Alok Ahuja, Chief Judge
Appellant Melissa McGaw filed a motion in the circuit court “to determine parent-child relationship, custody, and visitation” with respect to two children to whom she is not biologically related. The children were born at a time when Melissa1 was involved in a romantic relationship with the children’s biological mother, respondent Angela McGaw. Melissa’s motion alleged that she had participated in Angela’s decision to become pregnant with the children, and that Melissa had acted as a parent to the children, both before and after her relationship with Angela terminated. The circuit court dismissed Melissa’s motion without prejudice for lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Melissa appeals. We affirm.
Factual Background
Taking the facts Melissa alleged as true, she and Angela started dating in 1995, and began cohabiting the following year. In 1997, the couple had a commitment ceremony in Kansas City, and in 2000 Angela legally changed her last name to McGaw. The McGaws bought a home together, and by 2002 had decided to have children.
In 2004, Angela gave birth to twins in Kansas City. The children were conceived using sperm from an anonymous donor jointly selected by Melissa and Angela. From 2004 to 2007, Angela and Melissa raised the children together as co-parents.
Angela and Melissa separated in January 2007, and Melissa moved out of the shared household. Melissa alleged that she and Angela agreed to a schedule for visitation with the children, and a division of property, through mediation. Although separated, Melissa and Angela continued to share expenses for the children and to follow a visitation schedule until June 2013. At that time, Angela stopped allowing Melissa to see the children, and sent Melissa a text message stating that “[the children] will be living at my house until the parenting plan issue is resolved. I will call the police if you try to come and get them.” Melissa has not seen the children since that time.
On March 7, 2014, Melissa filed a Motion to Determine Parent-Child Relationship2 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, seeking “to determine parent-child relationship, custody, and visitation” pursuant to § 210.826.3 Angela filed an application for a change of venue to Clay County, which the court granted. In addition to her answer, Angela filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Melissa had no biological relationship to the children and therefore lacked standing to assert her claims, and that Melissa’s pleading failed to state a claim for relief.
[438]*438In her suggestions in opposition to Angela’s motion to dismiss, Melissa argued that she had standing under Missouri’s version of the Uniform Parentage Act (“MoUPA”), §§ 210.817-210.854, and that she had standing under common-law equitable doctrines defining parentage.
A commissioner recommended that the action be dismissed on the basis that Melissa lacked standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A circuit court judge adopted the commissioner’s findings and recommendations and entered judgment dismissing Melissa’s motion without prejudice. This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
Our review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim or for lack of standing is de novo. When reviewing for failure to state a claim, we treat the facts contained in the petition as true and construe them liberally in favor of the plaintiffs. The petition states a cause of action if it sets forth any set of facts that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiffs to relief. Similarly, this court determines standing as a matter of law on the basis of the petition, along with any other noncontested facts accepted as true by the parties at the time the motion to dismiss was argued, and resolves the issue as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed facts.
White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo.App. W.D.2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Analysis
At the outset, we note that the McGaws’ relationship began, and ended, at a time when the right of same-sex couples to marry had not been recognized in Missouri. Despite their inability to marry, Melissa’s motion alleges that she and Angela took multiple steps to formalize their relationship: they participated in a commitment ceremony; changed Angela’s surname to match Melissa’s; purchased a home together; jointly chose to conceive the children and raised the children together; and entered an agreement to govern the termination of their relationship. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Melissa and Angela were never married, and — as our decision in White recognized — Melissa’s claims must therefore be addressed under the legal rules applicable to unmarried couples (heterosexual or homosexual). Following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (which was decided after this case was submitted), couples like Melissa and Angela are now able to marry if they choose. We anticipate that in the wake of Obergefell, situations like this one, in which important issues involving children must be decided outside the established legal framework applicable to married couples, will occur less frequently.4
On appeal, Melissa does not challenge the circuit court’s dismissal of her claim to have her parentage established under the MoUPA. Instead, she argues that she stated a claim for relief based on [439]*439theories of breach of contract, or under common-law equitable doctrines. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that none of those theories justifies reversal.5
I.
In her first Point, Melissa argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her motion because she stated a claim to enforce a voluntary agreement between her and Angela governing visitation. Such agreements are enforceable, Melissa contends, so long as the trial court determines that the visitation agreement serves the best interests of the children.
