Melnitzky v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Melnitzky v. City of New York

1 A.D.3d 222, 767 N.Y.S.2d 97, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11909

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 18, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 1 A.D.3d 222 (Melnitzky v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Melnitzky v. City of New York, 1 A.D.3d 222, 767 N.Y.S.2d 97, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11909 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J), entered October 19, 2001, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the brief, denied plaintiffs motion for an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial upon the ground that his trial application to proceed pro se should have been granted, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Flaintiff, having chosen to act through retained counsel, was barred from proceeding pro se except by consent of the court (see CFLR 321 [a]). That consent was properly withheld. Flaintiff did not request to represent himself until midtrial and the record demonstrates that permitting plaintiff, whose courtroom demeanor had been volatile and on occasion irrational, to immediately take over the representational responsibilities until then competently discharged by his attorney would have unnecessarily prolonged the trial and introduced a prohibitive risk of jury confusion and mistrial. Concur— Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Mazzarelli and Marlow, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J), entered October 19, 2001, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the brief, denied plaintiffs motion for an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial upon the ground that his trial application to proceed pro se should have been granted, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Flaintiff, having chosen to act through retained counsel, was barred from proceeding pro se except by consent of the court (see CFLR 321 [a]). That consent was properly withheld. Flaintiff did not request to represent himself until midtrial and the record demonstrates that permitting plaintiff, whose courtroom demeanor had been volatile and on occasion irrational, to immediately take over the representational responsibilities until then competently discharged by his attorney would have unnecessarily prolonged the trial and introduced a prohibitive risk of jury confusion and mistrial. Concur— Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Mazzarelli and Marlow, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

1 A.D.3d 222, 767 N.Y.S.2d 97, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11909, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melnitzky-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-2003.