functions, the ALJ may find these activities inconsistent with the 8 reported disabling symptoms. Fair, 885 F.2d at 603; Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 9 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 10 416.902(a). “While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be 11 eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom claims when the 12 claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are 13 transferable to a work setting” or when activities “contradict claims of a totally 14 debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13. “Only if the level of 15 activity is inconsistent with Claimant’s claimed limitations” do daily “activities 16 have any bearing on Claimant’s credibility.” Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1203 (quoting 17 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722). 18 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to identify any activities that were 19 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s disabling allegations. ECF No. 12 at 18; ECF No. 20 20 at 9, 10. On the contrary, the ALJ noted multiple activities of daily living, in 21 addition to Plaintiff obtaining a job, which demonstrate Plaintiff can function in 22 excess of her reported limitations: she lives alone, cares for her brother, cleans her 23 home, does housework and yardwork for a friend, walks her dog, does laundry, 24 pulls weeds, washes her dishes, goes shopping in stores, visits with family or 25 friends for one to two months at a time, manages her finances, walks “a lot” to get 26 fresh air, takes care of her mom, works outside alongside a friend, hangs out with 27 her sister and best friend doing yard work, and had completed an anger 28 management course. Tr. 27-28. 1 Plaintiff’s documented activities of daily living provide another clear and 2 convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, to discount Plaintiff’s 3 symptom claims. 4 The ALJ is responsible for reviewing the evidence and resolving conflicts or 5 ambiguities in testimony. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 6 1989). It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 7 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. The Court has a limited role in 8 determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and 9 may not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it might justifiably 10 have reached a different result upon de novo review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 11 After reviewing the record, and based on the foregoing, the Court finds that 12 the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, which are fully supported by the 13 record, for finding Plaintiff’s symptom allegations were not entirely credible in this 14 case. Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this issue. 15 C. Step-Five 16 Plaintiff contends the ALJ also failed to meet his burden at step-five. ECF 17 No. 12 at 19-21. 18 Plaintiff first argues, citing Leitz v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 4342114 at *2 (9th 19 Cir. July 5, 2023),1 that the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to occasional interaction 20

21 1In Leitz, the ALJ held that the claimant “can have brief, superficial 22 interaction with co-workers and the public; and can have occasional interaction 23 with supervisors (although additional time for training is acceptable).” Leitz, 2023 24 WL 4342114 at *2. The Ninth Circuit determined that the “training-period caveat” 25 was not supported by the record, and that there was no evidence that the claimant’s 26 mental problems were “somehow alleviated during training periods because they 27 are less likely to include supervisor interactions than other work periods, or that 28 employers would be willing to tolerate her limitations during training periods.” Id. 1 with supervisors bars all job training and, consequently, precludes all competitive 2 employment. ECF No. 12 at 19-20. The undersigned does not agree with the 3 proposition that a limitation to occasional interaction with supervisors is per se 4 disabling. See Justin P. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 1559545 at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. April 5 10, 2024) (the Court applied Leitz and determined that the ALJ did not err). 6 Plaintiff next asserts the vocational expert testimony relied upon by the ALJ 7 was without evidentiary value because it was provided in response to an 8 incomplete hypothetical that failed to account for all of Plaintiff’s limitations. ECF 9 No. 12 at 20-21. 10 At step five of the sequential evaluation analysis, the burden shifts to the 11 Commissioner to establish that 1) the claimant can perform other work, and 2) 12 such work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 13 416.960(c)(2); Beltran, 700 F.3d at 389. In assessing whether there is work 14 available, the ALJ must rely on complete hypotheticals posed to a vocational 15 expert. Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ’s 16 hypothetical must be “based on medical assumptions supported by substantial 17 evidence in the record that reflects all the claimant’s limitations.” Osenbrock v. 18 Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001). The hypothetical should be “accurate, 19 detailed, and supported by the medical record.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. The 20 hypothetical that ultimately serves as the basis for the ALJ’s determination, i.e., the 21 hypothetical that is predicated on the ALJ’s final RFC assessment, must account 22 for all the limitations and restrictions of the claimant. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. 23 The ALJ’s RFC need only include those limitations found credible and 24 supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,1217 (9th 25 Cir. 2005) (“The hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the 26 limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in 27 the record.”). “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of the claimant’s 28 limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a 1 finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. However, 2 the ALJ “is free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are 3 not supported by substantial evidence.” Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 4 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the ALJ is not bound to accept as true the restrictions 5 presented in a hypothetical question propounded by a claimant’s counsel if they are 6 not supported by substantial evidence. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756-757; Martinez 7 v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff fails to establish that a 8 step five determination is flawed by simply restating an argument that the ALJ 9 improperly discounted certain evidence, when the record demonstrates the 10 evidence was properly rejected. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175- 11 1176 (9th Cir. 2008). 12 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational expert’s 13 response to an incomplete hypothetical. ECF No. 12 at 20-21. However, 14 Plaintiff’s argument assumes that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the medical 15 opinion and other evidence. As addressed above, the ALJ properly evaluated the 16 medical opinion evidence and properly discounted Plaintiff’s symptom claims. See 17 supra. The ALJ’s RFC determination adequately addresses the medical opinions 18 and other evidence in this record. Plaintiff’s alternative interpretation of the 19 evidence does not undermine the ALJ’s analysis. The ALJ did not err in assessing 20 Plaintiff’s RFC or finding Plaintiff capable of performing work existing in the 21 national economy based on that RFC determination. Plaintiff is not entitled to 22 remand on this issue. 23 CONCLUSION 24 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 25 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error and is 26 affirmed. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 27 1. Defendant’s Motion to affirm, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED. 28 2. Plaintiff’s Motion to reverse, ECF No. 12, is DENIED. 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive shall file this Order and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant and the file shall be CLOSED. 4 DATED February 5, 2026. oe gs ALEXANDER C. EKSTROM

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