' “To properly pléad a cause of action, the petition must state allegations of fact in support of each essential element of the .cause pleaded.” Am. Eagle Waste Indus., LLC v. St. Louis Cnty., 379 S.W.3d 813, 829 (Mo. banc 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A petition for breach of contract requires a plaintiff to “allege (1) the existence of a contract or agreement and the terms of that agreement; (2) that plaintiff performed or tendered performance; (3) that defendant did not perform; and (4) that defendant’s failure to perform caused plaintiff damage.” White, 293 S.W.3d at 23 (citation- and internal quotation marks omitted).
Melissa’s motion failed to adequately plead a breach of contract theory under these standards. Our decision in White involved circumstances strikingly similar to those in the present case, and White guides our resolution of many of Melissa’s claims, including her breach of contract claim. In White, plaintiff Leslea Diane White, alleged (among other things) that she and defendant Elizabeth Michelle White'had agreed to jointly support their children, but that Michelle had refused to comply with that agreement. Id. at 23.
White held that Leslea had failed to adequately plead a claim for breach of a child support agreement, and had failed to preserve for appeal the argument that she had stated a claim for breach of such an agreement. White noted that Leslea “did not expressly denominate any count of her petition as seeking relief for breach of a contract for support,” and that “despite her copious briefing and argument in opposition to Michelle’s motion to dismiss in the trial court, Leslea never explicitly invoked the express contract theory as a basis to sustain her claim for child support.” Id. White emphasized that, “[e]ven assuming that the allegations in the petition are sufficient to allege that Michelle entered into a contract with Leslea to pro[440]*440vide on-going support ..., they still fail to state the length of time for such support to continue or that Michelle has failed to provide the financial support required by the agreement.” Id.
Melissa’s motion suffers from the same sort of pleading inadequacies as the petition in White. The motion alleged that “[fjormal mediation determined visitation” at the time of the parties’ separation, and that “until June 13, 2013, Melissa and Angela followed a set visitation schedule, Melissa paid preschool tuition costs every other week and both parents shared equally in child-rearing activities and expenses.” The motion is silent, however, as to the terms of the separation agreement as they relate to visitation, or as to what the parties’ “set visitation schedule” was. Moreover, the prayer of Melissa’s motion did not seek to enforce any pre-existing agreement between the parties. Instead, she asked the court to determine her parentage of the children, and to “award the parties joint legal custody of their minor children, specify rights of visitation to the Plaintiff, award child support and enter such other orders as the court may deem just and necessary and in the best interests of the minor children.” The motion plainly asked the court to declare that she was a parent of the children, and based on that finding to order custody, visitation, and child support on terms the court deemed appropriate. The motion did not ask the court to enforce a preexisting agreement. In addition, as in White, Melissa did not argue that she had stated a claim for breach of an express agreement in opposition to Angela’s motion to dismiss.
Like the plaintiff in White, Melissa has failed to adequately plead a claim for breach of contract; as in White, “[i]n these circumstances, we will not reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petition” based on a breach of contract argument. 293 S.W.3d at 23. Point I is denied.
II.
In her second Point, Melissa argues that she has standing to seek custody or visitation under the doctrines of in loco parentis or equitable parentage.
The in loco parentis and equitable parentage doctrines share certain characteristics with other equitable theories which have been developed to address the parental status of third parties who are not biological parents, but who have assumed significant parental roles in children’s lives. White refused to adopt either the in loco parentis or equitable parentage theories in a case factually similar to this one. 293 S,W.3d at 14-16. As background, White quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995), for a commonly used definition of the circumstances in which recognition of parental status based on equitable considerations may be appropriate:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.
Id. at 435-36 (quoted in White, 293 S.W.3d at 14).
[441]*441We turn now to the two specific theories Melissa invokes in her second Point.
A.
White addressed the in loco parentis doctrine under Missouri law. “In loco parentis” is a Latin phrase meaning “in the place of a parent.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 907 (10th ed.2014).
In White, Leslea argued that “she and Michelle [stood] in loco parentis to each other’s biological child because they jointly raised the children with each other’s consent, and treated each child, and held each child out to the world, as the children of both of them.” 293 S.W.3d at 15. Although older Missouri cases recognized an in loco parentis relationship between stepparents and stepchildren, which survived the termination of the stepparent’s relationship with the biological parent, White held that this common-law doctrine had been “displaced” by § 453.400. Id. The statute provides that an in loco parentis support obligation exists only “so long as the stepchild is living in the same home as the stepparent,” § 453.400.1, and that the doctrine “shall not be construed as granting to a stepparent any right to the care and custody of a stepchild.” § 453.400.4; see discussion in White, 293 S.W.3d at 15-16. Because it concluded that § 453.400 expressed the outer limits of the in loco parentis doctrine, White held that, whether or not Leslea stood in loco parentis to Michelle’s child while she and Michelle lived together, “that status terminated when they separated and would deprive Leslea of standing to bring her action,” and could not support a claim for child custody, visitation, or support. Id. at 16.
Melissa argues that White was incorrectly decided. Unless and until it is overruled by this Court or the Missouri Supreme Court, however, we are bound to follow White under principles of stare deci-sis.
“The doctrine of stare decisis directs that, once a court has laid down a principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and. property are the same.” Under the doctrine, “a court follows earlier judicial decisions when the same point arises again in litigation and where the same or analogous issue was decided in an earlier case, such case stands as authoritative precedent unless and until it is overruled.”
Hinkle v. A.B. Dick Co., 435 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Mo.App.W.D.2014) (quoting Rothwell v. Dir. of Revenue, 419 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Mo.App.W.D.2013)). Particularly given that Melissa has, and is presently pursuing, an alternative remedy to seek custody and/or visitation with the children (as discussed in § II.B below), we see no justification for re-examining White’s treatment of the in loco parentis doctrine.6
[442]*442B.
Regarding her equitable parentage claim, Melissa contends that White “incorrectly determined that Missouri Supreme Court precedent does not allow individuals to seek custody or visitation as equitable parents,” and should be overruled. To the contrary, we conclude that the justification for rejecting an equitable parentage argument is stronger today than at the time White was decided.
In White, the Court observed that it was “unaware of any Missouri appellate court decision adopting the concept or theory of an ‘equitable parent.’ ” 293 S.W.3d at 15 n. 8. Although White did not read Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. banc 1998), as refusing to adopt the equitable parentage theory, it noted that “Cotton did not adopt the theory in a case where doing so would have permitted it to affirm the trial court’s decision without need for reversal and remand.” 293 S.W.3d at 15 n. 8. White also noted that, in a decision authored by Judge Mary Russell, now a member of the Missouri Supreme Court, the Eastern District interpreted Cotton as having affirmatively rejected the equitable parentage theory. Id. (discussing Jefferson v. Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d 510, 513-14 (Mo.App.E.D. 2004)). Following its discussion of Cotton and Jefferson, White concluded: “Accordingly, even if we were inclined to accept Leslea’s invitation [to recognize equitable parentage], we would not feel entirely confident that our decision conforms with the most recent decisional authority of the Missouri Supreme Court.” 293 S.W.3d at 15 n.8.7
Although White may be equivocal concerning the viability of the equitable parentage theory under Missouri law, we read it as rejecting the application of that theory in circumstances strikingly similar to those involved in the present case. The equitable parentage theory was raised by the appellant in White, and would have justified reversal and a remand for further proceedings if the equitable parentage doctrine in fact established a viable cause of action under Missouri law. Despite the appellant’s invocation of the equitable parentage doctrine, White affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the appellant’s petition, in which she sought to be recognized as a (non-biological) parent of the child of her former romantic partner.
An additional consideration, arising subsequent to the White decision, likewise justifies rejection of the equitable parentage theory under Missouri law. As the Missouri Supreme Court noted in Cotton (in which the appellant asked the Court to recognize equitable parentage), “[ujnless a statutory scheme is plainly inadequate under circumstances where a court has a [443]*443duty to act, there is no need for the court to exercise its equity powers to fashion a ‘better’ remedy than exists in the statutes.” 977 S.W.2d at 264; see also, e.g., Courtney, 302 S.W.3d at 141; Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d at 613, 517.
In this case, Melissa has an available statutory remedy under § 452.375.5(5) to assert her claims for child custody and visitation. Section 452.375.5(5) provides in relevant part that
Prior to awarding the appropriate custody arrangement in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider each of the following as follows:
⅜ ‡ ⅜ ⅜
(5) Third-party custody or visitation:
(a) When the court finds that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian, or the wélfare of the child requires, and it is in the best interests of the child, then custody, temporary custody or visitation may be awarded to any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide an adequate and stable environment for the child. Before the court awards custody, temporary custody or visitation to a third person under this subdivision, the court shall make that person a party to the action;
(b) Under the provisions of this subsection, any person may petition the court to intervene as a party in interest at any time as provided by supreme court rule.
“[A] significant bonding familial custody relationship with third parties can constitute a special or extraordinary reason or circumstance rendering it in a child’s best interest to award third-party custody” under § 452.375.5(5)(a)’s “welfare of the child” prong. Flathers v. Flathers, 948 S.W.2d 463, 470 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).
White rejected the appellant’s claim that she could obtain a determination of child custody and visitation under § 452.375.5(5). After citing the statute, White stated emphatically that “[njeither our statutes nor our case law remotely suggest that any third party that comes along has standing to bring an action seeking custody of children.” 293 S.W.3d at 18. White concluded that
a third party’s foundational standing to litigate custody or visitation is dependent upon the third party being a named party in an action brought by someone else (parent, Juvenile Officer) or being permitted to intervene in a pending action (dissolution) or in cases where the third party already has something other than de facto custody (decretal custody).
293 S.W.3d at 21.
Subsequent to White, however, the Missouri Supreme Court decided In re T.Q.L., 386 S.W.3d 135 (Mo. banc 2012). In T.Q.L., a male petitioner, believing he was a child’s natural father, filed a petition for declaration of paternity, custody, and visitation. Id. at 137. A paternity test determined, however, that the petitioner was not the biological father, and the circuit court dismissed his petition for failure to state a claim. Id. at 137-38. The petitioner appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the petitioner was entitled to file an amended petition asserting a right to custody under equitable estoppel and equitable parentage theories. T.Q.L. ex rel. M.M.A. v. L.L., 291 S.W.3d 258, 268 (Mo.App.S.D.2009).
On remand, the T.Q.L. petitioner filed an amended petition. T.Q.L., 386 S.W.3d at 138. The child’s mother filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended petition “failed to state a claim under the Uniform Parentage Act and that Missouri law did not support claims of equitable parentage.” Id. at 138. The circuit court [444]*444granted the motion to dismiss, and petitioner again appealed.
The Supreme Court did not address the petitioner’s argument that he could assert a claim for equitable parentage, even though he was not biologically related to the child. 386 S.W.3d at 140 n. 3. Instead, the Court held that dismissal was inappropriate because the petitioner had adequately stated a claim for relief under § 452.375.5(6):
Petitioner’s third amended petition was sufficient to meet the requirements of section 452.375.5(5)(a) because it alleged the unfitness of Child’s biological parents and that awarding Petitioner custody of Child would be in Child’s best interest. In addition to Petitioner’s sufficient allegations of Mother’s and the unknown father’s unfitness, his petition to transfer custody survives a motion to dismiss because he alleges facts that the “welfare of the child requires” that custody be vested in a third party pursuant to section 452.372.5(5)(a). This Court does not weigh the credibility and persuasiveness of the facts Petitioner alleged in his petition but acknowledges that those facts meet the elements of section 452.375.5(5)(a), and for that reason, the petition will be reinstated.
386 S.W.3d at 140.8
Notably, the T.Q.L. petitioner’s § 452.375.5(5) claim did not meet any of the scenarios identified in White in which a third party could assert custody or visitation rights: the petitioner in T.Q.L. was not “a named party in an action brought by someone else,” nor was he “permitted to intervene in a pending action,” nor was it a case in which the petitioner already had “something other than de facto custody.” White, 293 S.W.3d at 21. Because it held that the petitioner could assert a § 452.375.5(5) claim in circumstances beyond those contemplated by White, T.Q.L. necessarily overruled White’s construction of § 452.375.5(5).
This Court has recognized that under T.Q.L., § 452.375.5(5) provides a basis for a nonbiological parent to commence an action seeking child custody and visitation. In D.S.K. ex rel. J.J.K v. D.L.T., 428 S.W.3d 655 (Mo.App.W.D.2013), a husband sought to intervene in a paternity action filed by his wife. The wife’s paternity action prayed for a declaration that her deceased paramour was the father of three children born during her marriage to husband. Id. at 656. Although husband was excluded by paternity testing as the children’s biological father, he moved to intervene in the paternity action to assert claims for third-party custody and visitation. Id. at 657.
D.S.K. rejected husband’s contention that he was entitled to intervene in the paternity action, based on our conclusion that child custody and visitation were not at issue in the paternity case. Id. at 658-59. Based on T.Q.L., we also rejected husband’s argument that the paternity action was the only available forum in which he could raise his claims to third-party custody and visitation. We explained:
Husband argues ... that the paternity case is the only action in which he can assert his third-party custody claim, because he cannot assert it in the dissolution of marriage case. We agree with [445]*445Husband that the court does not have the authority in a dissolution proceeding to determine the custody of children not born of the marriage or adopted by the parties. Merely because Husband cannot assert his third-party custody claim in the dissolution proceeding does not foreclose him from raising it in a separate action. In In re T.Q.L., 386 S.W.3d 135 (Mo. banc 2012), the Missouri Supreme Court found that the appellant’s petition, in which he asserted a claim for third-party custody, sufficiently stated such a cause of action under Section 452.375.5(5)(a).
Thus, although Husband failed to establish that he had an interest in the paternity case entitling him to intervene as a matter of right, nothing prevents him from asserting his third-party custody claim as an independent cause of action.
Id. at 659-60 (other citations and footnotes omitted); see also id. at 660 n. 7 (“Pursuant to T.Q.L., an independent action for third-party custody is permissible.”).
We recognize that in In re Adoption of C.T.P., 452 S.W.3d 705 (Mo.App.W.D. 2014), this Court expressed “reservation[s]” concerning a reading of T.Q.L. that authorized a third party to file an independent action to assert a claim for child custody or visitation under § 452.375.5(5). Id. at 720-21. In a footnote, this court noted that
T.Q.L. made no reference to the decision in White. T.Q.L. did not mention any of the earlier appellate and Supreme Court decisions discussed in White addressing the narrow circumstances wherein a trial court is authorized to determine third-party child custody and visitation rights. Nor did T.Q.L. engage in customary statutory construction analysis to assess whether the legislature intended section 452.375.5(5) to authorize original proceedings to determine third-party child custody and visitation rights.
C.T.P., 452 S.W.3d at 721 n. 33.
While we acknowledge the concerns expressed by C.T.P., we are “constitutionally bound to follow the most recent controlling decision of the Missouri Supreme Court.” Christianson v. Goucher, 414 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Mo.App.W.D.2013), quoting Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of St. Louis, 311 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Mo.App.E.D.2010); see Mo. Const, art. V, § 2 (specifying that the Missouri Supreme Court’s “decisions shall be controlling in all other courts”). C.T.P. itself candidly “acknowledge^] ... that T.Q.L. does not offer a clear basis for constraint of its holding to the facts in that case.” 452 S.W.3d at 721 n. 33. Moreover, although both T.Q.L. and D.S.K. held that § 452.375.5(5) provided a third party with an independent right of action, C.T.P. did not decide the issue, but held only that “an interest in child custody or visitation is not sufficient to support intervention as a matter of right in an adoption proceeding where child custody determinations are not ‘in issue.’ ” Id. at 721. The dictum in C.T.P. cannot excuse us from recognizing and following the holding of T.Q.L., and of our own decision in D.S.K.9
[446]*446Recognizing that Melissa may pursue an independent action to assert custody and visitation rights over children to whom she is not biologically related does not run afoul of the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). The State of Washington statute at issue in Troxel permitted “ ‘[a]ny person’ to petition a superior court for visitation rights at ‘any time,’ and authorized] that court to grant such ‘visitation rights whenever visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’ ” Id. at 60, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Troxel held that this “breathtakingly broad” statute violated a biological mother’s substantive due process right to make child-rearing decisions without undue governmental interference. Id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054.10
Section 452.375(5), as interpreted by Missouri courts, is limited in important respects that were not present in Troxel. First, in contrast to the Washington statute at issue in Troxel, § 452.375.5(5) does not authorize third-party custody or visitation merely because a court determines that it would be in a child’s best interests. Instead, the court must first find that the child’s parents are “unfit, unsuitable, or unable to be a custodian,” or that “the welfare of the child” requires third-party custody or visitation. “Courts should not treat the term ‘welfare’ used in section 452.375.5(5)(a) as the equivalent of ‘best interests.’ Rather, the two are separate and distinct findings, and ‘welfare’ implicates pleading and proving special or extraordinary circumstances that make [447]*447third-party custody or visitation in the child’s best interest.” T.W. ex rel. R.W. v. T.H., 393 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo.App.E.D. 2013).
Further, Troxel held that the Washington statute “contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.” 530 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054. “[I]f a fit parent’s decision [to deny or limit visitation with third parties] becomes subject to judicial review, the ’ court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.” Id. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054.11 Unlike the statute in Troxel, -
[t]he Missouri statute carries a rebutta-ble presumption that custody should be with the parent. We presume parental custody is in a minor child’s best interests. To rebut this presumption, the third party seeking custody must carry the burden of showing either that each parent is unfit, unsuitable, or unable to have custody or that the welfare of the child requires third party custody.
Young v. Young, 59 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Mo. App.W.D.2001) (internal quotations omitted); see Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 545 (Mo. banc 2002) (distinguishing Troxel where Missouri’s grandparent visitation statute placed burden on petitioners to prove that parents’ denial of visitation was “unreasonable”).
Troxel also emphasized that the Washington courts had ordered grandparent visitation in that case, even though “there is no allegation that [the children’s mother] ever sought to cut off visitation entirely”; indeed, the evidence indicated that the mother was willing to allow the grandparents some — admittedly limited — visitation. 530 U.S. at 71, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Court found it significant that “many other States expressly provide by statute that courts may not award visitation unless a parent has denied ... -visitation to the concerned third party.” Id.; see also Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 544-45 (distinguishing Troxel where Missouri’s grandparent visitation statute only allowed grandparents to petition for visitation when they had been “unreasonably denied” visitation for a period exceeding 90 days). In this case, Angela has wholly denied Melissa any access to the children; indeed, in this case Angela went so far as to state in a text message that she would call the police if Melissa attempted to see them.
Finally, Melissa is not simply “any third party that . comes along.” White,. 293 S.W.3d at 18. In this case, as in T.Q.L. and D.S.K, a right of action under § 452.375.5(5) is-being asserted by an individual who was specifically invited by a biological parent to act as a parent of the children at issue, and in fact acted in that [448]*448capacity for an extended period of time. This is not a case where custody or visitation rights are being asserted by an extended-family member, a family friend, a paid caregiver, or some other third party who was never requested by the biological parents to function as a parent of the children. Troxel held that “the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied.” 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054; see Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 543. The fact that the party seeking custody or visitation in this case previously acted as a parent to the children, at the biological parent’s request, further distinguishes this case from Trox-el. See Bethany v. Jones, 2011 Ark. 67, 378 S.W.3d 731, 736 (2011) (distinguishing Troxel because in case before it, the party seeking visitation “in all practical respects, was a parent,” with the biological parent’s encouragement); Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C.App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58, 66-69 (2008) (similar); In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679, 712, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (in distinguishing Troxel, emphasizing that “a threshold requirement for the status of the de facto parent is a showing that the legal parent ‘consented to and fostered’ the parent-child relationship”); see also Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 544 (noting that Missouri’s grandparent visitation statute “avoids the sweeping breadth of the Washington statute” at issue in Troxel by limiting the right to seek court-ordered visitation to a child’s grandparents); In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 364 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000) (distinguishing Troxel where Missouri’s grandparent visitation statute “does not create the potential of subjecting parents’ every decision to review at the behest of endless third parties”).12
Under T.Q.L., Melissa has the right to assert her claims for child custody and visitation in an independent proceeding under § 452.375.5(5); indeed, in her briefing Melissa states that she has filed a separate petition for third-party custody under the statute concurrently with this appeal.13 The availability of a cause of action under § 452.375.5(5) further diminishes the need to adopt the non-statutory equitable parentage doctrine in this case.
Point II is denied.
III.
In her third Point, Melissa claims that Angela is equitably estopped from denying the parent and child relationship between Melissa and the children. In support, [449]*449Melissa cites several cases discussing equitable estoppel in the family law context. Melissa acknowledges in her brief that the White decision determined that equitable estoppel would not provide the standing needed to seek a declaration of maternity, custody, or support. 293 S.W.3d at 16-17. Melissa attempts to draw a distinction between her case and White by stating that she “has standing to bring a breach of contract action to enforce the custody agreement and, independently, she has standing to bring an action as an equitable parent or person in loco parentis.” We have rejected, however, Melissa’s equitable parentage and in loco parentis arguments, and have concluded that she failed to adequately plead a claim to enforce any custody agreement. The grounds on which Melissa seeks to distinguish White are unpersuasive. Point III is denied.14
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which dismissed without prejudice appellant Melissa McGaw’s Motion to Determine Parent-Child Relationship.
Judge Hardwick concurs.
Judge Clayton concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion.